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How do social networks shape the development and trajectory of militant organizations 
and revolutionary parties engaged in the process of establishing political order through violence? 
I argue that the topology of social networks becomes key to understanding how the complex web 
of interpersonal relationships shapes identities, interests, and collective action in the context of 
conflict, revolution, and state formation. Using a dataset of Khmer Rouge personnel from 
Democratic Kampuchea’s Southwest Zone, I examine mechanisms of network formation and 
contagion, maintaining that network structure matters a great deal to the success or failure of 
militant organizations as they transition into governing roles. I contend that networks are the 
result of mechanisms of attraction based on shared attributes, also referred to as homophily, and 
self-organization that relate to network topology itself. As a consequence, these mechanisms 
influence the formation of networks on which informal institutions are built, violence spreads, 
and organizational resilience emerges. Thus, the articles presented in this dissertation are guided 
by three respective questions that relate back to this broader puzzle. First, what leads to the 
emergence of informal institutions? Second, why are some individuals purged while others 
survive during times of revolution? Third, why are some organizations resilient while others are 
not?  
The first article provides a detailed description of the social networks present in the 
Southwest Zone. In this chapter, I present a map of the topological features of the network to 
analyze the social structures that existed beneath the formal institutional structures of the Khmer 
Rouge. The second article turns to the emergence of informal institutions, such as patron-client 
relations, using a relational approach that relies on social network analysis to explain how 
endogenous dependencies influence the formation of networks within revolutionary 
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organizations. Using an exponential random graph model, I examine the entangled nature of 
homophily and different self-organizing processes driven by network topology to better 
understand the complex nature of network formation that lies beneath informal institutions.  
The third article focuses on the consequences of individual network position during 
violent political purges, such as those that tore through the ranks of the Khmer Rouge, resulting 
in the arrest and execution of nearly 63% of the personnel in the Southwest Zone. With the help 
of a network autocorrelation model, I examine the influence of network position and exposure to 
violence on an individual’s likelihood of becoming a victim of a purge. Finally, in the fourth 
article, I investigate the sources of organizational resilience in the Khmer Rouge with a 
longitudinal network that the stability of relations in the Southwest Zone during forty-eight 
months of communist rule. After conducting a series of checks to confirm that the network is 
indeed robust across time, I then use a temporal exponential random graph model to examine 
how the mechanisms of embeddedness and cohesion each contribute to the development of 
resilient networks within the organization, demonstrating the stability of ties over time.   
Together, the articles presented in this dissertation represent a significant advance in our 
understanding of the internal dynamics of militant organizations and revolutionary parties and 
how social structure influences their ability to successfully build states.  In providing a rare look 
inside the Khmer Rouge, these articles examine the social networks within a militant 
organization in detail. Moving beyond a longstanding recognition that networks play an 
important function for organizations engaged in insurgency, terrorism, crime, and state building, 
this study offers the first known mapping of interpersonal relationships among personnel inside a 
militant organization turned revolutionary party. Going even further, the articles in this 
dissertation also extend the analysis of social networks to include tests of hypothesis related to 
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network formation and contagion in order to draw causal inferences related to organizational 
fragility and resilience. The resulting picture reveals that would-be state builders often face 
numerous paradoxes that emerge out of the contradiction found between social structure and 
formal institutional goals, which, in turn, influence organizational performance.  
 
 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Ban would not have been considered a monster. Neither would most of the men and 
women who joined the Khmer Rouge. They were ordinary people whose lives could be 
described as time spent with family, hard work, and hope that someday they might end up better 
off than where they started. Ban was born in Takeo province in Cambodia’s southwest region to 
a family of farmers as the second oldest of ten siblings. He grew up to earn a primary education 
and became a teacher at a secondary school. In July 1970, seeking comradery and a better 
country, Ban joined a clandestine organization that promised to bring dramatic change to 
Cambodia through a communist revolution. A year later he became an official member of the 
youth league, having been introduced by his friends. Shortly thereafter, Ban became a full-rights 
member of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, also known as the Khmer Rouge, something he 
claimed pride in achieving. Ban soon found himself working at Office S-71, which provided 
logistical support to the top-level Party offices, including those of the powerful Standing 
Committee of the Central Committee led by Pol Pot. It was while working there that Ban met his 
wife, Yort, who had also joined the revolution. Ban’s siblings soon followed their older brother 
into the Khmer Rouge (Biographic Database 2019).  
Ban’s experience as a member of the Khmer Rouge was far from atypical. Throughout 
Cambodia in the years leading up to the communist takeover in April 1975, thousands of men 
and women joined the Khmer Rouge. Like Ban, their journeys reflect a simple truth about 
conflict and revolution, namely that no one participates alone. Rather, the stories of individuals 
from hundreds of villages all point to the enduring interconnected nature of politics. The 
frequency with which members of the Khmer Rouge referred to relationships as the defining 
feature of the organization suggest that networks played a prominent role in its ability to govern. 
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This raises an important question. Given the relational nature of the revolutionary experience, 
how do social networks shape the development and trajectory of militant organizations and 
revolutionary parties engaged in the process of establishing political order through violence? In 
particular, the articles presented in this dissertation are guided by three respective questions that 
relate back to this broader question. First, what leads to the emergence of informal institutions? 
Second, why are some individuals purged while others survive during times of revolution? Third, 
why are some organizations resilient while others are not? In short, I contend that the answer to 
each of these questions lies in the networks that form the invisible backbone of militant 
organizations and revolutionary parties.    
1.1. Existing Research 
Previous approaches to the study of civil war, revolution, political violence, and state 
formation have each highlighted the importance of interpersonal networks as key factors related 
to success or failure in the effort to establish political order. For example, existing theories of 
political violence have pointed to the role of prewar social relations in facilitating mobilization 
and the spread of violence, emphasizing the instrumental nature of killing (Hinton 2005; Fujii 
2009; Kopstein and Wittenberg 2011; Su 2011; Braun 2016; Finkel 2017). Similarly, research on 
militant organizations has noted the importance of interpersonal networks as a significant factor 
in the creation of group longevity and survival (Wickham-Crowley 1992; Petersen 2001; Wood 
2003; Sinno 2008; Mampilly 2011; Christia 2012; Parkinson 2013; Staniland 2014; Parkinson 
and Zaks 2018). The literature on state formation has shown that attempts to establish political 
order frequently lead to gaps in formal institutional structures that are filled via informal means 
(Tsai 2006; Helmke and Levitsky 2006; Tsai 2007). As a consequence of notable shortcomings 
in institutional capacity, militant organizations and revolutionary parties rely on social networks 
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to compliment or substitute for formal structures (Urban 1989; Willerton 1992; Easter 2000; 
Hillman 2014).  
Although much of the existing literature points to the importance of networks to the 
process of fighting, survival, victory, and establishing order, there have been few attempts to take 
up the challenge of examining the underlying networks within militant organizations or 
revolutionary parties in detail.  Moreover, the current frontier of research on militant 
organizations and revolutionary parties has benefited from both a micro-level turn in studying 
conflict and an organizational turn in examining the groups themselves (Kalyvas 2006; 
Parkinson and Zaks 2018). Beginning with the groundbreaking work of Kalyvas (2006), the 
study of conflict has benefited from a micro-level turn that focuses on individuals. This 
ambitious research agenda has resulted in a number of important advancements in our 
knowledge of mobilization for collective action (Lichbach 1994; Goodwin 2001; Petersen 2001; 
Wood 2003; Balcells 2017), the formation of groups (Grossman 1991; Staniland 2014), the 
instrumental use of violence (Kalyvas 2006; Fujii 2009), inter and intra-group competition 
(Fjelde and Nilsson 2012; Staniland 2012), and internal dynamics of militant organizations and 
revolutionary parties (Wickham-Crowley 1992; Petersen 2001; Wood 2003; Weinstein 2007; 
Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Sinno 2008; Mampilly 2011; Christia 2012; Parkinson 2013; 
Staniland 2014; Parkinson and Zaks 2018). 
Secondly, the study of militant organizations and revolutionary parties has been enriched 
by an organizational turn that focuses on the organizations themselves as important units of 
analysis (Wood 2003; Sinno 2008; Mampilly 2011; Christia 2012; Parkinson 2013; Staniland 
2014; Parkinson and Zaks 2018). This literature has approached the investigation of militant 
organizations and revolutionary parties through an organizational sociological framework that 
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defines organizations as a system of roles and relations (Parkinson and Zaks 2018). In response 
to these trends, this dissertation represents an opportunity to further expand this research 
boundary to include an examination of the social networks that exist within militant 
organizations and revolutionary parties using empirical examples.  
1.2. A Network Approach to Understanding Revolutionary Organizations 
In order to extend the analysis beyond existing explanations of the micro-politics of 
militant organizations in post-conflict and revolutionary settings, I turn to a different perspective 
that is rooted in the interdisciplinary study of social networks. A network can be defined as a 
collection of relationships, identified using graph theory and data visualization to draw the nodes 
and edges with individuals representing each node and the edges the connections between them 
(Kadushin 2012). A network approach is based on the fundamental assumption that relationships 
matter. As a phenomenon of interest to social scientists, politics is particularly well suited for 
study from a network perspective given its inherently relational nature. Political actors and 
actions cannot be properly considered in isolation apart from the social context defined by 
relationships in which they exist (Emirbayer 1997).  
Four additional assumptions follow the conclusion that relationships are key to 
understanding revolutionary organizations from a network perspective. First, while traditional 
approaches assume the independence of observations, a network perspective assumes the 
opposite. Actors and actions are considered in terms of their interaction with one another in the 
context of interdependent networks (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Second, relationships, or ties, 
between actors function as conduits through which various phenomena move across a network 
(Wasserman and Faust 1994). Interpersonal relationships create natural pathways for 
information, resources, and other phenomena, such as violence, to move through a network. A 
 
 5 
third and closely related assumption holds that networks have both a constraining and enabling 
effect on actors (Wellman 1988). Relationships present opportunities and obstacles for actors. In 
the context of networks, individual positions are not equally advantaged in access to information 
and resources with some actors enjoying immense privilege and others suffering from poverty. 
Fourth, patterns of relationships among actors represent social networks (Wasserman and Faust 
1994). Knoke (1990) observes that the study of politics is essentially the study of roles occupied 
by actors and the ties between them.  
1.3. The Central Argument 
In this dissertation, I critically examine mechanisms of network formation and spreading, 
arguing that network structure matters a great deal to the development and trajectory of militant 
organizations as they transition into governing roles. Specifically, organizations face the 
challenge of balancing security and efficiency, and how they solve this dilemma is reflected in 
their underlying social networks. Individual attributes such as gender, ethnicity, occupational 
background, official positions, or length of time in an organization offer a partial explanation for 
the behavior and performance of militant organizations and revolutionary parties. Given the fact 
that individuals do not exist in isolation but are embedded in a broader social context, the 
topology of these networks becomes key to understanding how the complex web of interpersonal 
relationships shapes identities, interests, and collective action. In response, I contend that 
networks are the result of mechanisms of attraction based on shared attributes, also referred to as 
homophily, and self-organization that relate to the network topology itself. As a consequence, 
these mechanisms influence the formation of networks on which informal institutions are built, 
violence spreads, and organizational resilience emerges. 
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Moreover, this dissertation offers several contributions to comparative politics and 
international relations through the adoption of a relational perspective informed by network 
analysis. First, the articles presented in this dissertation provide new insight into the development 
of informal institutions that play a critical role in regime consolidation. This study attempts to 
enrich the existing literature by examining an empirical network to provide a formal test for a 
relational explanation of the emergence of these unofficial and sometimes invisible ways of 
accomplishing objectives that often exert significant influence on the development and trajectory 
of militant organizations and revolutionary parties. Second, this dissertation adds to our 
understanding of the micro-level processes that affect the spread of political violence. By 
examining political violence as a relational phenomenon, I highlight the way interpersonal 
relationships offer both costs and benefits during times of high-risk activity. Rather than focusing 
on individual motivation, a network approach casts political violence in a relational light to 
reveal the interdependent nature of violent acts. Third, the articles also offer a new approach to 
consider the long-recognized importance of interpersonal networks to the performance of 
militant organizations and revolutionary parties, particularly in the context of state formation. 
Using detailed archival data, I am able to map out the social networks, presenting a never-before-
seen look at the social structure behind one of history’s most notorious organizations, the Khmer 
Rouge. Together, these insights add to our knowledge of the internal dynamics of militant 
organizations and revolutionary parties with a new level of detail that promises to better our 
understanding of the processes of conflict, civil war, and revolution. 
1.4. Case selection  
 The articles submitted in the chapters that follow focus on Cambodia’s Southwest Zone, 
which was one of six major administrative zones created by the Khmer Rouge. The choice to 
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focus on the Southwest Zone as an ideal case is, in part, motivated by the central role that the 
zone’s personnel played in the Khmer Rouge regime as well as the zone’s prominent reliance on 
patron-client networks (Hinton 2005; Mertha 2014). Following the fall of Phnom Penh in April 
1975, the Khmer Rouge divided the country into six administrative units each headed by a 
powerful zone secretary who was responsible for day-to-day operations. The Southwest Zone 
consisted of regions 13, 33, 35, and 25, and was home to the 703rd Division of the military 
(Nhean 2010). The Southwest Zone also benefited from access to the coast, fertile soil, and 
plenty of water, making it an ideal location for rice production and a stronghold of Khmer Rouge 
activity early in the struggle against the government and throughout the Democratic Kampuchea 
era (Kiernan 2002; Ea 2004; Hinton 2005).  
The Southwest Zone was led by Zone Secretary Mok, sometimes referred to as Chhit 
Chhoeun or Grandfather Mok. Also known as Brother No. 5 and “the Butcher,” Mok was one of 
the top military commanders in the Khmer Rouge and a ruthless zone secretary who is 
remembered for successfully installing his relatives and friends in an extensive patron-client 
network throughout the zone (Hinton 2005; Mertha 2014). Mok, however, was not alone in 
seeking to build patron-client networks within the Southwest Zone. Historically, patron-client 
networks represented an organizing feature of political life in Cambodia, creating an informal 
system that reinforced authority and helped maintain an effective command structure by 
demanding loyalty in exchange for protection (Hinton 2005). Patron-client networks provided 
clients with security and access to resources while patrons received loyalty and support from 
their base (Hinton 2005; Nhean 2010). The power dynamics, however, were far from equal. 
Patrons often enjoyed positions of power that made clients dependent on them for security and 
resources and imposed heavy costs on individuals who attempted to switch patrons (Hinton 
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2005; Hicken 2011). Under this system, patron-client networks resembled “lines” or “strings” 
that joined individuals together in a complex web of relationships inside the regime (Chandler 
1999; Hinton 2005). 
Under Mok’s leadership, the Southwest Zone also became well-known for its harsh but 
effective administration, earning recognition from the Party Center as an exemplary role model 
for other zones to follow (Kiernan 2002; Ea 2004; Nhean 2010). Given its favor with the Party 
Center, the Southwest Zone provided an important source of military manpower in the effort to 
consolidate power. Cadres under Mok’s leadership were used repeatedly to forcefully remove 
and replace personnel in other zones as the Central Committee moved to eliminate potential 
rivals and build alternative patron-client networks within the party (Kiernan 2002; Ea 2004; 
Hinton 2005; Mertha 2014).  For these reasons, the Southwest Zone under the Khmer Rouge 
represents an ideal case with which to study the social networks within an armed revolutionary 
organization in an effort to better understand how interpersonal relationships influence the 
development and trajectory of organizations engaged in state building. 
1.5. Methods  
The analysis presented in the empirical chapters relies on the use of social network 
analysis. Network analysis offers a solution to the problem of interdependence of observations 
found in relational data. Standard statistical models operate on the assumption of independent 
and identically distributed (i.i.d) random variables. This i.i.d. assumption, however, implies that 
observations can be equally replaced with any randomly selected sample and that such an 
exchange would not impact the inferences drawn from the data. Stated differently, traditional 
statistical models often operate under the assumption that observations have no influence on each 
other (Cranmer, Desmarais, and Menninga 2012). The inherently relational nature of social 
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network data, however, explicitly violate this assumption due to the recognized interdependence 
of observations and autocorrelation of error terms (Cranmer, Heinrich, and Desmarais 2014).  
Social network analysis provides a systematic approach to the study of relationships 
between actors. This requires first mapping out the social networks that exist within the 
Southwest Zone of the Khmer Rouge in order to provide a clear picture of the underlying social 
structure on which the organization operated. In order to make inferences about causal 
mechanisms, however, a network map must be supported by the statistical analysis of social 
networks using models specifically designed to properly handle the interdependence of 
observations. 
In the articles below, I adopt two classes of models for this task, namely exponential 
random graph models and network autocorrelation models. Exponential random graph models 
treat the network itself as the dependent variable to explain the formation of an observed 
network. This class of models can be used to predict the likelihood of tie formation, enabling the 
modeling of network topology as the product of endogenous mechanisms of self-organizations 
and exogenous node attributes (Lusher, Koskinen, and Robins 2013). In an extension of the 
standard exponential random graph model, I also use a temporal exponential random graph 
model to examine the stability of the network across time. The temporal exponential random 
graph model adds inter-temporal dependencies to longitudinal models that allow for the 
estimation of the effect of previous ties on subsequent realizations of the network (Leifeld, 
Cranmer, and Desmarais 2018). This, in turn, opens the door to understanding network dynamics 
across time.  
Second, I use network autocorrelation models to understand the effect that individual 
network position and exposure might have on the likelihood of becoming a purge victim. 
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Network autocorrelation models represent a class of models that account for the 
interdependencies among actors and are specifically designed to deal with the issue of network 
autocorrelation in regression analysis (Ord 1975; Doreian 1980; Doreian et al. 1984; Ibarra and 
Andrews 1993; Franzese and Hays 2007; Franzese, et al. 2012; Hadden and Jasny 2017). I use 
this class of models to consider how violence spreads similar to a contagion across a network. 
The methodological approach taken in this dissertation is designed to facilitate inferential 
analysis of social network data. Importantly, the models used in each of the chapters gives proper 
consideration to the interdependent nature of relation data so often discussed in conceptual terms 
in political science but rarely tested. Through the use of exponential random graph modeling and 
network autocorrelation models, I test several hypotheses related to network formation and 
contagion across networks in order to gain additional insight into the internal dynamics of 
militant organizations and revolutionary parties.  
1.6. Data  
This dissertation relies data gathered from the digital archives of the Documentation 
Center of Cambodia, which hold the biographical records of more than 30,000 Khmer Rouge 
officials down to the district level. Founded in 1995 as a non-profit organization dedicated to 
preserving the historical legacy of the Khmer Rouge period, the Documentation Center of 
Cambodia is supported by the Royal Government of Cambodia and the United States of America 
with a mission of educating the public, memorializing victims, and working to preventing 
genocide with lessons learned from the Cambodian context (Documentation Center of Cambodia 
2019). The Biographic Database provides an online digital archive of Khmer Rouge personnel 
with information about each individual’s name, alias, sex, age, place of birth, place of death, 
education, job before 1975, party membership, geographic area during the Democratic 
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Kampuchea era, agency or employer 1975-1979, office or subdivision 1975-1979, arrest record, 
execution record, and date of execution. Individuals fall into four broad categories in the Khmer 
Rouge, including military, administrative, labor, and political roles.  
In addition to specific details about individual members of the regime, the Biographical 
Database contains information about personal relationships that existed among Khmer Rouge 
personnel, including parents, siblings, extended family, friends, superiors, subordinates, and 
other affiliations. These ties represent regular face-to-face contacts that occurred between 
officials and their immediate associates. The resulting data are organized into three datasets, a 
cross-sectional network of all individuals associated with members of the Southwest Zone, a 
cross-sectional network of Southwest Zone personnel, and a longitudinal network of Southwest 
Zone personnel that tracks the evolution of the network across the forty-eight months in which 
the Khmer Rouge ruled Cambodia. Using this data, I then reconstruct the social networks of 
Khmer Rouge personnel in the Southwest Zone for further analysis. 
1.7. Organization and Scope 
To present the findings and analysis, I put forward a collection of four standalone articles 
connected by the theme of networks within revolutionary organizations. Beginning with an 
examination of the extended social networks in the Southwest Zone, I then shift the focus of the 
dissertation to intra-organizational networks in order to test a series of hypotheses related to 
network formation and the effect of network structure on internal regime dynamics. The chapters 
are organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a detailed description of the social networks present 
in the Southwest Zone. In this chapter, I present a map of the topological features of the network 
to analyze the social structures that existed beneath the formal institutional structures of the 
Khmer Rouge.  
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Chapter 3 turns to the emergence of informal institutions, such as patron-client relations, 
using a relational approach that relies on social network analysis to explain how endogenous 
dependencies influence the formation of networks within revolutionary organizations. Using an 
exponential random graph model, I examine the entangled nature of homophily and different 
self-organizing processes driven by network topology to better understand the complex nature of 
network formation that lies beneath informal institutions.  
In Chapter 4, I move to focus on the consequences of individual network position during 
violent political purges, such as those that tore through the ranks of the Khmer Rouge, resulting 
in the arrest and execution of nearly 63% of the personnel in the Southwest Zone. With the help 
of a network autocorrelation model, I examine the influence of network position and exposure to 
violence on an individual’s likelihood of becoming a victim of a purge.  
Chapter 5 investigates the sources of organizational resilience in the Khmer Rouge with a 
longitudinal network that records the evolution of relations in the Southwest Zone during the 
forty-eight months of communist rule. After conducting a series of checks to see if the network is 
indeed robust across time, I then use a temporal exponential random graph model to examine 
how the mechanisms of embeddedness and cohesion each contribute to the development of 
resilient networks within the organization, demonstrating the stability of ties over time.   
Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation with a brief review of the main findings and their 
implications for the study of organizations engaged in internal conflict and state formation. The 
results of the dissertation point toward the critical nature of social networks as the backbone of 
militant organizations and revolutionary parties. The chapter also includes a discussion of 
recommendations for future research.  
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Finally, this dissertation is limited in scope to the networks among personnel within the 
Khmer Rouge administration in Cambodia’s Southwest Zone between 1975-1979. The choice to 
focus on this narrow aspect of the broader social structure was driven, in part, by the need to 
define a clear network boundary to facilitate the analysis. A second factor in the choice to 
concentrate on intra-organizational networks was the availability of data preserved in the 
historical record. Complete information is available primarily for individuals who actually joined 
and served in the Khmer Rouge while additional details on their extended networks outside the 
organization are sparse at best and non-existent at worse. In the chapters that follow, I provide a 
detailed examination of the social networks inside the Khmer Rouge in order to generate new 











Militant organizations making the transition from clandestine insurgencies to rebel 
groups to full-fledged revolutionaries are situated in a broader social context that poses the 
challenge of how best to establish security and efficiency. This paper examines how individuals 
attempt to solve this dilemma by analyzing a large network including 4,701 Khmer Rouge 
officials and their immediate relations in more than 400 identifiable social groups who governed 
the Southwest Zone of Democratic Kampuchea between 1975-1979. Creating a unique map of 
the social networks of the Southwest Zone, the analysis reveals a social structure characterized 
by decentralized clusters joined through key brokerage roles that enable strong within-group ties 
while simultaneously increasing connectivity across a sparse network. These network structures 
highlight the tendency for militant organizations to lean heavily on internal social networks in 
which a relatively few number of brokers occupy positions of significant influence despite 





The transition from rebellion to governing regime involves organizational compromise. 
In particular, the problem of how organizations balance security and efficiency during a period 
of vulnerability represents a significant challenge for groups engaged in conflict and state 
building (Morselli, Giguère, and Petit 2007; DellaPosta 2016). For members of revolutionary 
organizations, security depends on strong within-group relationships that create trust through 
regular interactions with known actors (Granovetter 1985; Lichbach 1998). Within-group ties, 
however, come with a cost as closed relationships limit an organization’s ability to coordinate 
action, resources, and communications (Lindelauf, Borm, and Hamers 2011; DellaPosta 2016; 
Ouellet, Bouchard, and Charette 2018). At the same time, high levels of connectivity needed for 
efficiency pose the danger of damage spreading rapidly through the organization (Granovetter 
1985; Papachristos, Braga, and Hureau 2012).   
Although existing research has examined how organizations attempt to solve the 
challenge of balancing security and efficiency in the context of criminal conspiracies, clandestine 
organizations, and organized crime (Morselli et al. 2007; DellaPosta 2016; Ouellet et al. 2018), 
this approach can be extended to build a better understanding of the social structures on which 
revolutionary organizations are built. This paper provides new insight into the dilemma facing 
militant organizations engaged in the process of state formation, particularly how social 
networks reflect a compromise between security and efficiency. Using archival material made 
available through the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DCCAM), which contains detailed 
biographical data on more than 30,000 Khmer Rouge leaders down to the district level, I 
reconstruct the social networks of Khmer Rouge officials located in the Southwest Zone and 
present a never-before-seen map of the social structure that existed within the regime.  
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The resulting analysis reveals a social structure defined by network closure and brokerage 
positions that favor security while simultaneously enabling a level of efficiency across a sparse 
network. Using a community detection algorithm to calculate network modularity, I find a social 
structure beneath the Khmer Rouge defined by decentralized clusters joined together at critical 
points through brokerage roles that enabled strong within-group ties while simultaneously 
increasing connectivity across a sparse network. These features of network topology highlight 
the fact that militant organizations are built on social networks that connect individuals within 
the organization to a broader social context.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I present an outline 
of the theoretical framework used to explain how organizations balance the dilemma of security 
versus efficiency. The third section then briefly surveys the historical background and formal 
organizational structure of the Khmer Rouge. The fourth section turns to a description of the 
Southwest Zone followed by a discussion of the broader social context in Khmer Rouge era 
Cambodia, which was characterized by patron-client relations before, during, and after the period 
of communist rule. The sixth section introduces a dataset of biographical information used to 
reconstruct the social networks of Khmer Rouge personnel. In the seventh section, I map the 
social networks of the Khmer Rouge in the Southwest Zone and examine the social structures 
present that facilitate security and efficiency. A final section concludes with a summary of the 
main findings and implications for future research.  
2.2. Security and Efficiency in Revolutionary Organizations  
Parkinson and Zaks (2018) define organizations as “collections of roles, linked by 
relations, which produce behaviors, to work toward goals within a given context” (272). In the 
context of rebellion and revolution, this definition applies to armed groups attempting to 
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establish a new regime. Like other types of clandestine organizations, revolutionary 
organizations face the problem of how to maintain security against both internal and external 
threats (Crenshaw 1992; Lichbach 1998; Ouellet et al. 2018). As a result, members of these 
organizations often form cohesive sub-groups for protection against attacks, gain a sense of 
solidarity, and create insurance against defection (Lichbach 1998; Hafez 2003; Della Porta 2013; 
Ouellet et al. 2018). Such cohesion emerges from regular interactions along social networks that 
often lie beneath the surface of revolutionary organizations (Parkinson 2013; Staniland 2014). 
These networks provide informal pathways to accomplish objectives and give the organization a 
great deal of flexibility while also increasing security for members of the organization 
(Parkinson 2013).  
The advantages and disadvantages of strong within-group ties become clear when viewed 
in the context of conflict, rebellion, and revolution. Periods of high-risk activity often occur in 
poor information environments, which means that members of clandestine organizations will 
seek to find ways to improve their ability to predict the behavior of others. Within-group ties 
produce clear group boundaries, which leave individuals with fewer demands for loyalty and 
enable groups to persist over time (Ouellet et al. 2018). In contrast, cross-factional ties can leave 
individuals with multiple demands for allegiance from competing factions, creating uncertainty 
and intensifying the likelihood of conflict or fragmentation (Staniland 2014). While strong 
within-group ties offer several advantages, network closure comes at a cost for members of an 
organization. Closure limits the ability of members of an organization to expand their network to 
find partners they can trust. This is particularly important in the area of recruitment, because 
closure restricts the number of potential recruits available to an organization (Ouellet et al. 
2018). Ironically, even though closure might minimize external threats, it can increase the risk of 
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internal threats through dense connections in a small area of the network. In the end, security 
concerns often outweigh the drawbacks of cohesive within-group relationships in the interest of 
survival. 
Clandestine networks, however, cannot remain completely closed to the outside world. 
The simple fact that insurgents, rebels, and revolutionaries are embedded in a wider social 
context means that networks also need a certain amount of connectivity in order to operate 
efficiently (DellaPosta 2016; Ouellet et al. 2018). Coordination and communication rely on the 
ability to reach across the network (Burt 1992; Kadushin 2012). Recruitment of new members 
requires ties to local communities outside the organization (Ouellet et al. 2018). Revolutionary 
organizations can achieve this objective through the presence of brokerage roles in the network 
(Parkinson 2013). Members of the organization can remain dispersed across different hubs 
joined by brokerage positions that bridge different parts of the network, helping solve the 
problem of organizational efficiency while minimizing the risk of connectivity (Granovetter 
1973; Parkinson 2013).  
Accordingly, we can expect the social networks within revolutionary organizations to 
display a tendency toward closure in which within-group relations are privileged over between-
group ties. The resulting social structure should demonstrate a bias toward the formation of 
distinct but decentralized groups joined together through brokerage positions at key points. This 
social structure facilitates a balance between efficiency and security. The purpose of this paper is 
to describe and examine the social networks that exist within revolutionary organizations in an 





2.3. The Khmer Rouge and Democratic Kampuchea, 1975-1979  
After decades of armed conflict, the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), better 
known as the Khmer Rouge, seized control of Cambodia on April 17, 1975 with the fall of 
Phnom Penh to communist forces. As an organization, the CPK was officially structured 
hierarchically along the lines of a Leninist revolutionary party. Euphemistically, the formal 
institutional structure of the CPK was referred to as the Angkar, which means “the 
Organization.” Pol Pot and his closest associates led the Party Center, which was also known as 
the Angkar Loeu or “Upper Organization” (Chandler 1999). As in other communist systems, the 
Angkar was meant to be all encompassing of every level of society, politics, economics, and 
culture. A popular Khmer Rouge slogan said the “Angkar has [the many] eyes of the pineapple,” 
which illustrates the lengths to which the CPK leadership sought to give the party panopticon-
like status in the eyes of the people (Locard 2004, 112). The Party’s existence and legitimacy 
became synonymous with the state, meaning that any deviation from the party line would be 
treated as matter of life and death (Hinton 2005). 
The Angkar was directed from the top through the Central Committee of the CPK. 
According to surviving historical records, the Central Committee contained of as many as 175 
members in total. Commanded by Pol Pot, the Standing Committee wielded ultimate power 
within the Central Committee of the CPK. The Standing Committee consisted of a tight-knit 
group of associates who had forged close ties to Pol Pot, including Nuon Chea, Son Sen, Mok, 
Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, Ke Pauk, and Yun Yat. At different times, various zone secretaries 
also sat in on the Standing Committee as reserve or candidate members who were allowed to 
take part in meetings but lacked the decision-making authority of full rights members (Mertha 
2014). A second key part of the Party’s formal apparatus was the Youth League, or Yuvakak, 
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which was responsible for recruiting, indoctrinating, and training young people into the 
revolution. Recruits were vetted through a multi-step process that included questioning, 
indoctrination, observation, and training before being granted official membership. Like mafia or 
gang membership, joining the revolution meant individuals were members until death. 
Disobeying orders, refusing promotion, or resignation from one’s position were likely to end in 
arrest and execution (Nhean 2010). 
Faced with the task of now governing the entire country, the Khmer Rouge reorganized 
DK into six administrative zones, North, Northeast, Northwest, East, Southwest, and West, 
Additional administrative units included the Center and the Kratie, Siem-Riep/Uddor Meanchey, 
and the Preah Vihear autonomous sectors, which were created in 1977. Each zone was further 
divided into regions, districts, sub-districts, communes, and villages. Zones were designed to 
erase traditional geographic boundaries and given a unique identifying number. North Zone 
(303) was divided into regions 41, 42, and 43. Northeast Zone (108) encompassed regions 101, 
102, 104, 105, 107, and 505 (later turned into the Kratie autonomous sector). Northwest Zone 
(560) was given regions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. Eastern Zone (203) included regions 20, 21, 22, 
23, and 24 Southwest Zone (405) controlled regions 13, 33, 35, and 25. West Zone (401) was 
divided into regions, 31, 32, 37, 15, and 11 (Documentation Center of Cambodia 2007). A zone 
committee administered each zone together with zone based military units. Military divisions 
included Division 1 in the Northwest Zone, Divisions 2, 11, 12, and 117 in the North Zone, 
Divisions 3, 4, 5, and 170 in the East, Division 703 in the Southwest, and Division 174 in the 
Center Zone with additional divisions based in autonomous sectors under the supervision of the 









Zone secretaries maintained powerful positions within their respective geographic areas 
and were given positions on the Central Committee. With a degree of autonomy, zone secretaries 
were responsible for decision-making and issuing orders, which were then passed on to lower 
levels of administration for implementation. A three-person committee modeled on the upper 
party structure ran lower levels of administration, including the regional, district, and commune 
levels (Jackson 1989; Ea 2004; Mertha 2014).  
2.4. The Southwest Zone 
The Southwest Zone, which was controlled by Zone Secretary Mok, also known as Chhit 
Chhoeun. Mok, sometimes referred to as Ta Mok or Grandfather Mok, had earned the nickname 
“the Butcher” while serving as one of the top military commanders of the Khmer Rouge forces 
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and was a member of the powerful Standing Committee of the Central Committee (Kiernan 
2002; Ea 2004). Under his leadership, the Southwest Zone had become a major base of 
operations for Khmer Rouge activity. The Southwest Zone was situated in a geographically 
advantageous position with fertile soil, ample water, and access to the coast. Administratively, 
the Southwest Zone consisted of four regions, and of these divisions, Region 13 was considered 
the most important as the ancestral home of Mok and an example of the ideal communist 
administration (Kiernan 2002; Ea 2004; Nhean 2010). In fact, on June 30, 1977, the official 
magazine of the CPK, Revolutionary Flags, or Tung Padevat, announced Region 13 as one of 
three regions awarded an Honorary Red Flag for its “exemplary” service as a “role model” in the 
“defense, continuation, and construction of the socialist revolution” (Documentation Center of 
Cambodia). The Southwest Zone also represented an important source of manpower in the Party 
Center’s efforts to consolidate power over the country after April 1975 (Ea 2004). For instance, 
the Central Committee used Southwest Zone cadres as a primary tool for the removal and 
replacement of rival factions in other zones, including the North, Northwest, and Eastern Zones 
(Kiernan 2002; Ea 2004; Hinton 2005). 
2.5. Patron-client Relations Under the Khmer Rouge 
 In addition to the formal institutional structures of the Party, the CPK was also 
characterized by strong informal institutions in terms of patron-client networks that were 
prominently visible in the Southwest Zone. Within the Khmer Rouge regime, patron-client 
relations appear to have thrived alongside the formal, impersonal legal structures of the CPK. 
Nhean (2010) argues that nearly every cadre was part of a patron-client system that helped 
reinforce respect for authority and maintained an effective command structure. Even though 
massive social and administrative upheaval was taking place, patron-client ties influenced 
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behavior at every level. Individuals often approached their work in military, administrative, 
labor, and political roles as part of a patron-client network, which recast official governmental 
duties as “personalized patron-client exchanges rather than as a formal state system” (Nhean 
2010, 6). 
This was due, in part, to the fact that one of the most enduring features of Cambodian 
politics before, during, and after the DK era has been the existence of patron-client networks.  
During the DK era, many Cambodians sought out powerful patrons in order to gain protection 
and access to resources while clients gave their support and loyalty to patrons (Hinton 2005). 
Patron-client networks were often referred to as “lines” or “strings” (khsae) to describe the webs 
of relations that joined individuals in kinship and exchange networks. These “strings,” or 
networks, however, did not exist in isolation. They were connected to other “strings” of higher-
ranking officials in an increasing complex network of relationships (Chandler 1999, 89; Hinton 
2005, 109). 
Traditionally, this system of patron-client networks provided clients with protection as 
well as access to opportunities while patrons received support and loyalty from their base 
(Hinton 2005; Nhean 2010). Patron-client relations, however, were unequal, personal, and 
dynamic (Scott 1972; Hicken 2011). Patrons occupied a position of power and access to 
resources that could not be matched by their clients, making the clients somewhat dependent on 
the patron. Patrons also knew that clients could choose to switch their loyalty to a different 
patron even if such a move proved costly (Hinton 2005; Hicken 2011).  
Throughout Cambodian history and especially during the DK era, patron-client relations 
were marked by “suspicion and distrust” (Hinton 2005, 124). Clients who began to be seen as a 
patron in their own right, gaining his or her own clients, were viewed as a potential rival or even 
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a traitor in the eyes of their former patron. At the same time, much of the maintenance of patron-
client relations fell to patrons who often attempted to prevent defection and disloyalty through 
incentives and coercion. The instability inherent in such a system led to the absence of lasting 
institutions outside of kinship and an environment of paranoia and suspicion (Hinton 2005).  
Zone secretaries also functioned as the head patron of their zone. Subordinates were 
hand-picked by zone secretary and being in the patron’s circle offered protection as a client. 
Cliques were common and often placed priority on kinship relations in order to deal with people 
who could be trusted. A hardened veteran of the struggle against French colonialism and the 
republic, Mok was also well known for building patronage networks within the institutional 
apparatus of the CPK. As Southwest Zone Secretary, he installed family members, including 
children, siblings, and in-laws, in key positions within the military, administrative, and political 
structures of the CPK (Kiernan 2002; Hinton 2005; Mertha 2014).   
Furthermore, the decentralized nature of its campaign to seize control of the government 
meant that the CPK faced the complicated task of consolidating power and governing a war-torn 
country while simultaneously dealing with multiple factions within its ranks. During the effort to 
secure a communist victory, zone secretaries had developed their own extensive patronage 
networks, which were seen as potential rivals with the Party Center (Hinton 2005). In the 
Southwest Zone, Mok took advantage of his growing power within the Pol Pot faction to give his 
relatives key positions in the military, administrative, and political structures of the zone (Hinton 
2005). Under Mok’s orders, purges were carried out to eliminate rival patronage networks 
among cadres in SW zone. Individuals connected to former peers and subordinates, including 
Chou Chet, Sok Thuok, Non Suon, and Vorn Vet, were viewed as potential enemies by Mok 
because they belonged to the networks of his rivals within the Southwest Zone (Nhean 2010).  
 
 25 
Moreover, the upper leadership of the party also contained divisions between a Pol Pot-
led faction and a moderate faction of intellectuals. During the DK period, the Pol Pot-led faction 
retained a tight grip on power at the top and moved systematically to eliminate or coopt rivals 
while building its own network of patron-client ties. The Party Center, led by Pol Pot, viewed 
rival political networks as an existential threat to the Khmer Rouge regime and sought to destroy 
them in a series of violent purges. CPK internal security forces, known as the Santebal, operated 
under the assumption that suspects were part of larger networks, or “strings of traitors,” actively 
seeking to undermine the Party (Hinton 2005). The Party Center demanded that the Santebal 
identify all members of a suspect’s “string” and eliminate them as well. The personal relations of 
a suspect immediately came under suspicion and were also targeted for arrest and execution. 
This included spouses, children, extended family, friends, coworkers, and other associates. This 
volatile mix of patron-client networks beset by suspicion and the existence of rival factions 
seeking to eliminate one another produced favorable conditions for a series of large-scale purges 
within the ranks of the CPK cadres at every level. Efforts to root out “strings of traitors” became 
the driving force behind the widespread purges that tore through the CPK cadres, unleashing a 
wave of violence within the ranks of the party (Hinton 2005). 
2.6. Social Networks of the Khmer Rouge in the Southwest Zone 
The digital archives of the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DCCAM) contain the 
detailed biographical data on Khmer Rouge officials to reconstruct the social networks of zone 
administration officials. Data were collected from the DCCAM Biographical Database, which 
contains the digitized and translated biographical records of more than 30,000 Khmer Rouge 
leaders down to the district level. The archives record a variety of ties, including kinship, 
recruitment, work, and general associations for each individual, which are suitable for 
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reconstructing the social networks within the regime. An initial search located individuals 
associated with the Southwest Zone, using the category “DK Geographical Area 75-79” and 
search terms “Southwest” and “SW.” The search results were used to collect information only on 
individuals who held an official position in the Khmer Rouge, which fell into four broad 
categories: military, administrative, labor, or political personnel. For each individual, a selection 
of attributes and relationships were collected, including name, aliases, gender, date of birth, 
birthplace, ethnicity, previous occupation, date of joining the revolution, number of years in the 
organization, pre-Democratic Kampuchea role, role during the Democratic Kampuchea era, 
geographic zone, region, district, village, kinship relationships, recruitment relationships, 
superiors, subordinates, and other known associates. Lastly, arrest, arrest dates, execution, and 
execution dates were also noted.   
Using biographical data collected from the DCCAM database, this paper reconstructs the 
social networks of members of the Khmer Rouge in the Southwest Zone as a static, cross-
sectional snapshot of the direct ties that existed between personnel during the period between 
1975 and 1979. This was accomplished through a two-stage procedure, starting with the 1188 
individuals identified in the search described above. Based on this initial group of individuals, I 
built a “two-degree” network using a snowball method. The “first degree” identified known 
associates listed in the records pertaining to each individual. These relationships included 
kinship, recruitment, and other known associates. The “two-degree” network was then completed 
by repeating the process for all of the associates identified in the first-degree networks 
(Papachristos 2011). This procedure resulted in the network seen in Figure 2.2, which began with 





Figure 2.2. Social Network of Democratic Kampuchea’s Southwest Zone 
 
Note: Colors indicate community membership and nodes are sized according to betweenness. 
 
The full network provides an overall picture of the wider social structure of Southwest 
Zone officials and their connections both within and outside the Khmer Rouge. The network is 
comprised of 4,701 nodes and a total of 6,368 ties. A quick glance at the network graph in Figure 
2.2 reveals that there are no individuals who are truly isolated socially. Each individual has an 
average degree of 2.86 ties, meaning that every individual has approximately 3 relationships with 
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others. The degree distribution, however, is skewed in favor a few individuals who possess more 
connections than most of the network. Given the average degree, the most common network 
structure is a triad (185) followed by simple dyads (119). The degree assortativity of the 
extended network is 0.0429, which suggests that nodes with similar degree tend to form 
connections with each other. Hubs are connected to other hubs, and individuals with low degree 
tend to connect with other individuals of low degree. The joining together of hubs makes the 
emergence of a giant component possible. Indeed, in the extended network seen in Figure 2.2, 
3,202 (68%) of the nodes are connected in a single component of the network that consists of 
hubs connected to even more hubs, forming a definable core and periphery. Despite the number 
of ties, the extended network of Southwest Zone officials is rather sparse, with a density of 
0.0006. Density represents the number of ties present out of all possible ties, which means that 
the extended network of Southwest Zone officials contains only 0.06% of possible ties in a 
network this size.  
2.7.1. Network Closure and Communities 
A visual inspection of the network also reveals the presence of numerous distinct social 
groups, even within the largest connected component that forms the core of the network of the 
Southwest Zone. On a local level, triads form the basic building blocks of most social networks 
(Kadushin 2012). Transitivity, also known as triadic closure or simply closure, provides a 
measure of the tendency for individuals to form strong within-group ties based on triadic 
relationships (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Kadushin 2012). Transitivity means that if individual 
i and j are connected, and j and k are also connected, then i and j are likely to form a tie 
(Wasserman and Faust 1994). Transitivity is measured on a scale of 0 to 1, with 1 being 
completely transitive. The social network of the Southwest Zone has a transitivity score of 0.07, 
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indicating that seven percent of the triads in the network are closed triangles (Wasserman and 
Faust 1994).  
On a macro level, the tendency to form strong within group ties based on transitivity 
often results in the emergence of distinct social groups, or communities. Communities are 
socially dense pockets of individuals within the network that have fewer ties with other groups 
(Newman and Girvan 2004). Communities within a network can be located using modularity, 
which relies on a community detection algorithm, such as the commonly used Louvain method, 
to partition the network (Blondel, Guillaume, Lambiotte, and Lefebvre 2008). The resulting 
network modularity score ranges between 0 and 1. In general, networks with modularity scores 
above 0.3 display strong within-group ties. The Southwest Zone network has a modularity score 
of 0.76, which points to presence of distinct communities characterized by cohesive relationships 
(Newman and Girvan 2004). Additionally, the Louvain algorithm reveals the presence of 420 
social groups composed of Khmer Rouge personnel and their immediate connections as seen in 
Figure 2.2. Nodes are colored according to community. The figure clearly shows several distinct 
groups, which is to be expected in a social system characterized by patron-client relationships. 
Community boundaries are relatively straightforward; however, there is also considerable 
overlap, revealing the presence of between-group ties. 
2.7.2. Brokerage Positions and Connectivity 
Between-group ties are made possible by the presence of brokerage positions in the 
Southwest Zone network. Brokerage positions describe individuals who sit across a number of 
shortest paths between different parts of the network. Brokers function as gatekeepers, 
controlling access to information and resources while also enabling communication and 
coordination (Wasserman and Faust 1994). The presence of brokerage ties in the network 
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enables a level of connectivity between different parts of the network that might not otherwise 
exist. The result is an average path length of 5.84, which refers to the average degrees of 
separation between any two nodes in the network. The average path length of 5.84 in the network 
makes it possible to reach any randomly selected node within less than six steps. This suggests 
that despite being organized into many small clusters, brokerage positions enable individuals to 
remain relatively close to one another within the network. The network diameter is 22, which 
represents the longest path length between two nodes as a measure of how many steps it takes to 
cross the entire network. Again, given a network of this size and its low density, individuals are 
relatively near one another.  
Interestingly, many of the key brokers in the Southwest Zone network are relatively 
unknown individuals who held mid-level positions within the Khmer Rouge. For example, one 
such individual is Poeun, who has the highest betweenness centrality score of any individual in 
the network. Very little is known about her background or time in the Khmer Rouge. Surviving 
historical records indicate that she grew up in the countryside as part of a large peasant family 
with twelve siblings. She joined the Khmer Rouge with the stated motive of “feeling bitter 
toward enemies who oppressed our people” (Biographic Database, 2018). Rising quickly within 
the ranks, Poeun became the chief administrator of a subdistrict hospital and one of the best-
connected members of the Khmer Rouge in the Southwest Zone (Biographic Database, 2018). 
In contrast to Poeun, who lived and died in relative anonymity, Southwest Zone Secretary 
Mok was famous throughout Cambodia. Although obviously important in the day to day 
administration of the zone, Mok did so from a position that allowed him to operate from the side 
rather than as the main broker of the network. Mok’s network position displays a high number of 
direct connections to others while at the same time avoiding brokerage ties. Mok’s large number 
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of direct connections insulated him from potential enemies and provided a redundant system of 
communication (Hinton 2005). This social network configuration, however, also constrained 
Mok’s ability to manipulate potential rivals, leaving him less room to maneuver through the kind 
of robust action enjoyed by brokers who could make strategically ambiguous statements and 
actions (Padgett and Powell 2012).    
2.8. Conclusion 
Scholars have noted the importance of interpersonal networks as a significant factor in 
the origins, development, and trajectory of revolutionary organizations (Wickham-Crowley 
1992; Petersen 2001; Wood 2003; Sinno 2008; Mampilly 2011; Christia 2012; Parkinson 2013; 
Staniland 2014; Parkinson and Zaks 2018). Although previous research has pointed to cohesion 
and decentralized network structures as key to militant group survival (Parkinson 2013; 
Staniland 2014), I extend this line of reasoning to the analysis of a large network of Khmer 
Rouge officials. Using archival data from the biographic database of the Documentation Center 
of Cambodia, I map a network of 4,701 individuals loosely connected in 420 distinct 
communities within the Southwest Zone between 1975-1979. The resulting analysis reveals two 
main findings.  
First, I find that closure appears to be a prominent feature of the network, creating 
distinct communities of individuals through strong within-group ties. In particular, the largest 
connected component is divided into several factions that represent the core of the network. This 
preference for within-group closure enables revolutionary organizations, like the Khmer Rouge, 
to meet the need for security, limiting the number of connections between members and creating 
regular patterns of interactions that build trust (Granovetter 1985; Lichbach 1998; Parkinson 
2013). Closure also leads to a gradual decrease in the size of an individual’s social circle to 
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include only fellow revolutionaries while simultaneously reducing communication pathways 
(della Porta 2013). As a result, within-group ties have the potential to bring stability to 
organizations in the midst of chaotic situations related to regime consolidation.     
Second, the analysis also shows that despite containing many closed communities the 
network is nonetheless connected through brokerage positions in a way that links groups across a 
sparse network. The preference for closure seen in the Southwest Zone network means that 
individuals are relatively isolated within their own social groups. Without bridges between 
different parts of the network, organizational efficiency is impossible. Importantly, many of the 
individuals occupying brokerage roles represent mid-level members of the Khmer Rouge who 
played a key role in connecting various hubs throughout the network.  
The implications of these findings have important consequences for how networks 
influence the internal dynamics of revolutionary organizations. Militants and revolutionaries do 
not exist in isolation but in fact live and operate in a specific social context. Social structures like 
those seen in the Southwest Zone of the Khmer Rouge that favor closure lead to the development 
of loosely connected pockets of dense ties that can give rise to a number of phenomena, 
including the emergence of informal institutions, the virality of violence, and organizational 
resilience. In sum, the findings described in this paper highlight the importance of social 
networks for organizations engaged in conflict and state formation as they attempt to navigate 







Chapter 3: Connected to the Revolution: The Endogenous Development of Informal 




Explanations of the emergence of informal institutions within political organizations 
point toward the existence of endogenous processes, such as increasing returns and path 
dependence. Although our understanding of informal institutions has benefited from such 
explanations, we have yet to explain the relational nature of these types of informal 
institutions. This paper begins to tackle this shortcoming, presenting a social network analysis of 
the Khmer Rouge. Specifically, I explain how endogenous dependencies influence the formation 
of networks within a militant organization. Using evidence from the Documentation Center of 
Cambodia, which houses the biographical data on more than 30,000 Khmer Rouge leaders, I 
examine the social structure of the Khmer Rouge to provide insight into the development and 
trajectory of the organization. I argue that endogenous processes play a role in the formation of 
networks, which function as informal institutions through which militant organizations operate. I 
find that homophily and network structure, particularly concurrency and transitive closure, each 
contribute to the overall structure of the network. Ultimately, this paper demonstrates the 
relational nature of endogenous processes that play a role in the formation of personal networks 






What are the processes by which interpersonal networks emerge inside revolutionary 
organizations? How do social networks come to form the backbone of these organizations? 
Existing theories of state formation (Migdal 1988; Tilly 1992; Ertman 1997; Herbst 2000; 
Centeno 2003; Marx 2003; Kalyvas, Shapiro, and Masoud 2008; Nexon 2009; Straus 2015) and 
studies of militant organizations (Wickham-Crowley 1992; Petersen 2001; Wood 2003; Sinno 
2008; Mampilly 2011; Christia 2012; Parkinson 2013; Staniland 2014; Parkinson and Zaks 2018) 
have both noted the importance of interpersonal networks as key elements in the process of 
establishing political order through violence.  
Although this research has contributed much to our current understanding of the internal 
functions of revolutionary organizations, to date, we still know relatively little about the internal 
processes that lead to the formation and self-organization of networks within formal structures. 
Efforts to establish political order as part of the process of state formation often lead to gaps in 
the reach of formal institutional structures, which may or may not have the capacity to extend 
their reach into all areas under their control (Tsai 2006; Helmke and Levitsky 2006; Tsai 2007). 
As a result, groups involved in the establishment of political order often rely on informal 
institutions, such as patron-client networks, to compliment or even substitute for shortcomings in 
formal political structures (Urban 1989; Willerton 1992; Easter 2000; Hillman 2014). Thus, 
while the existing literature correctly identifies the importance of networks to the process of 
establishing political order, there have been few systematic attempts to directly examine the 
social networks often described as playing a critical role in shaping the development and 
trajectory of revolutionary organizations.  
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In this paper, I argue that the interdependencies found among actors’ relations drive 
network formation within revolutionary organizations.  I contend that this endogenous processes 
related to features of network topology, such as connectivity, degree centrality, and triadic 
closure, play a role in the formation of networks which, in turn, have the potential to impact 
institutional outcomes, including the development of natural pathways for communication, 
coordination, and intra-organizational control. At the same time, these self-organizing network 
processes are also influenced by the tendency of individuals to be attracted to others with similar 
attributes. Operating simultaneously, these two processes of actor covariate effects and network 
effects shape the development of informal institutions. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to 
examine an aspect of revolutionary organizations that is, thus far, unexplored in the literature, 
namely the extent to which structural dependencies among actors influence the formation of 
networks that play a key part in the state formation process. 
Using archival material made available through the Documentation Center of Cambodia 
(DCCAM), which contains detailed biographical data on more than 30,000 Khmer Rouge leaders 
down to the district level, I reconstruct the social networks of Khmer Rouge officials located in 
the Southwest Zone to support this claim. Using social network analysis, this paper demonstrates 
how endogenous processes of network formation led to the development of relatively well-
connected patron-client networks characterized by rivalry, suspicion, and violence. The results of 
an exponential random graph model (ERGM) indicate that the process of network formation is 
driven by a combination of homophily effects and network effects. Specifically, I find that 
Khmer Rouge personnel exhibit a tendency to form relationships based on the shared attributes 
of military and political positions as well as within-group membership in distinct social groups in 
tandem with network effects, such as connectivity and transitivity.  
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This paper contributes to the literature on informal institutions, particularly social 
networks within revolutionary organizations engaged in state-building. It is the first paper to 
visually map and examine the social structure of the Khmer Rouge. Like many militant 
revolutionary organizations, the social networks, in the form of patron-client relations, shaped 
the development and trajectory of the Khmer Rouge regime. Social network analysis provides a 
way to quantify and systematically inspect the underlying social structure of the Khmer Rouge in 
an effort to better understand the inner workings of the regime. Second, this paper provides a 
statistical analysis of the endogenous processes of network formation that sheds light on the 
internal forces at work within one of history’s most notorious organizations. Thirdly, this paper 
also speaks to the broader literature on state formation, offering insight into a process that is 
often characterized by contestation and violence but rarely studied at such an intimate level. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section turns to a relational theory of 
endogenous formation of informal institutions through social networks. Using Cambodia’s 
Southwest Zone under the Khmer Rouge, the following sections then map the social networks 
that lay beneath the zone that the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) considered one of its 
exemplar administrations and presents a test of several hypotheses related to actor covariate 
effects and structural effects on network formation using an exponential random graph model. 
The sixth section discusses the results. A final section concludes with a summary of the main 
findings and recommendations for further research.  
3.2. Explaining Informal Institutions  
Informal institutions have been defined a number of ways. For example, North (1990) 
defines institutions as “the rules of the game in a society, or more formally, the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction” (3). O’Donnell (1994) describes institutions as 
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consistent patterns of communication and behavior that occur according to tacitly agreed upon 
norms in society. Similarly, Lauth (2000) argues that informal institutions should be considered 
social norms that carry the threat of sanction for violating those norms. Lauth (2000) also points 
out that informal institutions can have both beneficial and detrimental effects on the political 
process. Finally, Helmke and Levitsky (2006) define informal institutions as “socially shared 
rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside officially 
sanctioned channels” (5). Azari and Smith (2012) note that informal institutions often exist 
within and alongside established formal institutions, providing clarity for individuals operating in 
organizational environments characterized by gaps in formal institutions or overlapping authority 
structures. What each of these definitions has in common is the observation that informal 
institutions are inherently social structures that operate within formal institutions.  
According to Helmke and Levitsky (2004), informal institutions can take on at least four 
different forms, namely complementary, accommodating, substitutive, and competing informal 
institutions. Each type reflects the relationship between the effectiveness of formal institutions 
and the outcomes created by informal institutions operating within these structures. 
Complimentary informal institutions operate alongside effective formal institutional structures, 
providing a means of solving problems not articulated by written rules and enabling actors to 
work in accordance with the overall objective of formal institutions. Accommodating informal 
institutions allow actors to bend formal rules in order to achieve goals that sometimes run 
counter to the objectives of formal institutional structures. Substitutive informal institutions often 
emerge under conditions of ineffective formal institutions, where actors seek to find ways to 
comply with objectives despite the shortcomings of formal institutional structures. Competing 
informal institutions sometimes form in the absence of effective formal institutions, and lead to 
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the creation of parallel systems of norms that contradict the rules and objectives of formal 
institutional structures (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). Regardless of type, however, informal 
institutions provide individuals with opportunities to construct norms of behavior that emerge 
from interaction with other actors for a variety of purposes that often influence the development 
and trajectory of formal institutions. 
Informal institutions reflect the results of internally driven processes of which various 
models of endogenous institutional change have been proposed. Path dependent explanations 
focus on the self-reinforcing nature of “increasing returns,” whereby the rising cost of 
abandoning a particular path prohibits exit and leads to the creation of a positive feedback 
process (Pierson 2000). When viewed longitudinally, Greif and Laitin (2004) argue that internal 
processes can become self-reinforcing, creating powerful incentives for members to continue to 
comply with norms. If and when these self-reinforcing mechanisms weaken or are interrupted by 
exogenous shocks, self-undermining mechanisms may take hold, and members might begin to 
find reason to defect, breaking the cycle and resulting in institutional change (Greif and Laitin 
2004). Thelen (2003) offers a contrasting viewpoint, claiming that the increasing returns 
argument fails to explain why and how institutions change over time. Rather than path 
dependence, change occurs as the result of the process of institutional layering, in which certain 
parts of institutions are renegotiated while others remain in play, and conversion, which refers to 
the process of “institutional transformation to bring institutions in line with changing social, 
political, and economic conditions” (Thelen 2003, 209).   
This paper takes a third position that combines elements of path dependence, layering, 
and conversion by focusing on the relational nature of endogenous institutional development 
through what Tsai (2006) identifies as adaptive informal institutions. Tsai (2006) argues that the 
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mechanism driving endogenous institutional change rests upon the “regularized patterns of 
interactions that emerge as adaptive responses to the constraints and opportunities of formal 
institutions” (125-126). Interpersonal relationships form the key mechanism upon which 
informal institutions develop. Such an understanding of the relational nature of endogenous 
institutional development is needed to avoid biased estimates or misidentifying the mechanisms 
through which informal institutions, such as patron-client networks, form within revolutionary 
organizations. 
3.3. Social networks and revolutionary organizations 
Beneath their formal hierarchical structures, revolutionary organizations are built on the 
interpersonal relations that exist between members (Parkinson 2013). These relationships result 
in regular patterns of interactions that result in the development of informal institutions (Tsai 
2006). As such, informal institutions provide militant organizations and revolutionary parties 
with the ability to fill gaps in institutional capacity (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). One way to 
conceptualize informal institutions is through mapping the social networks that emerge within 
formal institutions according to mechanisms defined by the interactions between individuals at 
the local level. Lusher, Koskinen, and Robins (2013) argue that the formation of these 
connections into social networks is the result of two interrelated processes, namely attraction 
based on individual attributes, also known as actor covariate effects, and the structure of the 
network itself. Moreover, the patterns of ties can reveal these mechanisms as the driving forces 
behind the creation of particular network structures. Thus, rather than occurring at random, social 
network formation is the result of specific endogenous processes related to both roles and 
relations (Lusher et al. 2013; Parkinson and Zaks 2018). In the case of revolutionary 
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organizations, social network formation represents a combination of actor covariate effects and 
structural effects.  
3.3.1. Actor covariate effects 
Individuals seeking to form patron-client ties within a revolutionary organization as a 
means of finding informal solutions to problems related to high-risk activity must consider the 
potential costs and benefits of entering into relationships that demand loyalty and support in 
exchange for protection and access to resources (Hinton 2005). This means that some individuals 
can be expected to behave in ways that are more active than others in seeking out connections 
and are attracted to persons with similar attributes. Actor covariate effects, or actor relation 
effects, reflect this natural tendency of individuals to form relationships with others through 
selection. These effects are known as actor covariate effects and can be divided into two types 
based on actor activity and homophily (Lusher et al. 2013).  
3.3.1.1. Actor activity 
Actor activity effects, also called main effects, reflect the tendency of actors with certain 
attributes to be more active in the network, regardless of whether or not the actor shares an 
attribute with others (Lusher et al. 2013). Within revolutionary organizations, it is to be expected 
that members who occupy particular roles are more likely to be socially active as a natural 
function of their positions. Role represents an individual’s position in relation to others that is 
characterized by the attributes each individual possesses or the tasks he or she performs within 
the organization (Parkinson and Zaks 2018). Knoke (1990) argues that roles are “the basic units 
of any complex political system” (7). Moreover, roles can be defined by gender, age, and length 
of time in the organization as well as official positions, such as military, administrative, or 
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political positions. Roles or positions, however, are most accurately defined in relation to other 
positions, which are connected by social interactions.  
3.3.1.2. Homophily 
While acknowledging that members of revolutionary organizations do not share equal 
levels of participation according to their roles, it is important to remember that organizations are 
built on relations. Relations are defined as the interactions between individuals within a 
revolutionary organization. Social interaction is governed by norms that create expectations and 
obligations on actors to behave in certain ways (Knoke 1990; Parkinson and Zaks 2018). 
Moreover, organizations engaged in high-risk activities like civil war and revolution face internal 
and external threats to their existence that drive members to form strong within-group ties in an 
effort to seek protection and clarify group loyalties while also increasing a propensity to adopt a 
paranoid conspiratorial mindset toward outsiders (Lichbach 1998). Within-group ties strengthen 
cohesion and solidarity because they reduce uncertainty and create trust through regular contact 
(Granovetter 1985).  
Social network analysis identifies the tendency for individuals to form strong within-
group relationships, often with others who share similar attributes, as homophily, which is 
sometimes explained as the idea that “birds of a feather flock together” (Lazarsfeld and Merton 
1954; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001; Kadushin 2012). This attraction can be based 
on status, values or attributes and is often founded on pre-existing relationships, such as kinship 
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001).   
Within a revolutionary organization, relevant attributes that cause individuals to be 
attracted to one another can include gender, age, ethnicity, survival, geographic co-location, 
previous occupation, official role in the organization, and social group. Shared gender and 
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ethnicity can enable coordination (Parkinson 2013; Larson 2016, 2017; Larson and Lewis 2018).  
Moreover, survivors of intra-organizational violence are often found connected to one another as 
violence tends to travel along the natural pathways of social networks, producing chains of 
survivors and victims (Papachristos et al. 2014).  
In addition to physical characteristics, homophily can also be driven by selection 
according to other kinds of attributes, such as being located in the same geographic location 
(McPherson et al. 2001), having similar skill sets related to occupational backgrounds (Huang 
2017), and sharing in common experiences that create cohesion among members, such as serving 
together in the same unit under stressful conditions (Parkinson 2013; Staniland 2014). Due to 
this propensity to favor within-group ties, the presence of homophily can exert a significant 
effect on the structure of networks (Krivitsky and Morris 2017). Thus, it is important to test for 
the presence of homophily, which leads to my first hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1: Actors are more likely to form strong ties with individuals who have 
similar attributes than those with different attributes. 
 
3.3.2. Structural effects 
Although individual activity and selection based on attributes play a role in network 
formation, the endogenous dependencies that exist between ties also contribute to the self-
organization of social networks within formal institutions (Lusher et al. 2013). These self-
organizing characteristics are known as structural effects and are concerned with the topology of 
the network itself. Three types of network structures are of particular interest when examining 
large, complex political organizations, namely connectivity, degree centrality, and closure.  
3.3.2.1. Limited Connectivity 
Revolutionary organizations face the challenge of balancing a need for cohesiveness 
while at the same time avoiding higher levels of connectivity in order to avoid risk. Direct ties 
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are often key for generating trust with other members of the organization, reflecting a preference 
for interacting with individuals whose reputation and history of past behavior can be known 
(Granovetter 1985). This, in turn, reduces uncertainty and provides a level of predictability.  
Although social networks can produce trust and reliable behavior, Granovetter (1985) 
points out that relationships “are not sufficient to guarantee these and may even provide occasion 
and means for malfeasance on a scale larger than in their absence” (491). In some instances, 
interpersonal relationships characterized by trust actually enable betrayal and violence on a much 
wider level than if actors existed independently and alone. Granovetter (1985) offers three 
reasons for why this is the case. First, trust can also present an occasion for wrongdoing. People 
are less suspecting of those they know and trust. Trusting relationships also have the potential for 
creating vulnerabilities. Second, “force and fraud are most efficiently pursued by teams,” which 
depend on trust that often emerges out preexisting personal connections (Granovetter 1985, 492). 
The trust found in networks enables groups to carry out misdeeds efficiently; however, it also 
creates the possibility that entire networks can be taken down through the arrest or elimination of 
a single member. Third, Granovetter (1985) argues that the scale and reach of bad conduct is 
shaped by the social structure of these relations. Moreover, networks do not penetrate society 
evenly, meaning that some individuals are more connected than others, placing them in situations 
with differing degrees of opportunity and constraint as coalitions form and dissolve. For some, 
these networks offer protection while preying on victims. At the same time, networks can also 
create risk for other actors who occupy vulnerable roles (Granovetter 1985). As a result, the need 
to maintain security often leads individuals to limit their connectivity among members of 
clandestine organizations in an attempt to avoid vulnerability under the assumption that fewer 
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ties will lead to safety (Simmel 1950; Erickson 1981; DellaPosta 2016). This leads to my second 
hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 2: Individuals are more likely to limit their relationships in an effort to 
establish positions of security than build more relationships to create efficiency. 
 
3.3.2.2. Degree Centrality 
Although members of revolutionary organizations exhibit a bias toward forming fewer 
connections, the desire for security in high-risk environments often happens in the context of 
patron-client relations (Scott 1972; DellaPosta 2016). As a particular kind of informal institution, 
patron-client ties are characterized by networks, factions, and coalitions that often exist within 
formal institutions, such as political parties and bureaucracies, of the modern state (Scott 1972; 
Hicken 2011; McLean 2011). Traditionally, systems of patron-client relations provide clients 
with protection as well as access to opportunities while patrons received support and loyalty 
from their base. These informal structures are based on clusters of individuals who form 
communities dependent on a patron and exhibit multiplex behavior in the overlapping ties that 
form out of kinship and other types of relationships (Scott 1972; Hinton 2005; Hicken 2011). 
Patron-client relations, however, are also rarely equal. Patrons usually occupy a position of 
power and access to resources that cannot be matched by their clients, making the clients 
somewhat dependent on the patron. Even though this relationship is instrumental in nature, it 
does not give patrons absolute power (Hinton 2005).  
Moreover, patrons know that their clients can choose to switch their loyalty to a different 
patron even if such a move proves costly. This tends to create an atmosphere of “suspicion and 
distrust” (Hinton 2005, 124). Clients who begin to be seen as a patron in their own right, gaining 
their own clients, can come to be viewed as potential rivals or even traitors in the eyes of their 
former patron. Rival patrons are viewed as enemies who seek to undermine one’s own position 
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of power. At the same time, much of the maintenance of patron-client relations falls to patrons 
who often attempt to prevent defection and disloyalty through incentives and coercion. The 
instability inherent in such a system often leads to the absence of lasting institutions outside of 
kinship and an environment marked by paranoia and suspicion (Hinton 2005).    
From a network perspective, patron-client relations can be understood through the 
concept of degree centrality, which refers to the number of direct connections that each 
individual possesses (Freeman 1978). Actors with a large degree, such as patrons, are considered 
more prominent than other actors because they have many direct connections to others that offer 
opportunities and options in the form of access to power, information, and resources. In contrast, 
actors with a low degree have significantly less influence due to their peripheral position 
characterized by few direct ties to others (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Moreover, degree is 
rarely distributed evenly across a network. Large numbers of ties are often concentrated in the 
hands of a powerful few while most members have only a few direct connections (Kadushin 
2012). This phenomenon leads to the formation of multiple star-like structures that serve as the 
building blocks of patron-client networks. Degree centrality gives an indication of the overall 
tendency toward centralization or decentralization within the network (Scott 1972; Lusher et al. 
2013). Thus, given the frequent presence of multiple patron-client networks within the formal 
organizational structure, it can be expected that multiple clusters will exist rather than a single 
hub. This raises a third hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: Individuals are likely to form decentralized clusters of patron-client 
relations more than a single, centralized cluster. 
 
3.3.2.3. Closure 
Alongside the tendency to cluster around patrons, DellaPosta (2016) argues that in the 
case of clandestine and criminal networks, individuals face transaction costs in finding partners 
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they can trust, reputational costs that accompany the formation of between-group ties, and 
opportunity costs in time spent developing those relationships. Individuals face transaction costs 
in the formation and maintenance of relationships that prioritize trust. Strong ties offer better 
security and are easier to form along the lines of pre-existing relationships, such as kinship. 
Members of revolutionary organizations also face reputational costs as relationships with 
outsiders can raise questions about within-group loyalty to one’s own patron-client network. 
Moreover, opportunity costs can restrict the choices of individuals to seek relationship outside 
their own social group. Under these circumstances, it becomes much easier to rely on within-
group ties for access to resources and opportunities than to build relationships with outsiders 
(Erickson 1981; DellaPosta 2016).  
As a result, individuals in clandestine networks often exhibit a preference for network 
closure, which is characterized by strong within-group ties, in pursuit of security at the expense 
of network effectiveness (DellaPosta 2016). The formation of within-group relationships, 
however, is not without its own costs. Closure limits both the sharing of information across the 
network as well as coordination with other parts of the network (DellaPosta 2016). Network 
closure, also knowns as transitivity, refers to the tendency for groups of three individuals to form 
closed triangles within a network (Lusher et al. 2013). Undirected networks can contain four 
possible types of relations among three nodes (no tie, one tie, two ties, and three ties); however, 
triangular ties tend to be structurally balanced, which means that if i and j share a relationships 
and j and k also share a relationship, then i is likely to form a relationship with k as well 
(Wasserman and Faust 1994). More often than not, these triangular structures are found grouped 
in clusters that form the basis of network communities. This leads to my fourth and final 
hypothesis.    
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Hypothesis 4: Individuals are likely to form closed triangles in an effort to increase 
security rather than leave their relations open for efficiency. 
 
3.4. Method 
Traditional statistical methods are not well-suited for studying social networks because of 
the interdependence of ties within the network. Standard linear regression models assume 
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables. The i.i.d. assumption implies 
that observations can be replaced with any randomly selected sample and that such an exchange 
of rows of data would not impact the inferences made. In other words, standard regression 
models operate under the assumption that observations have no influence on each other 
(Cranmer, Desmarais, and Menninga 2012). The relational nature of the data used in network 
analysis, however, violate this assumption due to the interdependence of observations and 
autocorrelation of the error terms (Cranmer, Heinrich, and Desmarais 2014). Moreover, 
traditional likelihood models based on the i.i.d. assumption tend to underestimate network effects 
and sometimes even fail to identify their presence (Cranmer et al. 2012). 
In order to properly account for properly account for the dependencies present in 
relational data, this paper abandons the i.i.d. assumption and turns to a different class of 
likelihood models, namely the exponential random graph model (ERGM). ERGMs are used to 
predict the likelihood of tie formation and identify the processes through which tie formation 
occurs. ERGMs operate under the assumption that network ties are the product of endogenous 
self-organizing processes related to interdependence among actors that may simultaneously be 
shaped by actor attributes and other exogenous factors (Lusher et al. 2013). 
ERGMs have the general form 








where (1) the summation is over all configurations A; (2) hA is the parameter corresponding to 
configuration A; (3) gA(y) is the network statistic corresponding to configuration A, so that gA(y) 
= 1 if the configuration is observed in the network y, and gA(y) = 0 otherwise; and (4) k is a 
normalizing quantity that ensures a proper probability distribution (Robins, Pattison, Kalish, and 
Lusher 2007, 178-179).  
ERGMs enable modelling of the macro-level topology of the network as the product of 
interacting properties that include endogenous mechanisms of self-organization and exogenous 
node attributes at the micro-level. Thus, ERGMs are useful for “explaining patterns of ties in a 
social network” (Lusher et al. 2013, 16). ERGMs do not, however, predict individual level 
outcomes. Instead, an ERGM considers the network itself as the dependent variable. The ERGM 
used in this paper was estimated using the statnet and xergm packages in R, the open source 
language and environment for statistical computing and graphics.  
3.5. Data Collection and Measurement 
The Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), also known as the Khmer Rouge, provides 
an appropriate case with which to test the hypotheses described above. As a revolutionary 
organization engaged in the violent process of state formation, the Khmer Rouge was structured 
along the lines of a Leninist revolutionary party, known as the Angkar, which means “the 
Organization” (Chandler 1999; Chandler 2008). Directed by a powerful Central Committee led 
by Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge reorganized the country into six administrative zones, North, 
Northeast, Northwest, East, Southwest, and West. Additional administrative units included the 
Center as well as the Kratie, Siem-Riep/Uddor Meanchey, and Preah Vihear autonomous sectors 
(Jackson 1989; Short 2004; Documentation Center of Cambodia 2007; Mertha 2014).  Each of 
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these administrative zones was ruled by a powerful zone secretary who, in turn, often installed 
their own patron-client networks, known as khsae or “strings” (Chandler 1999; Hinton 2005).  
The Southwest Zone under the control of Zone Secretary Mok, also known as Chhit 
Chhoeun, represents a clear case in which patron-client relations continued to function as 
informal institutions under the Khmer Rouge. Mok, sometimes referred to as Ta Mok or 
Grandfather Mok, had earned the nickname “the Butcher” while serving as one of the top 
military commanders of the Khmer Rouge forces and a member of the powerful Standing 
Committee of the Central Committee. A hardened veteran of the struggle against French 
colonialism and the republic, Mok was also well known for building patronage networks within 
the institutional apparatus of the CPK. As Southwest Zone Secretary, he installed family 
members, including children, siblings, and in-laws, in key positions within the military, 
administrative, and political structures of the CPK. Under Mok’s guidance the Southwest Zone 
gained repeated recognition from the Party Center as most effective communist administration in 
the country (Kiernan 2002; Ea 2004). 
Although these networks provided support and protection, the Party Center, led by Pol 
Pot, viewed rival political networks as an existential threat to the Khmer Rouge regime and 
sought to destroy them in a series of violent purges. CPK internal security forces, known as the 
Santebal, operated under the assumption that suspects were part of larger networks, or “strings of 
traitors,” actively seeking to undermine the Party (Hinton 2005). In response, the Party Center 
demanded that the Santebal identify all members of a suspect’s “string” and eliminate them as 
well. The personal relations of a suspect immediately came under suspicion and were also 
targeted for arrest and execution. This included spouses, children, extended family, friends, 
coworkers, and other associates. These efforts to root out “strings of traitors” can be considered 
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one of the driving forces behind the widespread purges that tore through the CPK cadres, 
unleashing a wave of violence within the ranks of the party (Hinton 2005). 
This paper uses evidence from the digital archives of the Documentation Center of 
Cambodia (DCCAM), which contain detailed biographical information on Khmer Rouge 
officials to reconstruct the social networks of Southwest Zone personnel. Data were collected 
from the DCCAM Biographical Database, which contains the digitized and translated 
biographical records of more than 30,000 Khmer Rouge members down to the district level. The 
archives record a variety of ties, including kinship, recruitment, work, and general associations 
for each individual, which are suitable for reconstructing the social networks that existed within 
the organization as a single contact network based on direct personal ties.  
An initial search of the Biographic Database located 1,188 individuals associated with the 
Southwest Zone through the category “DK Geographical Area 75-79” and search terms 
“Southwest” and “SW.” The search results were used to collect information only on individuals 
who held an official position in the Khmer Rouge, which fell into four broad categories: military, 
administrative, labor, or political personnel. For each individual, a selection of attributes and 
relationships were also collected, including name, aliases, gender, date of birth, birthplace, 
ethnicity, previous occupation, date of joining the revolution, number of years in the 
organization, pre-Democratic Kampuchea role, role during the Democratic Kampuchea era, 
geographic zone, region, district, village, kinship relationships, recruitment relationships, 
superiors, subordinates, and other known associates. Lastly, arrest, arrest dates, execution, and 
execution dates were also noted.  
Using the biographical data collected from the DCCAM database, I then reconstructed 
the social networks of members of the Khmer Rouge in the Southwest Zone as a binary, 
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undirected, cross-sectional network. In order to maximize the data available, this study restricts 
its scope to the social networks within the Khmer Rouge as a militant revolutionary organization, 
limiting the analysis to the 1,188 individuals who held an official position and their relationships 
with one another inside the organization in the Southwest Zone. The resulting network can be 
seen in Figure 3.1 below.   
Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics for Individual Attributes. 
 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Min Max N 
Gender 0.70 0.46 0 1 1188 
Age 26.53 8.77 6 60 1188 
Khmer 0.96 0.18 0 1 1188 
      
Previous Occupation      
Military 0.08 0.27 0 1 96 
Professional 0.07 0.25 0 1 82 
Service 0.03 0.16 0 1 33 
Agriculture 0.69 0.46 0 1 818 
Skilled 0.05 0.22 0 1 58 
Unskilled 0.04 0.19 0 1 44 
Student 0.05 0.21 0 1 57 
Joined before 1975 0.63 0.48 0 1 1188 
      
Role in Regime      
Military 0.37 0.48 0 1 440 
Administrative 0.39 0.49 0 1 469 
Labor 0.15 0.36 0 1 184 
Political 0.08 0.27 0 1 95 
      
Purged 0.63 0.48 0 1 1188 
 
Demographically, the population of 1,188 Khmer Rouge officials in the Southwest Zone 
represents a predominantly male group with males accounting for 70% while females make up 
only 30%. The average age of Khmer Rouge members is 26, but age ranges between the 
youngest at 6 and the oldest at 60 years old. The Khmer Rouge officials in the Southwest Zone 
also represent a largely homogenous ethnic background of 96% Khmer. A solid majority of these 
officials (63%) joined the Khmer Rouge prior to the seizure of power in 1975 and came from an 
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agricultural background. Most officials served in administrative roles followed by military, labor, 
and political positions respectively. During the period of Khmer Rouge rule, officials in the 
Southwest Zone represented 567 different villages scattered throughout the zone. Out of this 
population of Khmer Rouge officials, a total of 63% were purged between 1975-1979. 
3.5.1. The Social Network of Southwest Zone Personnel 
The outcome variable of interest in this study is the network itself. The network of Khmer 
Rouge officials described below represents face-to-face relationships within the organization. It 
does not include those individuals connected to regime officials who were not part of the Khmer 
Rouge, but instead, focuses on the internal connections among those who were part of the 
Southwest Zone administration.  





Average Degree 3.04 





Average path length 4.25 
 
 A visualization of the Southwest Zone personnel network can be seen in Figure 3.1. The 
network contains 1,807 connections among 1,188 Khmer Rouge officials. Despite the number of 
ties, the network of Southwest Zone officials is rather sparse, with a density of only 0.0026. Each 
individual has an average degree of 3.04 ties, meaning that every individual has approximately 3 
connections to others. The distribution of degree, however, is skewed in favor of a few 
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individuals who possess more connections that the rest of the network. This uneven distribution 
of ties indicates that the network of Southwest Zone personnel is remarkably open, suggesting an 
overall lack of cohesion that may have prevented any single individual from exerting absolute 
power over the entire network.  
Figure 3.1. Social Network of Southwest Zone Personnel 
 
 
 Betweenness is similarly distributed. A relatively small number of individuals occupy 
brokerage positions between smaller clusters. The network diameter is 10, which represents the 
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longest path length between two nodes as a measure of how many steps it takes to cross the 
entire network. Average path length is 4.25, which indicates the average degree of separation 
between any two nodes in the network. With an average path length of 4.25, it is possible to 
reach any randomly selected node within less than five steps, reflecting a high level of 
connectivity within the network. For example, even though he occupied a powerful position as 
Southwest Zone Secretary, Mok had the ability to reach only 42% of the network within a 
relatively few number of steps, suggesting that although he had strong influence, there were 
limits to Mok’s power. 
 Moreover, the network of Southwest Zone personnel consists of several visually 
identifiable features. First, there are a considerable number of isolates. In fact, there are 571 
individuals who possess no ties to other organizational members. Second, the remaining 617 
officials are clustered in 26 identifiable components of which the largest contains 525 
individuals. This large connected component consists of 525 individuals and 1,217 ties, meaning 
that connections within the network are concentrated largely in this cluster. Nested within the 
largest connected component, there are 22 distinct social groups. The largest connected 
component is shown in Figure 3.2 below.  
 The presence of a large connected component reflects the tendency of individuals to form 
clusters. For example, the degree assortativity of the network is 0.32, which suggests that nodes 
with similar degree tend to form connections with each other. Hubs are connected to other hubs, 
and individuals with low degree tend to connect with individuals of low degree. The joining 
together of these hubs makes the emergence of a giant component possible. The giant component 





Figure 3.2. Largest Connected Component within the Southwest Zone Network 
 
 
 Upon visual inspection of the largest connected component, it can be seen that 
individuals appear to be clustered near one another. There appears to be a clear core-periphery 
structure in which the majority of ties are densely clustered in a few groups around the center. 
Thus, the largest connected component of the Southwest Zone network provides an appropriate 
analytic sample with which to study the connections between personnel. Taking the largest 
connected component among the observed network of Khmer Rouge personnel as the dependent 
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variable, this paper examines the endogenous dependencies that drive the formation of networks 
within the Khmer Rouge by studying actor covariate effects and structural effects.  
3.5.2. Model Specification 
 
3.5.2.1. Actor covariate effects 
In an ERGM, actor covariate effects can take several forms that enable testing of activity 
and homophily. Actor activity effects, or main effects, indicate whether an individual with a 
particular attribute is more or less likely to be socially active in forming ties to others within the 
network. In the models used in this paper, a total of four actor activity effects (gender, age, 
length of time in the organization, and purge status) are used as control variables. The actor 
covariate effects for activity included in the model are gender (0=Female, 1=Male), age (in 
years), whether or not a person joined before the 1975 takeover (0=No, 1=Yes), and purge status 
(0=No, 1=Yes) as a measure of the social activity of individuals through the number of times an 
actor with a particular attribute appears in an edge (Morris, Handcock, and Hunter 2008). 
Homophily effects account for the tendency for individuals who share attributes to form 
ties with one another. A total of six homophily terms (gender, ethnicity, purge status, geographic 
co-location, previous occupation, role in the Khmer Rouge, and social group) are included in 
Models 3 and 4. Gender (0=Female, 1=Male), Khmer ethnicity (0=No, 1=Yes), purge status 
(0=No, 1=Yes) are operationalized using categorical variables. Previous occupational 
background is divided into dummy variables for military, professionals, service workers, 
agricultural workers, skilled labor, unskilled labor, and students (0=No, 1=Yes). Formal role 
within the Khmer Rouge regime is accounted for using dummy variables for military, 
administrative, labor, and political roles (0=No, 1=Yes).  
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To account for the presence of patron-client relations within the largest connected 
component, a community detection algorithm is used to identify the presence of distinct social 
groups.1 These communities represent interconnected social groups within the largest connected 
component. Using this procedure, each individual was assigned membership in one of 22 social 
groups, which is then operationalized as a homophily term to test the likelihood of tie formation 
based on within-group membership.  Positive coefficients indicate likelihood of tie formation. 
3.5.2.2. Structural effects 
Structural effects are measured using terms specifically designed to account for the 
dependencies among ties in the network. The structural effects included in the models are edges, 
monogamy, degree centrality, and transitivity. The edge term indicates the propensity for ties to 
form within the network and reflects the overall density (in log-odds) of the network. A negative 
term signifies a sparse network (Morris, Handcock, and Hunter 2008). Following Krivitsky and 
Morris (2017), connectivity is operationalized using a monogamy term, which captures an 
individual’s tendency to have a single relationship. I expect the coefficient to be positive, which 
indicates that while most individuals have relatively few ties within the network most have at 
least one tie (Krivitsky and Morris 2017).   
One option to address the endogenous dependencies related to degree centrality, or the 
number of ties an individual has within the network, is to use the kstar(2) term, which provides a 
count of the number of times a structure consisting of two ties occurs in the network. Moreover, 
the number of connections a person has within the network follows an exponentially decaying 
distribution, where a few members have a large number of ties. The use of terms like kstar to 
                                                        
1 Community detection was accomplished using a fastgreedy algorithm, which implements an 
iterative search to partition the network in a way that optimizes modularity. This process 
identified 22 distinct social groups. 
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account for such structures, however, often leads to model degeneracy in larger networks 
(Lusher et al. 2013). Fortunately, the kstar and alternating kstar statistics can be represented 
using an endogenous dependency term known as geometrically weighted degree distribution 
(GWD) (Hunter 2007). I therefore operationalize degree centrality using GWD to model the 
degree distribution and obtain a better model fit (Lusher et al. 2013). To capture transitivity, or 
triadic closure, within the network, a geometrically weighted edgewise shared partners (GWESP) 
term is used. GWESP is used instead of a triangle term because like degree, the edgewise shared 
partner distribution decays exponentially, which tends to lead to model degeneracy when using a 
standard triangle term (Hunter 2007; Lusher et al. 2013; Leifeld 2018).  
3.6. Results 
The ERGM results are presented in Table 3.3. The variable names for actor covariate 
effects and structural effects are given in the first column. The remaining columns contain the 
coefficients for each model. Model 1 contains the main effects that act as control variables. 
Model 2 adds homophily terms to test for the likelihood of tie formation based on shared 
attributes. Model 3 includes the structural terms to capture the presence of network effects. The 
models indicate that both actor covariate effects and structural effects influence the formation of 
the observed network. The edges term consistently produces a negative coefficient across all 














Table 3.3. Summary of Exponential Random Graph Model Results. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
Edges -4.6593 (0.1446)*** -7.4428 (0.4670)*** -6.8461 (0.3970)***  
     
Actor Covariate Effects     
Actor Activity Effects     
Gender -0.0826 (0.0482) 0.0297 (0.0521) 0.1288 (0.0451)**  
Age 0.0078 (0.0026)** 0.0051 (0.0029) 0.0021 (0.0024)  
Length of Time in 
Organization 
-0.0099 (0.0465) -0.0491 (0.0495) -0.0643 (0.0403)  
Social Activity of Purge 
Victims 
-0.4921 (0.0532)*** -0.0067 (0.0547) 0.1232 (0.0443)**  
     
Homophily     
Same Gender  -0.0386 (0.0673) -0.0537 (0.0652)  
Both Khmer  0.3138 (0.1650) 0.2656 (0.1348)*  
Both Purged  0.7357 (0.0752)*** 0.6951 (0.0705)***  
Same Location  0.5750 (0.0901)*** 0.5399 (0.0804)***  
Previous Military  -0.1015 (0.1425) -0.1050 (0.1205)  
Previous Professional  -0.4096 (0.1098)*** -0.2938 (0.0988)**  
Previous Agriculture  0.4567 (0.0944)*** 0.3812 (0.0873)***  
Previous Skilled  -0.0570 (0.1840) -0.0783 (0.1479)  
Previous Unskilled  0.2663 (0.1830) 0.0945 (0.1545)  
Previous Student  0.0626 (0.1672) -0.0625 (0.1522)  
Both Military  0.3852 (0.0683)*** 0.3245 (0.0621)***  
Both Admin  0.1214 (0.0695) 0.1232 (0.0661)  
Both Labor  0.0750 (0.1023) 0.0852 (0.0891)  
Both Political  0.1527 (0.0781) 0.1553 (0.0706)*  
Same Social Group  3.0101 (0.0655)*** 2.4593 (0.0739)***  
     
Structural Effects     
Female Limited 
Connectivity 
  1.7186 (0.2469)***  
Male Limited Connectivity   2.2434 (0.1984)***  
Clustering (Degree)    0.5417 (0.2942)  
Triadic Closure   0.4061 (0.0385)***  
AIC 13810.5641 11006.5893 10593.7832  
BIC 13859.7228 11203.2241 10829.7450  
Log Likelihood -6900.2821 -5483.2946 -5272.8916  






3.6.1. Actor covariate effects 
The actor covariate effects reflect both main effects and homophily effects. 
Although used as control variables, the main effects for gender, age, length of time in the 
organization, and survival status provide useful information about the social activity of Khmer 
Rouge personnel in the Southwest Zone. The main effects indicate that actor attributes indeed led 
some individuals to be more socially active than others in the formation of network ties. The 
positive and significant coefficient for gender indicates that men were more socially active than 
women in forming ties to others. Age returns as positive but does not attain a level of 
significance. Similarly, length of time in the organization, defined as joining the Khmer Rouge 
prior to their takeover in 1975, is negative but also fails to attain statistical significance. 
Together, the lack of significance for both age and length of time in the organization suggest that 
seniority played little role in the social activity of Khmer Rouge personnel. Interestingly, purge 
victims had an increased tendency to form relationships compared to survivors as indicated by 
the positive and statistically significant coefficients for the main effects of purge status. Purge 
victims were 13% more likely (exp[0.1232]=1.13) than survivors to form ties to others. 
The results for homophily effects reveal variation on different attributes. For instance, 
there is no indication that having the same gender increases the likelihood of tie formation. 
Although not statistically significant, gender returns as negative, which implies that men and 
women were more likely to form ties with one another than with members of the same gender. 
On the other hand, shared ethnicity is positive and significant, which indicates that when both 
members shared the Khmer identity, they were more likely to form a tie. The models also reveal 
a positive and significant effect related to ties among to purge victims. Purge victims tend to be 
connected to one another, and survivors tend to have ties with other survivors. This finding 
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supports the argument that violence does not spread randomly but likely moves along social 
networks. Geographic co-location is positive and significant, which implies that individuals from 
the same village are more likely to form relationships with one another.   
Moreover, a key mechanism of tie formation within the network appears to be homophily 
based on previous occupational background, official role within the Khmer Rouge, and social 
groups. Former professionals, including teachers and monks avoided one another while 
agricultural workers were more likely to form relationships. Former military, skilled and 
unskilled workers, and students did not exhibit a preference for ties with each other. As for roles 
within the Khmer Rouge, positive and significant coefficients for military and political personnel 
mean that members of the armed forces were more likely to form ties to other military personnel 
while and political officials were more likely to seek out other individuals in similar political 
roles. The results for administrative and labor personnel, however, are not statistically 
significant. This suggests that officials working in administrative or labor roles possibly did not 
trust one another within their respective units. As expected, within-group ties among members of 
the same social group exert a significant influence on tie formation. Overall, the results for 
homophily effects support both hypothesis 1, indicating that shared attributes and within-group 
ties were important drivers of network formation within the Khmer Rouge.  
3.6.2. Structural effects 
Positive and significant coefficient estimates on structural effects indicate that particular 
network structures, such as limited connectivity, clustering, and closure, are observed in the 
network more often than would be the case by chance. As anticipated, the results of Model 3 
reveal a positive and significant result for limited connectivity for both men and women, 
reflecting the tendency to privilege security concerns over efficiency. This suggests that both 
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men and women were likely to form a limited number of connections, most likely a single 
relationship, rather than multiple relationships within the Southwest Zone in an effort to 
prioritize security. The coefficient for degree distribution is positive but not statistically 
significant, meaning that the results do not support hypothesis 3. The positive coefficient implies 
that there is a propensity among Khmer Rouge personnel toward centralization; however, this 
conclusion must be viewed with caution since the term lacks statistical significance and the 
confidence interval includes zero. Closure, or transitivity, is positive and significant, supporting 
hypothesis 4. Triadic closure increases the odds of having a tie with another member of the 
Khmer Rouge by a factor of 1.50 (exp[0.4061]=1.50).  Combined with the homophily effect for 
within-group ties, the presence of a statistically significant result on transitivity indicates that 
Khmer Rouge personnel tended to pursue network closure. Closure has the potential to prevent 
information from moving from one part of the network to another, which can offer protection 
while limiting coordination (DellaPosta 2016). Overall, the results for structural effects lend 
support to hypotheses 2 and 4, related to connectivity and transitivity, respectively, but fail to 
confirm hypothesis 3 related to clustering. 
3.7. Discussion 
This paper has analyzed several attribute-based and structural processes that influence the 
endogenous formation of social networks within revolutionary organizations. The data on Khmer 
Rouge personnel in the Southwest Zone reveal a social network of predominantly young males 
who worked in mostly military and administrative roles within the regime. Social network 
analysis shows a network of 1,188 individuals with an average of 3 personal connections to other 
members inside the organization. Additionally, ties are clustered in a large connected component 
consisting of 1,217 ties among 525 individuals, which represents nearly 44% of the personnel 
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and 67% of the ties in the Southwest Zone. This concentration of connections among Khmer 
Rouge personnel constitutes the backbone of the Southwest Zone administration.  
The results of the exponential random graph models indicate that social networks among 
Khmer Rouge personnel in the Southwest Zone were likely the product of a combination of 
homophily, limited connectivity, and closure. Consistent with theoretical expectations, I find that 
members of a revolutionary organization engaged in high-risk activities were motivated to seek 
out relationships primarily within their own social groups defined, in part, by shared attributes. 
Homophily effects among rural peasants, geographically co-located individuals, and military and 
political personnel were found to be important in the creation of network ties.   
Given the threats that organizations engaged in high-risk activities like civil war and 
revolution face, the presence of homophily effects within the social network of members of the 
Southwest Zone of the Khmer Rouge appears to drive an endogenous process of network 
formation in an effort to seek protection and clarify group loyalties while also increasing a 
tendency to adopt a paranoid conspiratorial mindset toward outsiders (Lichbach 1998). Within-
group ties strengthen cohesion and solidarity because they reduce uncertainty and create trust 
through regular contact with a small number of individuals (Granovetter 1985). The tendency to 
form limited connectivity among both men and women identified in this study reveals an 
important mechanism in the formation of social networks within revolutionary organizations that 
are engaged in the process of state formation and regime consolidation. Khmer Rouge personnel 
in the Southwest Zone exhibit a strong preference for having few relationships.  
Lastly, the results also indicate the presence of transitivity, or triadic closure, as a key 
mechanism of network formation among Khmer Rouge personnel. Triadic closure indicates a 
preference for security over effectiveness from an organizational perspective. Closure, however, 
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brings both costs and benefits, increasing cohesion while limiting the flow of information and 
coordination across the network (DellaPosta 2016). Moreover, closure is key to creating a sense 
of solidarity within small-scale clusters. The closure of revolutionary networks around members 
of the same social group leads to a gradual decrease in the size of an individual’s social circle to 
include only members of fellow revolutionaries while simultaneously reducing communication 
pathways (della Porta 2013). 
Overall, the findings of this study add support to the extensive historical evidence of the 
existence of patron-client networks and rivalry inside the Khmer Rouge regime. The presence of 
homophily and network effects highlight the complex nature of network formation. Social 
networks within the Khmer Rouge are not simply the product of individuals seeking out 
connections with others with similar attributes but also network self-organization along the lines 
of preferential attachment (Kim and Altmann 2017). Under the conditions of high-risk activity, 
homophily and network effects become mutually reinforcing mechanisms of network formation 
(della Porta 2013). Together, the network effects revealed in this study support the conclusion 
that criminal and clandestine networks, such as those found in revolutionary organizations, limit 
information and coordination across the network in an effort to protect members from internal 
and external threats.   
3.8. Conclusion 
In conclusion, this paper offers insight into the ways in which endogenous dependencies 
among actors and their relations drive network formation within formal political organizations. 
The purpose of this paper was to provide a statistical test of the processes that shape network tie 
formation within revolutionary organizations. The results of an ERGM reveal that network 
formation among Khmer Rouge personnel in the Southwest Zone was driven by attraction based 
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on similar attributes and network self-organization through limited connectivity and closure. This 
combination of actor covariate effects and network effects resulted in strong within-group ties 
that limited the flow of information and coordination across different parts of the network while 
also increasing connectivity and enabling the arrest and execution of Khmer Rouge personnel to 
spread throughout the network. 
Although formally established as a Marxist-Leninist command and control hierarchy 
designed for efficiency, this ability for coordination was undercut by a social structure defined 
by a preference for security, compartmentalization, and limited connectivity. The social structure 
highlighted here appears to have enabled a system of governance that relied on personal loyalty 
and strong within-group ties a source of organizational cohesion that ironically stood in the way 
of creating more robust formal institutions needed to establish control over the country under 
communist rule. The presence of rival patron-client networks within the formal organization 
actually hindered coordination and collective action.   
The results of this paper open the door to several interesting questions for future research. 
First, how does network formation differ across different types of ties, such as kinship, 
recruitment, and friendship? Second, given the nested nature of network effects, what else might 
be learned by disentangling homophily effects and network effects even further? Third, how do 
within-group ties and between-group ties influence the distribution and patterns of political 
violence found in revolutionary organizations like the Khmer Rouge? Finding answers to these 
questions would advance our knowledge of the inner workings of militant organizations and 











Why do some members of revolutionary organizations become victims of violent purges 
while others do not? Explanations of political violence have shown that violence is rarely the 
result of random events but instead used instrumentally; however, we have yet to adequately 
explain the interpersonal nature of violence and its spread. Using Cambodia’s Southwest Zone, 
this paper provides evidence from the digital archives of the Documentation Center of 
Cambodia, which contain detailed biographical data on more than 30,000 Khmer Rouge leaders. 
This paper presents a fine-grained analysis of social networks within the Khmer Rouge to 
demonstrate how interpersonal relationships shaped patterns of intense political violence. The 
results of a network autocorrelation model indicate that there is indeed a network effect on 
victimization among Khmer Rouge cadres. Specifically, I find that exposure to other victims 






Why do some people fall victim to political violence during periods of regime change 
while others do not, despite sharing similar background characteristics as members of high-risk 
populations? More specifically, why are some members of revolutionary political organizations 
purged violently while others are not? Existing theories of political violence that focus on 
intergroup relations (Varshney 2003), regime type (Harff 2003; Davenport 2007), territorial 
control (Kalyvas 2006), pre-existing grievances (Kalyvas 2006; Balcells 2017), revenge (Hinton 
2005; Balcells 2017), and prewar social relations (Hinton 2005; Fujii 2009; Kopstein and 
Wittenberg 2011; Su 2011; Braun 2016; Finkel 2017) largely take social structure for granted 
while emphasizing the instrumental nature of violence. 
Although much of this research has added to our knowledge about the motives and 
perpetrators of political violence, these explanations cannot make a convincing case for why 
some people fall victim to violent purges while others do not. In some instances, victims and 
survivors alike share similar personal attributes as members of the same high-risk population. If 
victimization is based on possession of certain characteristics, then it could be argued that purges 
simply represent a random phenomenon. Our current understanding of political violence, 
however, is that it is not a random event (Kalyvas 2003). Moreover, instrumentality is based on 
interests that are based on identity, and identity is constructed out of social relations (McLean 
2011; Padgett and Powell 2012). Thus, while the existing literature correctly identifies the 
importance of social structure as a key factor in explaining violence (Fujii 2009; Su 2011; Straus 
2015; Braun 2016), it has rarely dealt explicitly with understanding how the relational nature of 
politics plays a direct role in the spread of violence.  
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In this paper, I argue that victimization during a violent purge can be better explained by 
examining the social networks in which it occurs. Individuals are not purged only because they 
possess particular characteristics. Attributes such as gender, ethnicity, previous occupation, 
official position, or length of time in an organization offer an incomplete explanation on their 
own for the seemingly chaotic nature of a purge. I contend that during violent political purges 
individuals are arrested and killed because they are socially embedded in a set of social networks 
that shape the likelihood of becoming a victim or a survivor. As victims are identified, arrested, 
imprisoned, and executed, their relationships with family, friends, neighbors, and coworkers 
often become suspect as well. The result is that violence spreads in an epidemic-like fashion in a 
contagion along social networks, placing individuals at risk according to their personal 
relationships with others.  
I support this claim with evidence from the digital archives of the Documentation Center 
of Cambodia (DCCAM), which contain detailed biographical data on more than 30,000 Khmer 
Rouge leaders to reconstruct the social networks of zone administration officials. Using social 
network analysis, this paper demonstrates how interpersonal relationships shaped patterns of 
intense political violence under the Khmer Rouge. The results of a network autocorrelation 
model indicate that there is indeed a network effect on victimization among Khmer Rouge 
cadres. Specifically, I find that network position, as defined by degree, betweenness, structural 
similarity, and exposure, is directly related to the likelihood of victimization. 
This paper contributes to the literature on political violence in three ways. It is the first 
study to date to visually map and examine the social structure of the Khmer Rouge. Like any 
other militant revolutionary organization, social networks shaped the development and trajectory 
of the Khmer Rouge regime. Social network analysis provides a way to quantify and 
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systematically inspect the underlying social structure of one of history’s most notorious political 
organizations in an effort to better understand the inner workings of the Khmer Rouge. Second, 
this paper sheds light on how social relations structure the distribution and patterns of violence in 
post-revolutionary settings. Social structure has long been identified as a key part of how 
violence spreads. This paper turns to social network analysis as a means of understanding the 
relational pathways along which violence moves through a population. Third, this paper brings 
together the literatures on political violence and genocide/mass killing in order to present new 
insights into the phenomenon of intra-elite violence in post-civil war and revolutionary settings. 
The introduction of social networks as independent variable has the potential to add new insight 
into research at the micro-level.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section situates a theory of 
violent political purges as a socially embedded phenomenon characterized by social networks 
within the wider context of studies on violence. Then, the paper turns to a case study of violent 
political purges from Cambodia’s Southwest Zone under the Khmer Rouge, mapping and 
describing the networks of relationships that lay beneath the zone that the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea considered one of its premier administrations. The fourth section presents a test of 
several hypotheses related to the influence of social networks on the distribution of violence 
from the perspective of individual network position using a network autocorrelation model. The 
fifth section presents the results followed by discussion. A final section concludes with a 
summary of the main findings, implications, and possible avenues for further research. 
4.2. The Logic of Violent Purges 
Internecine violence in the form of fratricide is a frequent feature of revolutionary 
organizations engaged in the process of regime consolidation, especially in the wake of civil war 
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(Kalyvas 2006; Fjelde and Nilsson 2012; Staniland 2012; Sudduth 2017; McLauchlin and La 
Parra-Perez 2018). Fratricide involves violence against loyal supporters using a repertoire of 
deadly tools, including assassination, mass arrests, torture, and execution (Staniland 2012; 
Gutierrez-Sanin and Wood 2017). The causes of fratricide, however, are numerous and difficult 
to disentangle. Fratricide can emerge out of factional competition and conflict over territory, 
resources, or personality. In other instances, fratricide is the result of ideological dogmas that 
incentivize adherents to engage in violence against their rivals. Regardless of its origins, 
fratricide is often seen as a useful strategy through which revolutionaries can consolidate power 
(Fjelde and Nilsson 2012; Staniland 2012). In particular, political purges in the wake of rebel 
victory in civil war represent an exceptionally public and lethal form of fratricide aimed at 
eliminating potential rivals within the regime (Staniland 2012).   
Following a successful seizure of power, revolutionaries face the problem of 
consolidating power from a position of relative weakness, which leaves them vulnerable to a 
possible coup d’état from regime insiders as well as overthrow by external enemies (Roessler 
2011). Under pressure to secure their rule, revolutionaries often pursue coup-proofing strategies, 
beginning with the elimination of potential internal enemies through purges (Roessler 2011). 
Given the lack of robust institutions, political survival becomes a deadly game characterized by 
intrigue, betrayal, and paranoia (McLauchlin and La Parra-Perez 2018). Regime insiders have 
little guarantee of their safety and thus turn to building their own alliances and base of supporters 
with the expectation that rivals will eventually move to eliminate them (Roessler 2011). Roessler 
(2011) argues that under these conditions “eliminating one’s rival from power is the only viable 
strategy to guarantee political and personal survival” (311). Thus, the goal for regime supporters 
 
 71 
is the elimination of rival networks in order to consolidate power while their competitors are 
vulnerable (Sudduth 2017).   
Ironically, a coup-proofing strategy of violent purges often undermines a revolutionary 
regime’s ability to produce effective internal governance and defend itself against external 
threats (Braithwaite and Sudduth 2016). Failure to completely eliminate members of rival 
factions can lead to defection to the opposition, which can create additional enemies (Roessler 
2011; Staniland 2012). Roessler (2011) refers to this situation as the internal security dilemma. 
Much like the security dilemma that states face in the international system, fratricidal purges can 
set off a spiral of escalation within the regime as paranoia and suspicion of potential rivals 
increases (Roessler 2011). Efforts to drive out internal threats carry the risk of creating even 
more enemies of the regime.  
As a form of pre-emptive and selective violence, purges are driven by the assumption that 
anyone is potentially disloyal and thus, an existential threat to the regime (McLauchlin and La 
Parra-Perez 2018). Collective targeting in a poor information environment characterized by 
secrecy, suspicion, and paranoia within the ranks means that the perpetrators of fratricidal 
violence often rely on stereotypes of disloyalty based on personal attributes. Rather than carried 
out in response to an actual threat to the regime, individuals are selected based on a perpetrator’s 
belief that a suspect is likely to become an enemy because they fit a specific profile, whether that 
be gender, age, personal history, ethnicity, or formal role in the regime (McLauchlin and La 
Parra-Perez 2018). 
4.2.1. Networks and the Contagion of Violence 
Although an individual’s profile certainly plays a role in selection for arrest and 
execution, violent purges in post-civil war settings appear to be driven by more than identity. In 
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low information environments characterized by high levels of suspicion and paranoia, purges not 
only operate on assumptions of guilt but also guilt by association. During a purge, the personal 
relationships of victims often become suspect. As individuals are arrested and executed, their 
families, friends, and acquaintances are likely to suffer a similar fate. Thus, guilt by association 
becomes possible through the underlying social structure found within a revolutionary 
organization, which can often be described in terms of patron-client relationships.  
Much like other post-civil war contexts, revolutionary regimes are not always ruled 
through strong formal institutions, such as bureaucracies, but by patron-client networks 
(Baberowski 2012). Moreover, even as bureaucratic power begins to develop, patron-client 
relationships often find ways to continue to thrive within the formal structures of party and 
government (McLean 2011). Patron-client relationships are characterized by the networks, 
factions, and coalitions that exist within the formal structures of party, bureaucracy, and 
government. Individual clients cluster around a patron to form communities dependent on that 
patron’s position of power. Under this type of system, patrons provide clients with protection and 
access to resources in exchange for loyalty and support (Scott 1972; McLean 2011).    
Patron-client relations also tend to be unstable as clients can choose to move their loyalty 
to a different patron even if such a shift in support carries a high price. Clients who emerge as 
patrons with their own following of clients can come to be considered potential rivals or even 
traitors in the eyes of their former patron. Rival patrons are perceived as enemies who threaten 
the base of support of their competitors. At the same time, much of the maintenance of patron-
client relations falls to patrons who often attempt to prevent defection and disloyalty through a 
combination of incentives and coercion. The instability inherent in such a system often 
undermines the development of enduring institutions outside of kinship and contributes to an 
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atmosphere of competition, suspicion, and paranoia in which patrons engage in a zero-sum 
contest of survival of the fittest against rivals to claim supporters and amass power (Hinton 
2005). Under these conditions, a rapid contagion of violence associated with purges becomes 
possible as personal relationships provide natural pathways for arrests and executions to follow. 
In order to better explain the role of personal connections in purges, a different 
conceptual framework is needed to understand how violence spreads and how networks can 
affect the diffusion of arrests and executions. One way to accomplish this objective is to model 
the contagion of violent purges as an epidemic (Papachristos 2009; Papachristos, Braga, and 
Hureau 2012; Zhukov 2012). A simple contagion model, also known as a susceptibility and 
infection (SI) model requires the presence of three conditions, namely an infection, a susceptible 
population, and pathways along which the epidemic can spread. Transmission occurs as infected 
individuals come into contact with susceptible individuals (Bianconi 2018).  Using an SI model, 
purges can be conceptualized as specific type of pathogen that affects a high-risk population 
consisting of members of a revolutionary organization. Just like a lethal virus, purges that result 
in the execution of suspected disloyal members do not offer the possibility recovery.  
Moreover, the ability of a purge to spread is conditioned on the topology of the social 
networks on which it takes place (Granovetter 1985; Zhukov 2012; Papachristos and Wildeman 
2014). A network can be defined as a collection of relationships, identified using graph theory 
and data visualization to draw the nodes and edges with individuals representing each node and 
edges the connections between them (Kadushin 2012). The topology of social networks inside an 
organization refers to the general properties of the networks, including but not limited to distinct 
communities and structures (Kadushin 2012). Given that individuals vary in the number of 
connections and occupy positions of different vulnerability, network topology can both constrain 
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and facilitate the spread of violence during a purge, producing in an uneven distribution of 
victims and survivors (Papachristos and Wildeman 2014).   
Using social networks as an independent variable, this paper examines the patterns of 
violence that tore through the ranks of the Khmer Rouge during its brief time in power between 
1975-1979, focusing on the effect of individual network position on the likelihood of becoming a 
victim of a violent political purge. I argue that victimization is contagious, and connection to 
purge victims is likely to increase an individual’s own chances of becoming a victim 
(Papachristos and Wildeman 2014). As a result, contagion is influenced by two factors, namely 
individual network position and exposure to violence within the network. Individual network 
position, which is an individual’s location within a network, and exposure, which refers to the 
extent an individual’s connections are victimized, allow violence to spread along social networks 
as a form of contagion. Personal contacts and network structures facilitate the spread of violence 
and help determine its distribution across the network (Papachristos, et al. 2012). 
4.2.2. Network Position 
Individual network position within a revolutionary organization plays a part in 
determining who falls victim during a purge and who survives. In general, network position can 
be defined as the set of relationships that connect actors in a network (Burt 1976). This paper 
follows Papachristos’s (2011) usage in reference to position as an actor’s location within a 
network in relation to other actors. Moreover, network position can be operationalized using a 
number of different measures related to network centrality. The following section focuses on 
three centrality measures, namely degree, betweenness, and structural equivalence. Centrality 
represents the extent to which an actor is involved in relationships with other actors (Wasserman 
and Faust 1994). For example, an individual at the center of a star shaped network is said to 
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occupy a central position. Such a position confers power, prominence, and influence within a 
network through better access to and control over information or resources while also making an 
actor more visible (Wasserman and Faust 1994).  
Actors with a large number of connections are considered more prominent than other 
actors because they have many direct connections to others that offer opportunities and options 
in the form of access to power, information, and resources. In contrast, actors with a low degree 
have significantly less influence due to their peripheral position characterized by few direct ties 
to others (Wasserman and Faust 1994). A corresponding network concept, degree refers to the 
number of direct connections that each individual possesses (Freeman 1978). Moreover, degree 
is rarely distributed evenly across a network. Large numbers of ties are often concentrated in the 
hands of a few while most members have only a few direct connections (Kadushin 2012). As a 
result, it can be expected that actors who have more ties to others are generally more privileged, 
influential, and prominent within the network, making them better targets as potential threats to 
rivals. The concept of degree gives rise to my first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Individuals with a higher number of connections will be more likely to 
become victims themselves. 
 
While most individuals within militant organizations and revolutionary parties often have 
relatively few ties compared with a select number of prominent individuals, these peripheral 
individuals can sometimes occupy key positions that connect different parts of the organization. 
This concept of betweenness rests on the idea of brokerage or bridging ties. Betweenness is 
defined as the number of shortest paths an individual sits across, connecting different segments 
of the network. Individuals who occupy brokerage roles serve as gatekeepers in the network, 
controlling access to information and resources through their position between different parts of 
the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Although brokerage roles can give an actor with 
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relatively few direct connections to others a great deal of power, this type of network position 
also poses a particularly difficult problem during a violent political purge. Sitting across multiple 
paths between different parts of a network places an individual in a vulnerable position as attacks 
can come from several directions at once. The concept of betweenness gives rise to my second 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Individuals sitting across multiple paths occupy positions of greater 
vulnerability and thus are more likely to become victims. 
 
The concept of network position within a militant organization or revolutionary party can 
also be understood through the concept of structural similarity. Structural similarity is defined as 
comparable patterns of relations between individuals. In this case, the nodes may represent 
different actors, but the structural configuration of their ties is similar. Thus, actors that share 
specific network structures are considered to have a similar network position (Borgatti and 
Everett 1992). If network structure is a significant factor in determining the pattern of purge 
victims, then structurally similar positions should result in similar outcomes. This leads to my 
third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Purge victims are more likely to share structurally similar positions within 
the network.  
 
4.2.3. Network Exposure 
In addition to properties characterizing network position, it is important to also consider 
the effect that the exposure to purge victims has on an individual’s own chances of becoming a 
victim. Exposure refers to the extent to which an actor’s connections are victimized 
(Papachristos et al. 2015). Individuals have higher exposure if their network contains victims and 
lesser exposure if they are not connected to purge victims. In the context of violent political 
purges, large numbers of connections can be both a blessing and curse. Connections to others 
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who are victims pose an increased risk for an individual while ties to survivors can increase 
protection. Direct exposure can be operationalized as a path distance of 1 to a victim. In this 
case, the immediate friends of an individual are victimized; thus, exposing him or her to also 
becoming a victim. This suggests a clear connection between network position and exposure to 
violence and generates my fourth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Individuals with direct connections to victims are more likely to become 
victims themselves. 
  
Given the socially embedded nature of individuals within networks inside organizations, indirect 
connections can also matter in the process of social contagion (Papachristos et al. 2015). 
Networks that possess higher levels of connectivity can provide pathways along which violence 
can spread. Indirect exposure can be operationalized as a path distance of 2 to a victim, meaning 
that a friend of a friend has the potential to put an individual at risk. This leads to my fifth 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 5: Individuals whose indirect connections are purged are more likely to be 
victimized than individuals whose indirect connections were not victims. 
 
In sum, the likelihood of becoming a purge victim can be best understood as an effect of one’s 
network position and exposure to other victims. Rather than considering individual attributes, I 
argue that individuals are targeted during a violent political purge in part because of their 
embeddedness in social networks within revolutionary political parties. As a result, personal 
relationships facilitate the spread of violence throughout the network. 
4.3. Explaining Patterns of Purge Victims 
In order to test these hypotheses, fine-grained relational data on the interpersonal 
connections of the members of a revolutionary organization is required. This paper turns to 
evidence from the digital archives of the Documentation Center of Cambodia (DCCAM), which 
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contain detailed biographical data on Khmer Rouge leaders to reconstruct the social networks of 
administration officials in the Southwest Zone. Using these reconstructed networks, I test the 
hypotheses outlined in the previous section about individual network position and exposure with 
members of the Khmer Rouge regime between 1975-1979.  
4.3.1. The Data 
The Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), also known as the Khmer Rouge, provides 
an ideal case with which to test the hypotheses described in the previous section. As a 
revolutionary organization, the Khmer Rouge was structured along the lines of a Leninist 
revolutionary party, known as the Angkar, which means “the Organization” (Chandler 1999; 
Chandler 2008). Directed by a powerful Central Committee led by Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge 
reorganized the country into six administrative zones, North, Northeast, Northwest, East, 
Southwest, and West. Additional administrative units included the Center as well as the Kratie, 
Siem-Riep/Uddor Meanchey, and Preah Vihear autonomous sectors (Jackson 1989; Short 2004; 
Documentation Center of Cambodia 2007; Mertha 2014).  Each of these administrative zones 
was ruled by a powerful zone secretary who, in turn, often installed their own patron-client 
networks, known as khsae or “strings” (Chandler 1999; Hinton 2005). For example, the 
Southwest Zone was controlled by Zone Secretary Mok, also known as Chhit Chhoeun. Mok, 
sometimes referred to as Ta Mok or Grandfather Mok, had earned the nickname “the Butcher” 
while serving as one of the top military commanders of the Khmer Rouge forces and a member 
of the powerful Standing Committee of the Central Committee. A hardened veteran of the 
struggle against French colonialism and the republic, Mok was also well known for building 
patronage networks within the institutional apparatus of the CPK. As Southwest Zone Secretary, 
he installed family members, including children, siblings, and in-laws, in key positions within 
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the military, administrative, and political structures of the CPK. Under Mok’s guidance the 
Southwest Zone gained recognition from the Party Center as most ideologically pure communist 
administration in the country (Kiernan 2002; Ea 2004). 
Although these networks provided support and protection, the Party Center, led by Pol 
Pot, viewed rival political networks as an existential threat to the Khmer Rouge regime and 
sought to destroy them in a series of violent purges. CPK internal security forces, known as the 
Santebal, operated under the assumption that suspects were part of larger networks, or “strings of 
traitors,” actively seeking to undermine the Party (Hinton 2005). In response, the Party Center 
demanded that the Santebal identify all members of a suspect’s “string” and eliminate them as 
well. The personal relations of a suspect immediately came under suspicion and were also 
targeted for arrest and execution. This included spouses, children, extended family, friends, 
coworkers, and other associates. These efforts to root out “strings of traitors” was one of the 
driving forces behind the widespread purges that tore through the CPK cadres, unleashing wave 
after wave of violence within the ranks of the party (Hinton 2005). 
Using the biographical data collected from the Documentation Center of Cambodia 
(DCCAM) database, this study reconstructs the social networks of members of the Khmer Rouge 
in the Southwest Zone as a static, cross-sectional network. The digital archives of the DCCAM 
contain detailed biographical data on Khmer Rouge officials to reconstruct the social networks of 
zone administration officials. Data were collected from the DCCAM Biographical Database, 
which contains the digitized and translated biographical records of more than 30,000 Khmer 
Rouge leaders down to the district level. The archives record a variety of face-to-face ties, 
including kinship, recruitment, work, and general associations for each individual, which are 
suitable for reconstructing the social networks within the regime. An initial search located 1,188 
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individuals associated with the Southwest Zone, using the category “DK Geographical Area 75-
79” and search terms “Southwest” and “SW.” The search results were used to collect information 
only on individuals who held an official position in the Khmer Rouge, which fell into four broad 
categories: military, administrative, labor, or political personnel. For each individual, a selection 
of attributes and relationships were collected, including name, aliases, gender, date of birth, 
birthplace, ethnicity, previous occupation, date of joining the revolution, number of years in the 
organization, pre-Democratic Kampuchea role, role during the Democratic Kampuchea era, 
geographic zone, region, district, village, kinship relationships, recruitment relationships, 
superiors, subordinates, and other known associates. Lastly, arrest, arrest dates, execution, and 
execution dates were also noted. In order to maximize the data available, this study restricts its 
scope to the social networks within the Khmer Rouge regime, limiting the analysis to the 1,188 
individuals who held an official position and their relationships with one another inside the 
organization in the Southwest Zone.  
4.3.2. The Empirical Analysis 
The analysis proceeds in two stages. The first stage uses social network analysis to map 
the social structure of Khmer Rouge officials in the Southwest zone, providing a detailed 
description of the intra-organizational network. The second stage uses a network autocorrelation 
model to examine the effect of individual network position on the likelihood of becoming a 
victim. To evaluate the impact of social networks on the distribution of violence in the Southwest 
Zone, this paper focuses on individual Khmer Rouge members as the unit of analysis.  
The dependent variable used in this paper is whether or not a person falls victim to a 
purge or not. This is operationalized as a dichotomous variable (No=0, Yes=1). In the case of 
purges within the Khmer Rouge, individuals who were arrested and/or executed were counted as 
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victims. While some victims lack information regarding the date of execution, their presence in 
the records from interrogation and execution center S-21 indicate they were indeed killed as part 
of the purge. The independent variables of interest in this paper are network position and 
exposure. Network position is operationalized using degree centrality, betweenness centrality, 
and structural similarity. Each of these measures captures different aspects of individual position, 
such as the number of ties, brokerage roles, and configuration of immediate contacts in the 
network respectively. 
Exposure is estimated using an exposure term that accounts for direct and indirect 
exposure to violence within the network. The exposure term is calculated by multiplying the 
social network influence weight matrix, which is simply the adjacency matrix of the undirected 
network, and a vector indicating whether each individual was purged or not (Fujimoto and 
Valente 2012; Papachristos et al. 2015). The resulting vector is then row normalized, which 
divides the first vector by another vector indicating the total number of people to which each 
individual is connected. The resulting term represents the level of peer influence of j on i as the 
average effect. This enables the calculation of an individual’s network exposure to victims as the 
percent of an individual’s direct contacts who are victims, friends of friends, and other contacts 
out to a distance of four handshakes away (Leenders 2002; Fujimoto and Valente 2012; 
Papachristos et al. 2015).  
Individual attributes, such as gender (0=Female, 1=Male), age (in years), Khmer ethnicity 
(0=No, 1=Yes), and previous occupational background, which is divided into dummy variables 
for military, professionals, service workers, agricultural workers, skilled labor, unskilled labor, 
and students, are included as exogenous nodal covariates. Whether or not a person joined before 
the 1975 takeover (0=No, 1=Yes), and role in the Khmer Rouge regime, for which dummy 
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variables for military, administrative, labor, and political roles, are used. I also include a variable 
for geographic location, using village as an additional exogenous variable. 
Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics for Individual Attributes. 
 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Min Max N 
Gender 0.70 0.46 0 1 1188 
Age 26.53 8.77 6 60 1188 
Khmer 0.96 0.18 0 1 1188 
      
Previous Occupation      
Military 0.08 0.27 0 1 96 
Professional 0.07 0.25 0 1 82 
Service 0.03 0.16 0 1 33 
Agriculture 0.69 0.46 0 1 818 
Skilled 0.05 0.22 0 1 58 
Unskilled 0.04 0.19 0 1 44 
Student 0.05 0.21 0 1 57 
Joined before 1975 0.63 0.48 0 1 1188 
      
Role in Regime      
Military 0.37 0.48 0 1 440 
Administrative 0.39 0.49 0 1 469 
Labor 0.15 0.36 0 1 184 
Political 0.08 0.27 0 1 95 
      
Purged 0.63 0.48 0 1 1188 
 
Demographically, the population of 1,188 Khmer Rouge officials in the Southwest Zone 
represents a predominantly male group with males accounting for 70% while females make up 
only 30%. The average age of Khmer Rouge members is 26, but age ranges between the 
youngest at 6 and the oldest at 60 years old. The Khmer Rouge officials in the Southwest Zone 
also represent a largely homogenous ethnic background of 96% Khmer. A solid majority of these 
officials (63%) joined the Khmer Rouge prior to the seizure of power in 1975 and came from an 
agricultural background. Most officials served in administrative roles followed by military, labor, 
and political positions respectively. During the period of Khmer Rouge rule, officials in the 
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Southwest Zone represented 567 different villages scattered throughout the zone. Out of this 
population of Khmer Rouge officials, a total of 63% were purged between 1975-1979.  
4.3.3. The Social Network of Southwest Zone Officials 
The network of Khmer Rouge officials described below represents face-to-face 
relationships within the organization. It does not include those individuals connected to regime 
officials who were not part of the Khmer Rouge, but instead, focuses on the internal connections 
among those who were part of the Southwest Zone administration.  





Average Degree 3.04 





Average path length 4.25 
Components 597 
 
A visualization of the Southwest Zone personnel network can be seen in Figure 4.1. The network 
contains 1,807 connections existed among the 1,188 Khmer Rouge officials. Despite the number 
of ties, the network of Southwest Zone officials is rather sparse, with a density of 0.0026. Each 
individual has an average degree of 3.04 ties, meaning that every individual has approximately 3 
connections to others. The distribution of degree, however, is skewed in favor of a few 
individuals who possess more connections that the rest of the network. This indicates that the 
network of Southwest Zone personnel is remarkably open, suggesting a lack of cohesion and that 
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prevented any single individual from exerting absolute power over the entire network. The 
network diameter is 10, which represents the longest path length between two nodes as a 
measure of how many steps it takes to cross the entire network. Average path length is 4.25, 
which indicates the average degree of separation between any two nodes in the network. With an 
average path length of 4.25, it is possible to reach any randomly selected node within less than 
five steps, reflecting a high level of connectivity within the network. For example, even though 
he occupied a powerful position as Southwest Zone Secretary, Mok had the ability to reach only 
42% of the network within a relatively few number of steps, suggesting that although he had 
strong influence, there were limits to Mok’s power. 
Figure 4.1 Social Network of Southwest Zone Personnel. 
 




 Moreover, the network of Southwest Zone personnel consists of several visually 
identifiable features. There are 571 individuals who isolates within the organization. These 
individuals possess no ties to other organizational members. The remaining 617 officials are 
clustered in 26 identifiable components of which the largest contains 525 individuals. The 
remaining components vary in size but represent much smaller clusters of individuals or isolates. 
This large connected component consists of 525 individuals and 1,217 ties, meaning that 
connections within the network are concentrated largely in this cluster. This is shown in Figure 
4.2 below. The presence of a large connected component reflects the tendency of individuals to 
form clusters. For example, the degree assortativity of the network is 0.32, which suggests that 
nodes with similar degree tend to form connections with each other. Hubs are connected to other 
hubs, and individuals with low degree tend to connect with individuals of low degree. The 
joining together of these hubs makes the emergence of a giant component possible. The giant 
component represents 44% of the personnel in the Southwest Zone.  
 Upon visual inspection of the largest connected component, it can be seen that purge 
victims appear to be clustered. There are areas of the network where victims concentrate and, in 
many instances, are only a few connections away from each other. On the other hand, there are 
other parts of the network without any victims where survivors are concentrated. Thus, the 
largest connected component of the Southwest Zone network provides an appropriate analytic 
sample with which to study the connections between personnel. The following analysis uses a 





Figure 4.2 Largest Connected Component within the Southwest Zone Network. 
 
Red nodes = purge victims, Black nodes = survivors 
 
4.4. Modeling Network Effects 
 In order to understand the effect that network position and exposure might have on an 
individual’s chance of becoming a purge victim, this paper uses a network autocorrelation model 
(NAM), using the Temporal Network Autocorrelation Model (tnam) package in R. Although 
previous studies of violence have accounted for network effects on the distribution of violence 
using linear regression models, this approach poses a problem when dealing with relational data 
common to network analysis (Papachristos et al. 2015). Standard linear regression analysis 
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assumes independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables. This means that 
observations can be replaced with any random sample and such an exchange of rows of data 
would not impact the inferences made. In other words, regression models operate under the 
assumption that observations have no influence on each other (Cranmer, Desmarais, and 
Menninga 2012). The relational nature of the data used in network analysis, however, violate this 
assumption due to the interdependence of observations and autocorrelation of the error terms 
(Cranmer, Heinrich, and Desmarais 2014). If not accounted for in the model, network effects are 
likely to be attributed to covariate effects, when in reality, covariate effects might exert no 
influence on the likelihood of being purged. This is problematic when using regression analysis 
with network data because it would imply that the model is not specified properly, thereby 
violating the properties of maximum likelihood estimation (Greene 2003; Cranmer, Desmarais, 
and Menninga 2012). Therefore, a different approach is needed to examine the effects of the 
network itself on purge victimization. 
Network autocorrelation models are the most widely used statistical models to account 
for social influence and were developed to specifically deal with the issue of network 
autocorrelation in regression analysis (Ord 1975; Doreian 1980; Doreian et al. 1984; Ibarra and 
Andrews 1993; Franzese and Hays 2007; Franzese, et al. 2012; Hadden and Jasny 2017). 
Network autocorrelation models can take one of two forms. One type, known as the peer effects 
or network effects model, considers social contagion as the result of not only individual 
attributes but also interactions with others in the network (Doreian et al. 1984; Leenders 2002; 
Vitale, Porzio, and Doreian 2016). The network effects model reflects the direct influence of 
others on an individual within the network (Leenders 2002). A second type of network 
autocorrelation model is the network disturbances model in which social contagion is modeled as 
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the result of comparison to others that results in changes in an individual’s behavior (Ord 1975; 
Doreian et al. 1984; Dow et al. 1984; Leenders 2002). This study uses a network effects model to 
estimate the impact of network position and exposure on the likelihood of victimization.2  
Network autocorrelation models are not without their own limitations. Mizruchi and 
Neuman (2008) note that network autocorrelation procedures tend to produce negatively biased 
estimates of network influence. Mizruchi and Neuman (2008) find that negative bias holds 
consistent across network types and sizes. This poses two problems for the analysis of social ties 
using a network autocorrelation model. First, models might not identify that network effects 
exist. Second, network autocorrelation models consistently underestimate the effects of network 
influence (Mizruchi and Neuman 2008). This problem of underestimation becomes more 
problematic with higher density networks; however, for low-density networks like those found in 
the Khmer Rouge, the bias tends to be less pronounced and only occurs in the case of positive 
coefficients (Mizruchi and Neuman 2008). Thus, in the case of the Khmer Rouge, the effects can 
be interpreted in a straightforward manner because significant and negative effects are unlikely 
biased while significant and positive effects are likely greater than estimates indicate. 
                                                        
2 The network autocorrelation models used in this paper were implemented using the 
tnam package in R, which is an extension of the xergm package for network analysis using 
temporal network autocorrelation models. tnam builds on the spatial autocorrelation model 
through the xergm package and is designed to account for the interdependence of phenomena 
that are embedded within social networks in a way that satisfies the requirements of maximum 
likelihood estimation (Leifeld, Cranmer and Desmarais 2014). Additionally, the tnam package 
can be used for either a single time period or multiple time periods by simply adjusting the 
number of time steps in the model as a well as a dichotomous dependent variable by changing 




 Although originally intended to measure the effects of physical proximity, the spatial 
autocorrelation model can be used to account for peer effects within a social network (Leenders 
2002). The network autocorrelation model takes the general form   
𝑌 = 	𝜌𝑊𝑌 + 𝑋𝛽 + 	𝜖 
 
In this model, purge victimization or survival, Y, is a function of exogenous covariates X and a 
weight matrix W multiplied by Y so that it represents the effect of an individual’s connections. 
The error term is represented by 𝜖. In its simplest form, the weight matrix W is the adjacency 
matrix for the network (Leenders 2002). The network autocorrelation model does not require the 
assumption that purge victims are independent of one another. Instead, within the tnam package, 
the network autocorrelation model can be configured to deal with a variety of network 
dependencies, including individual network position, network structures, and exposure.  
4.5. Results 
The results of the models are summarized in Table 4.3. Model 1 is a simple linear 
regression model in which I examine only the attributes of individual Khmer Rouge members as 
determinants of purge status. Inspection of individual-level predictors show that the likelihood of 
becoming a purge victim is greater for males than females and increases for individuals who 
occupy military, administrative, and labor roles within the regime. Each of these variables attains 
statistical significance. Occupational background, however, has no effect on the chance of being 
arrested and executed. Joining the Khmer Rouge before 1975 has a positive effect on the risk of 
becoming a victim; however, this variable does not attain statistical significance. Thus, the 
amount of time spent in the organization appears to have been neither protective nor harmful. 
Likewise, ethnicity is not significant in any of the models due to the fact that most personnel 
share the same Khmer background. The findings for the effects of personal attributes remain 
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consistent across all three models. Although not entirely exhaustive, the results suggest that 
younger, female members of the Khmer Rouge who joined prior to 1975 and served in non-
military roles during the DK era were more likely to avoid becoming victims of violent purges. 
On the other hand, relatively young males who served in labor, military, and administrative roles 
within the regime stood a higher chance of becoming victims.  
In Model 2, I introduce three variables to account for individual network position, 
defined as degree, betweenness, and structural similarity. The inclusion of network position 
improves the overall fit of the model with a difference in AIC of 12.25. Finally, Model 3 adds 
the exposure terms for both direct and indirect exposure. These two terms measure the effect of 
path distances of 1, a direct connection, as well as indirect connections up to a distance of 4 
handshakes away on the likelihood of becoming a victim. Again, the inclusion of the exposure 

























Table 4.3. Results of the Network Autocorrelation Models 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
(Intercept) -4.3341 (1.2673)*** -4.6127 (1.2892)*** -4.8031 (1.3857)***  
  Gender 2.4105 (0.3485)*** 2.3541 (0.3553)*** 2.4231 (0.3943)***  
  Age 0.0570 (0.0170)*** 0.0593 (0.0177)*** 0.0588 (0.0186)**  
  Khmer 0.6706 (0.8020) 0.9521 (0.8426) 0.7136 (0.8754)  
     
Previous Occupation     
  Military 0.3301 (1.0533) 0.2622 (1.0325) 0.6267 (1.1534)  
  Professional -0.4998 (0.8449) -0.1435 (0.8469) -0.6585 (0.9835)  
  Service 1.0532 (1.2086) 0.6948 (1.2039) 0.8245 (1.3147)  
  Agriculture -1.2693 (0.7062) -1.3191 (0.6703)* -0.9149 (0.7997)  
  Skilled Labor -0.4490 (1.1257) -0.5617 (1.0913) -0.3632 (1.2699)  
  Unskilled Labor -0.8119 (0.9440) -1.0342 (0.9192) -0.8645 (1.0559)  
  Joined Before 1975 -0.1095 (0.3096) 0.0263 (0.3237) 0.1719 (0.3571)  
     
Official Role     
  Military 1.4041 (0.3472)*** 1.1923 (0.3556)*** 1.0096 (0.3834)**  
  Administrative 0.9842 (0.3889)* 0.7408 (0.4003) 0.8756 (0.4278)*  
  Labor 2.8695 (0.6609)*** 2.8703 (0.7041)*** 3.0807 (0.7747)***  
     
Network Position     
  Degree  -0.3532 (0.1477)* -0.4088 (0.1664)*  
  Betweenness  0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0002 (0.0001)*  
  Structural Similarity  -0.1221 (0.0619)* -0.1575 (0.0698)*  
  Direct Exposure   0.9636 (0.4052)*  
  Indirect Exposure (Path dist. of 2) 5.5209 (1.5541)***  
  Indirect Exposure (Path dist. of 3) -5.8093 (3.7290)  
  Indirect Exposure (Path dist. of 4) -15.1586 (8.9764)  
AIC 484.9022 472.6571 425.0603  
BIC 544.5897 545.1349 514.5916  
Log Likelihood -228.4511 -219.3286 -191.5301  
Deviance 456.9022 438.6571 383.0603  
Num. obs. 525 525 525  








Individual network position defined as degree, betweenness, and structural similarity 
each return as statistically significant. The models indicate a negative correlation exists between 
degree centrality and purge victimization. This implies that the more connections an individual 
possesses the less likely they are to become purge victims, which runs counter to my expectation 
in Hypothesis 1. Instead, it appears that having a greater number of connections offers a level of 
security from purges by insulating individuals against the arrest. This negative correlation 
between number of contacts and purge victimization also suggests that social cohesion is not 
necessarily the mechanism driving the contagion of violence (Hadden and Jasny 2017). In fact, 
the results support the opposite conclusion. While cohesion appears to be key to survival, purge 
victims seem to suffer from the strength of weak ties noted by Granovetter (1973). Betweenness 
centrality, or brokerage, is positively correlated with purge victimization; however, an increase 
in the number of paths between other nodes does not lead to a noticeable increase in the odds of 
being purged. This null finding reveals that betweenness does not affect the likelihood of 
victimization, contrary to the expectations of Hypothesis 2, which claims that sitting across a 
greater number of shortest paths between other nodes places an individual in a potentially 
vulnerable position.  
The statistical significance of both degree and structural similarity appear to confirm that 
the contagion of violence in the Southwest Zone was driven by both divergence and competition 
within a sparse network. The negative correlation between structural similarity and purge 
victimization points toward targeting based on structural differentiation, which is indicative of 
competition within the network aimed at the removal of rivals (Burt and Talmud 1993; Hadden 
and Jasny 2017). Sharing a structurally similar position decreases the odds of becoming a purge 
victim. Rather than spreading via similar network substructures, the models indicate that the 
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contagion of violence is driven by dissimilar structures within an unstable network.  This finding 
is in line with the results found in Models 2 and 3 for betweenness.  
Lastly, Model 3 provides evidence that direct and indirect exposure are significant and 
positively correlated to becoming a purge victim, confirming Hypotheses 4 and 5. This means 
that an increase in direct exposure to each additional purge victim puts an individual at an 
increased risk of being purged. For each additional indirect connection at a path distance of 2 
that is victimized, the risk of an individual becoming a victim increases. In other words, having a 
friend of a friend arrested and executed was a cause for concern that an individual would suffer a 
similar fate. Beyond a path distance of 2, the risk of purge declines. Thus, exposure to purge 
victims increases the chances that an individual will also be victimized while the further an 
individual is from purge victims, the less likely they will be arrested and executed.  
To better understand the impact of network position on the risk of being purged, I 
calculated the average marginal effects (AMEs) from the coefficients estimated by Model 3.3 
Average marginal effects provide a useful indicator of the probabilistic impact of network 
position on the risk of being purged by summarizing the network effects across all observations 
and reporting the average (LeSage and Pace 2009). Average marginal effects have rarely been 
used with network models; however, the results are consistent with the overall evidence 
suggesting the impact of network position on the risk of being purged. Additionally, the results 
of the network autocorrelation model and its average marginal effects are similar to those 
produced by standard logistic regression. The results of this comparison are presented in the 
appendix. Moreover, the findings suggest that the models used in this paper are correctly 
                                                        
3 Average marginal effects were calculated using the margins package in R, which is designed to 
produce similar results as the margins function in Stata. 
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identifying a network effect in the contagion of violence. The average marginal effects for the 
statistically significant results from Model 3 are seen in Table 4.4.   










Structural Similarity -0.0185 
Direct Exposure 0.1129 
Indirect Exposure (Path Dist. Of 2) 0.6467 
N = 525  
 
Although the effect of degree centrality and structural similarity each lead to a slight 
decrease in the chance of becoming a victim, the impact is quite small. The null results for 
betweenness means that brokerage roles do not affect the likelihood of victimization. On the 
contrary, the statistically significant but negligible findings related to betweenness suggest that 
brokerage is profitable in terms of survival for some members of the network but also creates 
risk for others. This is possibly indicative of a more complex phenomenon at work, such as an 
interaction effect taking place between different variables or differences in the types of relations 
in the network that would require a more detailed investigation in the future using different 
network models, such as exponential random graph modeling, as a starting point. 
The average marginal effects highlight how direct and indirect exposure dramatically 
increase the risk of being purged. For instance, the model suggests that having a greater number 
of connections in general offers protection; however, this ceases to be the case when and if ties 
are arrested and executed. Rather than insulating an individual from violence, an increase in 
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direct exposure to each additional victim leads to an 11% increase in the likelihood of being 
purged.   
Figure 4.3 Average Marginal Effect of Indirect Exposure 
 
 
An increase in indirect exposure at distance of 2 leads to an even greater increase in the 
likelihood of being arrested and executed than direct exposure. For every additional friend of a 
friend that is purged, the chance of becoming a victim increases 64%. Figure 4.3 highlights this 
point by plotting the predicted probabilities from model 3 against the average effect of indirect 
exposure at a distance of 2. Interestingly, indirect exposure has a larger impact than direct 
exposure on the likelihood of being purged, which is indicative of a spillover effect, or social 
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contagion within the network (LeSage and Pace 2009). The quantitative findings also 
compliment historical evidence that the purges within the Khmer Rouge often reached beyond 
the initial arrest into the social network of a victim, which was often immediately targeted for 
arrest and execution. This included spouses, children, extended family, friends, coworkers, and 
other known associates. The efforts to root out “strings of traitors” led internal security forces to 
carry out widespread purges that eliminated CPK cadres in large numbers (Hinton 2005). 
Together, these findings confirm that social networks indeed played a part in the contagion of 
violence in Cambodia’s Southwest Zone during the Khmer Rouge era.  
4.6. Discussion 
The data on Khmer Rouge personnel in the Southwest Zone reveal a social network of 
relatively young males who worked in mostly military and administrative roles within the 
regime. Social network analysis shows a network of 1,188 individuals with an average of 3 
personal connections to other members inside the organization. Additionally, ties are clustered in 
a large connected component consisting of 1,217 ties among 525 individuals. This concentration 
of connections among Khmer Rouge personnel was instrumental in the contagion of violence 
across the network, resulting in the arrest and execution of 62.7% of members of the Southwest 
Zone administration.  
The results of the network autocorrelation model clearly indicate a network effect on 
victimization. Consistent with theoretical expectations, I find that individual network position 
and exposure are correlated with the contagion of violence victimization during a political purge. 
Individual network position surprisingly benefits from an increase in the number of direct ties in 
general. Contrary to expectations, cohesion appears to be a key factor in the survival of Khmer 
Rouge members in the Southwest Zone rather than the contagion of violence. The estimates for 
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brokerage roles, however, offer a less clear picture. For some individuals, occupying a bridging 
position between different parts of the network introduces an element of vulnerability while for 
others sitting across paths between others offers protection. The tests of structural similarity 
reveal evidence of instability and competition within the network. This is possibly indicative of 
the fact that despite official efforts to rid the CPK of personal networks, patron-client ties 
continued to play a significant role in shaping the behavior of personnel within the organization 
(Hinton 2005). 
Direct exposure to purge victims leads to an increased risk of arrest and execution. While 
the network autocorrelation model does not indicate causal direction, the results clearly 
demonstrate a positive correlation between direct exposure to victims and an increased chance of 
being purged. The results also indicate that this risk extends to indirect exposure through a 
friend-of-a-friend being purged. Moreover, these findings are consistent with similar research 
into homicide victims and the contagion of gang violence across social networks in North 
America, which reveal that network structure plays an important role in the spread of murder 
across a high-risk population (See Papachristos et al. 2015).   
4.7. Conclusion 
This paper provides insight into why some individuals fall victim to violent political 
purges while others do not despite sharing similar characteristics as members of high-risk 
populations. The results of the network autocorrelation models offer support to the argument that 
violence is a socially embedded phenomenon that spreads in contagion-like fashion across a 
network. Individual attributes, such as gender, age, ethnicity, previous occupation, official roles, 
or length of time in the organization cannot adequately explain why purge victims tend to cluster 
around another. On the contrary, the results of this study imply that victimization during a 
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violent purge is better explained by examining individual network position and exposure. The 
evidence suggests that during violent political purges individuals are arrested and killed because 
they inhabit a set of social networks that shape the likelihood of becoming a victim or a survivor. 
As victims are identified, arrested, imprisoned, and executed, their relationships with family, 
friends, neighbors, and coworkers become natural pathways through which violence spreads.  
This paper also highlights the need for a better understanding of the influence of social 
structure in micro-level studies of political violence. If political violence is indeed a socially 
embedded phenomenon, then approaches such as those used in this paper should be considered 
vital to explaining important questions about victimization and survival. The wider implications 
of these findings suggest that the spread of political violence in general relies on social networks 
with important consequences for how we understand repression and violence against civilians in 
general. A secondary implication of this study is the value of using social network analysis in the 
study of comparative politics and international relations. Given the interdependent nature of 
many phenomena of interest, network models can help explain a wide range of different puzzles, 
including ones related to political violence, conflict, peace, trade, alliances, and political 
economy. 
To be clear, the conclusions of this study are limited. Although the network 
autocorrelation models used in this study do not provide conclusive evidence for a causal test, 
the results point toward a conceivable causal relationship between network position and exposure 
and purge victimization. Further research using a temporal network autocorrelation model could 
possibly help tease out the causal relationship with greater clarity. 
Finally, this paper points toward several additional questions for further study. One area 
of interest deserving additional research is a closer examination of cohesion and structural 
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similarity, or in some instances, divergence and competition, as mechanisms that drive the 
contagion of violence.  Why, as in the case of the Khmer Rouge, do these particular network 
features facilitate the spread of violence? Is one more important than the other? Answering these 
questions would add to our understanding of the underlying mechanisms behind the contagion of 
violence. Another area in need of more research is the exploration of network structures that 
drive contagion and produce the observed pattern of victimization. Do network structures help 
explain the observed differences in the distribution and patterns of victims and survivors within 
the network? Finding an answer to this question would provide additional evidence that could be 
used to explain the mechanisms underlying the spread of violent purges. Lastly, the results 
presented in this paper suggest that using social network analysis can further our understanding 
of the violent processes related to state formation and the establishment of political order. 
Further research should seek to identify the types of networks and mechanisms that contribute to 














Why are some militant organizations more resilient than others? What gives some 
organizations the ability to continue to operate despite losses while others collapse? Existing 
research points to a number of factors, such as access to resources, formal structure, and 
ideology; however, missing from these explanations is a detailed analysis using empirical data on 
the actual networks themselves found within militant organizations. In this paper, I explain how 
endogenous dependencies influence the resilience of networks within a militant organization. 
Using Cambodia’s Southwest Zone under the Khmer Rouge as an illustrative case, this paper 
presents evidence from the digital archives of the Documentation Center of Cambodia, which 
contain detailed biographical data on more than 30,000 Khmer Rouge leaders down to the 
district level. The archives record a variety of ties, including kinship, recruitment, work, and 
general associations, which are suitable for reconstructing the social networks within the regime. 
I argue that endogenous processes play a key role in the formation of networks, which function 
as the backbone of revolutionary organizations. Using a temporal exponential random graph 
model, I find that network structure, particularly brokerage and transitive closure, each 
contribute to the formation of a resilient network structure over time. Ultimately, this paper 







Why are some militant organizations more resilient than others?  What gives some 
organizations the ability to continue to operate despite losses while others collapse? Existing 
research on terrorist organizations (Jordan 2014), mafia syndicates (Agreste, Cantese, De Meo, 
Ferrara, and Fiumara 2016), and criminal gangs (Ouellet, Bouchard, and Charette 2018) has 
offered a number of possible explanations as the cause of organizational resilience, including 
size (Haveman 1993), formal structures (Minkoff 1999; Parkinson 2013; Jordan 2014), and 
access to resources (Schulman 1993; Minkoff 1999; Weinstein 2007; Humphreys and Weinstein 
2008). Moreover, studies of militant organizations in particular have noted the importance of 
interpersonal networks as a significant factor in the creation of group longevity and survival 
(Wickham-Crowley 1992; Petersen 2001; Wood 2003; Sinno 2008; Mampilly 2011; Christia 
2012; Parkinson 2013; Staniland 2014; Parkinson and Zaks 2018). Although this research has 
contributed much to our present understanding of the internal dynamics of revolutionary 
organizations, to date, we still know relatively little about the internal processes that lead to the 
formation of resilient social networks within these formal institutional structures. Missing from 
this research is a detailed analysis using empirical data on the actual networks themselves found 
within militant organizational structures.  
In this paper, I argue that the underlying social networks within revolutionary 
organizations are key to understanding organizational resilience among militant groups. I 
contend that embeddedness and cohesion play a critical role in the formation of networks which 
provide the ability of revolutionary organizations to withstand significant losses over time. The 
temporal evolution of these networks reflects a combination of endogenous processes, such as a 
tendency to create brokerage positions through weak ties, a preference for decentralized clusters, 
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and an inclination to seek triadic closure, which each have a direct bearing on organizational 
capacity for communication and coordination. Operating simultaneously, the processes of 
cohesion and embeddedness shape the development and effectiveness of formal institutional 
structures over time. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to examine an aspect of revolutionary 
organizations that is, thus far, unexplored in the literature, namely the extent to which structural 
dependencies among actors influence the evolution of networks that are vital to the longevity of 
militant organizations.  
Using archival material made available through the Documentation Center of Cambodia 
(DCCAM), which contains detailed biographical data on more than 30,000 Khmer Rouge leaders 
down to the district level, I reconstruct the social networks of Khmer Rouge officials located in 
the Southwest Zone to support this claim. Through social network analysis, this paper 
demonstrates how endogenous processes of network evolution led to the resilience of social 
networks within the Khmer Rouge. The results of a temporal exponential random graph model 
(TERGM) indicate that the formation of a resilient network is driven by a combination of 
embeddedness and cohesion.  
This paper contributes to the literature on militant organizations, particularly our 
understanding of social networks as sources of organizational resilience. I present a rare visual 
map of the social structure of Khmer Rouge personnel, which is then examined in detail. Like 
many militant revolutionary organizations, social networks shaped the development and 
trajectory of the Khmer Rouge regime. Longitudinal social network analysis provides a way to 
quantify and systematically investigate the underlying social structure of the Khmer Rouge in an 
effort to better understand the inner workings of the regime. Second, this paper provides a 
statistical analysis of the endogenous processes of network formation that sheds light on the 
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internal forces that sustained one of history’s most notorious militant organizations. Thirdly, this 
paper also speaks to the broader literature on militant organizations and non-state actors who 
engage in state formation, offering insight into a process that is often characterized by 
contestation and violence but rarely studied at such an intimate level. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section turns to a relational 
theory of organizational resilience as the result of robust social networks. Using Cambodia’s 
Southwest Zone under the Khmer Rouge, I map the social networks beneath the Southwest Zone, 
which the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) considered one of its model administrations 
and presents a test of several hypotheses related to network formation using a temporal 
exponential random graph model. The sixth section discusses the results. A final section 
concludes with a summary of the main findings and recommendations for further research.  
5.2. Organizational resilience 
The concept of resilience has developed across a diverse body of research in a number of 
different fields, including the physical sciences (Holling 1973), social sciences (Meyer 1982; 
Weick 1993), and management (Christopher and Peck 2004; Sheffi and Rice, Jr. 2005). In 
general, resilience can be described from two different perspectives. Ecological resilience refers 
to the ability to withstand external shocks and remain viable as a system while engineering 
resilience focuses on the “resistance to disruption and speed of return to the pre-existing 
equilibrium” (Annarelli and Nonino 2016, 3). When applied to organizations, resilience can be 
defined as the capacity of an organization to withstand shocks and continue operations despite 
the continued existence of stress (Sutcliffe and Vogus 2003). Additionally, organizational 
resilience represents a temporal process and is best viewed from a longitudinal perspective that 
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emphasizes how organizations respond to external shocks over time (Bakker, Raab, and Milward 
2012).   
Research across an interdisciplinary landscape has identified a number of explanations as 
the possible source of organizational resilience, including the size of an organization (Haveman 
1993), diversification of roles and bureaucratization (Minkoff 1999; Parkinson 2013; Jordan 
2014), and access to resources (Schulman 1993; Minkoff 1999; Weinstein 2007; Humphreys and 
Weinstein 2008). Empirical evidence indicates that there is a positive relationship between size 
of an organization and its flexibility. Medium to large-sized organizations have the resources and 
formal structures needed to adapt, making them able to absorb external shocks and reposition 
resources to meet changes in the environment (Haveman 1993).  
Moreover, the size of an organization is directly related to the level of diversification and 
bureaucratization within the organization. As size increases, organizations often diversify to 
specialize in different functions, creating routines, rules, and processes to establish order, 
stability, and efficiency (Jordan 2014). Militant group diversification, in terms of the 
development of differentiated roles within an organization, is a key source of group longevity, 
flexibility, and survival (Parkinson 2013). This diversification of roles within militant 
organizations often takes on the form of bureaucratization through the creation of specific 
command and control hierarchies as well as separate military, political, and social branches 
responsible for carrying out specialized functions (Jordan 2014). These formal structures provide 
an internal system of rules and procedures that give the organization stability as well as clear 
roles and responsibilities for members when placed under stress (Jordan 2014).  
Size and bureaucratization are also important factors that affect an organization’s access 
to resources. Larger, more diversified organizations possess more slack resources, which refer to 
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resources available within the organization that can be shifted to areas of need in response to 
external environmental changes (Schulman 1993; Minkoff 1999). In sum, as they age and grow 
in size, organizations are more likely to have a variety of specialized units, which can provide the 
flexibility, resources, and speed needed to adjust to changes in the environment without losing 
operational readiness (Haveman 1993; Minkoff 1999). 
5.2.1. A Network perspective on organizational resilience 
Although size, diversification, and access to resources are correlated with organizational 
resilience, these factors fail to explain why some militant organizations are able to continue 
operating in the face of severe shocks while others with similar traits cease to exist. The fact that 
large, bureaucratized organizations sometimes fail while smaller, less diversified organizations 
survive suggests that there are additional causal mechanisms at work. Thus, in order to gain 
further insight into the internal dynamics of militant organizations, I turn to a relational 
explanation based on the interdisciplinary study of social networks that examines interpersonal 
relationships among members as the source of organizational resilience.  
Like other kinds of organizations, revolutionary organizations are built and operate on the 
interpersonal relations that exist between members. Organizations can be defined as identifiable 
configurations of roles joined by relations that are created for the purpose of accomplishing a 
particular task (Kadushin 2012; Parkinson and Zaks 2018). Role represents an individual’s 
position in relation to others that is characterized by the attributes each individual possesses or 
the tasks he or she performs within the organization (Parkinson and Zaks 2018). Knoke (1990) 
argues that roles are “the basic units of any complex political system” (7). Moreover, roles can 
be defined by gender, age, and length of time in the organization as well as official positions, 
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such as military, administrative, or political positions. Roles or positions, however, are most 
accurately defined in relation to other positions, which are connected by social interactions.  
While true that members of revolutionary organizations often take on distinct roles, it is 
important to consider that organizations also depend on the relations among members. Relations 
are defined as the interactions between individuals within a revolutionary organization. Social 
interaction is governed by norms that create expectations and obligations on actors to behave in 
certain ways (Knoke 1990; Parkinson and Zaks 2018). Moreover, organizations engaged in high-
risk activities like criminal activity, terrorism, insurgency, or revolution face internal and 
external threats to their existence that drive members to form strong within-group ties in an effort 
to seek protection and clarify group loyalties while also increasing a propensity to adopt a 
paranoid conspiratorial mindset toward outsiders (Lichbach 1998). Within-group ties strengthen 
cohesion and solidarity because they reduce uncertainty and create trust through regular contact 
(Granovetter 1985).  
Moreover, formal organizational structures are intended to create a clear chain of 
command that directs members as they carry out day to day tasks. Diversification often leads to 
the development of siloed bureaucratic structures designed to carry out specialized tasks or 
functions, such as military operations or administrative functions (Kadushin 2012). Informal 
networks, however, often emerge across vertical structures as individuals seek to gain security, 
efficiency in cooperation, access to resources, and positions of power, which can either align 
with the goals of the organization or actively work against them (Kadushin 2012). These 
networks thus form the backbone of a militant organization (Kilduff and Krackhardt 2008; 
Kadushin 2012; Parkinson 2013; Parkinson and Zaks 2018). Although a hierarchical structure 
might exist on paper, the “important work in most organizations gets done through networks” 
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(Cross and Parker 2004, 4). These networks often take priority over formal organizational 
structures, shaping the way communication and coordination take place within an organization 
and exerting a direct influence on performance, particularly the capacity to respond to extreme 
stress (Cross and Parker 2004; Pedahzur and Perliger 2006). 
Intra-organizational networks are key to understanding the behavior, cohesion, and 
dynamics that determine the trajectory of militant organizations (Staniland 2014). For example, 
insurgent organization trajectories are influenced by pre-war social networks that become part of 
militant operations (Staniland 2014). Parkinson (2013) identifies this overlap of organizational 
hierarchy and quotidian relationships within militant organizations as the main source of 
organizational resilience over time. Pre-existing networks, such as kinship and friendship, that 
become part of a militant organization provide a supply of ready participants who can be easily 
mobilized. Additionally, resilience emerges from a combination of horizontal and vertical ties 
between peers and leaders respectively that determine the level of cohesion within an 
organization (Staniland 2014). Networks are able to bridge gaps between specialized units, such 
as military, administrative, social, and political units, providing critical links that create the 
flexibility necessary for innovation and adaptation in the face of significant disruptions 
(Pedahzur and Perliger 2006; Parkinson 2013).  
Resilience can be defined as a function of the robustness of the networks within an 
organization that enable it to withstand attacks and continue to exist as a defined network 
(Barabasi 2016; Annarelli and Nonino 2016). As such, robustness is directly related to network 
topology, which refers to the overall structure of the network and its properties as a whole 
(Barabasi 2016; Gao, Barzel, and Barabasi 2016). In general, the topology of a network can 
provide a measure of robustness by considering the level of network connectivity, which is 
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associated with the distance between nodes and the diameter. Distance represents the length of 
the shortest path between a given pair of nodes while diameter indicates to the longest path 
between a given pair of nodes. Both of these measures capture the reachability of the network. 
Moreover, if a path exists between every pair of nodes in the network, a connected subgraph 
called a component is present (Wasserman and Faust 1994). The key question behind 
understanding robustness then becomes, does the network remain connected as nodes are 
removed? In other words, robustness can be measured as the effect of node removal on network 
connectivity, and a network is said to be robust if connectivity remains relatively stable in the 
face of attacks (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Barabasi 2016). Lastly, network robustness can be 
calculated directly using the Malloy-Reed criterion to obtain the critical threshold at which the 
largest connected component ceases to exist.4 The measure found using this approach reveals the 
percent of nodes that must be removed in order for the network to collapse and provides a clear 
indicator of network robustness (Barabasi 2016).  
In addition, network robustness is not only related to type of network determined by the 
topology but also the nature of an attack. Random networks refer to networks in which degree 
distribution follows a normal distribution, meaning that connections between nodes occur 
according to probability. Random networks are able to absorb attacks until a certain percentage 
of nodes are removed, which then results in the collapse of the network into disconnected 
components (Barabasi 2016). On the other hand, scale free networks describe networks in which 
degree distribution follows a power law or exponential curve, which reveals that connections 
                                                        
4 The Malloy-Reed Criterion is defined as 𝑘 = (<
=)
(<)
> 2, where k = average degree. When k > 2, 
a giant component is likely to exist. Using the Malloy-Reed Criterion, the robustness of the 
network can be calculated to locate the critical threshold fc using the following formula:  




  (Barabasi 2016). 
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between nodes are unevenly distributed with a few nodes possessing most of the connections 
found in the network. Although able to withstand random attacks, scale free networks are 
particularly vulnerable to targeted removal of high degree nodes (Barabasi 2016). In sum, 
robustness can be measured and analyzed using social network analysis to examine the topology 
of the network, specifically the level of connectivity present, which has a direct influence on the 
network’s ability to withstand attacks. Of particular analytical interest are the mechanisms that 
lead to the formation of networks that create organizational resilience.  
5.3. Mechanisms of network formation that lead to resilience 
For clandestine organizations, such as criminal groups, gangs, terrorists, insurgents, and 
revolutionaries, resilience and longevity often reflect a tradeoff between the ability to continue to 
grow through the recruitment of new members and conservation of resources that places a 
priority on security (Ouellet et al. 2018). Organizational preference for security over efficiency 
can create a built-in flexibility that provides resilience to attacks but also can produce tension 
between coordinating collective action through information sharing and maintaining secrecy 
(Lindelauf, Borm, and Hamers 2011). Balancing these two seemingly opposite organizational 
needs requires the presence of two different but interrelated mechanisms, namely embeddedness 
and cohesion, that drive network formation within the organization (Ouellet et al. 2018). 
5.3.1. Embeddedness  
First, revolutionary organizations have a clear need for efficiency that enables 
information sharing and coordinates collective action. This organizational efficiency is directly 
related to the concept of social embeddedness. In general, social embeddedness refers to the fact 
that actors exist within interactive networks of social relationships, which shape both identities 
and interests (Granovetter 1985). More specifically, embeddedness is defined as the number of 
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common neighbors between two individuals (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Accordingly, 
members of revolutionary organizations are embedded within social networks that exist inside 
the organization, which produces a level of connectedness necessary for resilience (Parkinson 
2013; Staniland 2014).  
For Granovetter (1985), the connectivity between actors is key to understanding social 
embeddedness as the source of trust between members of a network. In general, social 
relationships provide reliable information that allows actors to know the reputation of others 
based on past behavior. As a result, social networks mitigate the problem of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma by allowing actors to gain a degree of certainty about the preferences of others and 
anticipate their actions. In the context of revolutionary organizations, direct ties are necessary for 
generating trust with other members of the organization, reflecting a preference for interacting 
with individuals whose reputation and history of past behavior can be known (Granovetter 1985). 
This, in turn, reduces uncertainty and provides a level of predictability.  
Even though social networks create trust and reliable behavior, Granovetter (1985) points 
out that relationships “are not sufficient to guarantee these and may even provide occasion and 
means for malfeasance on a scale larger than in their absence” (491). In some instances, 
interpersonal relationships characterized by trust actually enable betrayal and violence on a much 
wider level than if actors existed independently and alone. Granovetter (1985) offers three 
reasons for why this is the case. First, trust can also present an occasion for wrongdoing. People 
are less suspecting of those they know and trust. Trusting relationships also have the potential for 
creating vulnerabilities. Second, “force and fraud are most efficiently pursued by teams,” which 
depend on trust that often emerges out preexisting personal connections (Granovetter 1985, 492). 
The trust found in networks enables groups to carry out actions efficiently; however, it also 
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creates the possibility that entire networks can be taken down through the arrest or elimination of 
a single member. Third, Granovetter (1985) claims that the scale and reach of bad conduct is 
shaped by the social structure of these relations. Additionally, networks are not distributed 
evenly society evenly, meaning that some individuals are more connected than others, placing 
them in situations with differing degrees of opportunity and constraint as coalitions form and 
dissolve. For some, these networks offer protection while preying on victims. At the same time, 
networks can also create risk for other actors who occupy vulnerable roles (Granovetter 1985). 
As a result, the need to maintain security can create incentives for members of an organization to 
limit their connectivity (Simmel 1950; Erickson 1981; DellaPosta 2016). 
5.3.1.1. Brokerage Roles  
Under these circumstances, organizational efficiency can often be achieved through 
brokerage positions. According to Granovetter (1973), acquaintances, or “weak ties,” provide 
key points of contact by acting as bridges or brokers between different parts of a network that 
might otherwise be disconnected. Social networks among members of a revolutionary 
organization are likely to contain brokerage positions, which offer a number of distinct 
advantages that aid the development of organizational efficiency (Parkinson 2013). For example, 
weak ties guarantee the ability of information and resources to move from one part of a network 
to another (Parkinson 2013). Clusters or hubs within a network resemble closed systems that are 
cut off from other parts of the network, which limits members’ ability to access information and 
resources. Brokerage positions help overcome this problem by providing important connections 
between distant parts of a network (Burt 1992; Kadushin 2012). Thus, brokerage positions allow 
revolutionary organizations to avoid the problem of vulnerability posed by large clusters of 
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members directly linked to one another, giving the organization a level of functional connectivity 
and flexibility needed to remain resilient (Parkinson 2013). This leads to my first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: Brokerage positions are likely to be a key factor in the formation of 
resilient networks. 
 
5.3.2. Cohesion  
Although revolutionary organizations can benefit from the efficiency of embeddedness, 
they also face pressure to maintain cohesion against both internal and external threats (Crenshaw 
1992; Lichbach 1998; Ouellet et al. 2018). Cohesion describes the way in which social structure, 
particularly multiple independent paths between individuals, enables members of a group to stick 
together. In a more technical sense, cohesion refers to the minimum number of individuals that 
can be removed from the group before it ceases to remain connected. In other words, cohesion is 
a reflection of the robustness of the underlying networks within an organization (Moody and 
White 2003).  
Strong within-group ties to other members tend to help insulate the group against attacks, 
create a shared sense of identity, and reduce the chance of defections (Lichbach 1998; Hafez 
2003; Della Porta 2013; Ouellet et al. 2018). Such solidarity is the result of regular interaction, 
often along preexisting social networks that run much deeper than formal organizational 
structures (Parkinson 2013; Staniland 2014). These social networks strengthen cohesion by 
reducing uncertainty and building trust among members (Granovetter 1985). Lusher, Koskinen, 
and Robins (2013) argue that the formation of cohesive personal relationships into social 
networks is the result of two interrelated processes, namely attraction based on individual 
attributes, also known as homophily, and the structure of the network itself, which is the product 





Relationships within revolutionary organizations are often the product of individual 
selection. Social network analysis identifies the tendency for individuals to form strong within-
group relationships, often with others who share similar attributes, as homophily, which is 
sometimes explained as the idea that “birds of a feather flock together” (Lazarsfeld and Merton 
1954; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001; Kadushin 2012). This attraction can be based 
on status, values or attributes and is often founded on pre-existing relationships, such as kinship 
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001).   
Among members of a revolutionary organization, relevant attributes that attract 
individuals to one another can often gender, age, ethnicity, survival, geographic co-location, 
previous occupation, official role in the organization, and social group. Shared gender and 
ethnicity can enable coordination (Parkinson 2013; Larson 2016, 2017; Larson and Lewis 2018).  
Moreover, survivors of intra-organizational violence are often found connected to one another as 
violence tends to travel along the natural pathways of social networks, producing chains of 
victims and survivors (Papachristos et al. 2014).  
In addition, homophily can also be driven by other kinds of characteristics, such as being 
located in the same geographic location (McPherson et al. 2001), having similar skill sets related 
to occupational backgrounds (Huang 2017), and sharing in common experiences that create 
cohesion among members, such as serving together in the same unit under stressful conditions 
(Parkinson 2013; Staniland 2014). Each of these characteristics can cause members to build and 
maintain strong ties with one another. Due to the propensity to favor within-group ties, the 
presence of homophily can exert a significant effect on the structure of networks (Krivitsky and 
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Morris 2017). Thus, it is important to test for the presence of homophily, which leads to my next 
two hypotheses.   
Hypothesis 2: Actors are more likely to form strong ties with individuals who have 
similar attributes than build relationships with others who have different attributes. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Actors are more likely to form strong ties with members of their own 
social groups than between-group ties. 
 
Although individual attributes play a role in network formation, the self-organization of 
social networks via endogenous dependencies that exist between ties also contribute to the 
development and trajectory of networks within formal organizational structures (Lusher et al. 
2013). These self-organizing characteristics are known as structural effects and are related to the 
topology of the network itself. Two types of network structures are of particular interest when 
examining large, complex militant organizations, namely degree centrality and closure.  
5.3.2.2. Degree Centrality 
Although members of revolutionary organizations must address the need for connectivity, 
the demand for cohesion in high-risk environments often leads to the formation of strong within-
group relations (Scott 1972; DellaPosta 2016). As a particular type of within-group structure, 
patron-client ties characterized by networks, factions, and coalitions that often exist within the 
formal institutions of militant organizations, political parties, and bureaucracies of the modern 
state (Scott 1972; Knoke 1990; Hicken 2011). Traditionally, systems of patron-client relations 
provide clients with protection as well as access to opportunities while patrons received support 
and loyalty from their base. These informal structures are based on clusters of individuals who 
form communities dependent on a patron and exhibit multiplex behavior in the overlapping ties 
that form out of kinship and other types of relationships (Scott 1972; Knoke 1999; Hinton 2005). 
Patron-client relations, however, are also rarely equal. Patrons usually occupy a position of 
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power and access to resources that cannot be matched by their clients, making the clients 
somewhat dependent on the patron. Even though this relationship is instrumental in nature, it 
does not give patrons absolute power (Hinton 2005).  
Moreover, patrons must deal with the reality that their clients can choose to switch their 
loyalty to a different patron even if such a move proves costly. This tends to create an 
atmosphere of “suspicion and distrust” within patron-client systems (Hinton 2005, 124). Clients 
who begin to be seen as a patron in their own right, gaining their own clients, can come to be 
viewed as potential rivals or even traitors in the eyes of their former patron. Rival patrons are 
viewed as enemies who seek to undermine one’s own position of power. At the same time, much 
of the maintenance of patron-client relations falls to patrons who often attempt to prevent 
defection and disloyalty through incentives and coercion. The instability inherent in such a 
system often leads to the absence of lasting institutions outside of kinship and an environment 
marked by paranoia and suspicion (Hinton 2005).    
Using social network analysis, patron-client relations can be understood through the 
concept of degree centrality, which refers to the number of direct connections that each 
individual possesses (Freeman 1978). Actors with a large degree, such as patrons, are considered 
more prominent than other actors because they have many direct connections to others that offer 
opportunities and options in the form of access to power, information, and resources. In contrast, 
actors with a low degree have significantly less influence due to their peripheral position 
characterized by few direct ties to others (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Moreover, degree is 
rarely distributed evenly across a network. Large numbers of ties are often concentrated in the 
hands of a powerful few while most members have only a few direct connections (Kadushin 
2012). The overall tendency in systems characterized by patron-client networks and clandestine 
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activity means that there is often a tendency toward decentralization within the network. This 
phenomenon leads to the formation of multiple star-like clusters that serve as the building blocks 
of patron-client networks (Scott 1972; Hicken 2011; Lusher et al. 2013). This raises a fourth 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: Individuals are likely to form multiple, decentralized star-shaped clusters. 
 
5.3.2.3. Closure 
In addition to a tendency to gather in clusters around patrons connected by brokers, 
DellaPosta (2016) argues that in the case of clandestine and criminal networks, individuals face 
transaction costs in finding partners they can trust, reputational costs that accompany the 
formation of between-group ties, and opportunity costs in time spent developing those 
relationships. Individuals face transaction costs in the formation and maintenance of 
relationships that prioritize trust. Strong ties offer better security and are easier to form along the 
lines of pre-existing relationships, such as kinship. Members of revolutionary organizations also 
face reputational costs as relationships with outsiders can raise questions about within-group 
loyalty to one’s own patron-client network. Opportunity costs restrict the choices of individuals 
to seek relationship outside their own social group. It becomes much easier to rely on within-
group ties for access to resources and opportunities than to build relationships with outsiders 
(Erickson 1981; DellaPosta 2016).  
Due to these concerns, individuals in clandestine networks can exhibit a preference for 
network closure, which is characterized by strong within-group ties, in order to gain security at 
the expense of network effectiveness (DellaPosta 2016). Closure constrains both the sharing of 
information across the network as well as coordination between other parts of the network 
(DellaPosta 2016). Network closure, also knowns as transitivity, refers to the tendency for 
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groups of three individuals to form closed triangles within a network (Lusher et al. 2013). 
Undirected networks can contain four possible types of relations among three nodes (no tie, one 
tie, two ties, and three ties); however, triangular ties tend to be structurally balanced, which 
means that if i and j share a relationships and j and k also share a relationship, then i is likely to 
form a relationship with k as well (Wasserman and Faust 1994). More often than not, these 
triangular structures are found grouped in clusters that form the basis of network communities. 
This leads to my fifth and final hypothesis.    
Hypothesis 5: Individuals are more likely to form closed triangles than open relationships 
designed for efficiency. 
 
In sum, the resilience of militant organizations is driven by much more complicated 
mechanisms than embeddedness or cohesion alone. In reality, the formation of resilient networks 
on which organizational longevity is built emerge from both embeddedness and cohesion. 
Together, these two mechanisms give organizations the ability to balance between efficiency and 
security (Ouellet at al. 2018).  
5.4. Method 
Standard statistical approaches, such as logistic regression, are not well-matched for 
analyzing social networks due to the interdependence of ties within the network. Linear 
regression models operate under the assumption that observations are independent and 
identically distributed (i.i.d.). The i.i.d. assumption suggests that an observation can be replaced 
with any randomly selected sample and that such an exchange of rows of data does not affect the 
inferences that can be drawn from the data. Put differently, standard regression models assume 
that observations are completely independent from one another (Cranmer, Desmarais, and 
Menninga 2012). The complex relational nature of network data, however, clearly violates this 
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assumption due to the interdependence of observations and autocorrelation of the error terms 
(Cranmer, Heinrich, and Desmarais 2014). 
One approach to deal with these interdependencies between observations is the use of 
exponential random graph models (ERGMs). ERGMs can be used to predict the likelihood of tie 
formation and are useful for identifying the processes through which network formation happens 
(Cranmer, Desmarais, and Menninga 2012). Rather than focusing on individual level outcomes, 
an ERGM uses the network itself as the dependent variable to explain the pattern of ties found in 
an empirical network (Lusher et al. 2013). Moreover, an ERGM assumes that network ties are 
the outcome of a combination of exogenous factors, including actor attributes, and endogenous, 
self-organizing principles related to network topology (Lusher et al. 2013). Thus, ERGMs offer a 
way to model both exogenous and endogenous mechanisms of network formation in a single 
approach.  
In this paper, I use an extension of a standard ERGM to analyze the longitudinal 
networks within a revolutionary organization. The temporal exponential random graph model 
(TERGM) is designed to include inter-temporal dependencies in longitudinal networks. As such, 
a TERGM “conditions the realization of the network in each year on previous realizations of the 
network” (Leifeld, Cranmer, and Desmarais 2018). I estimate the TERGM using bootstrap 
pseudolikelihood (MPLE) (Desmarais and Cranmer 2012). In contrast to an ERGM, which uses 
a computationally expensive Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach, a TERGM using 
bootstrap pseudolikelihood offers a less intensive method for estimating maximum likelihood 
distributions with large networks as well as longitudinal networks (Leifeld et al. 2018). 
Additionally, unlike other network models, a TERGM using bootstrapped pseudolikelihood 
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estimation can correct the downward bias in uncertainty measures associated with this method in 
single network ERGMs (Desmarais and Cranmer 2012; Leifeld et al. 2018).5  
5.5. Data and measurement 
In order to test the hypotheses described above, I turn to the case of the Communist Party 
of Kampuchea (CPK), also known as the Khmer Rouge, which began as a clandestine effort to 
establish communist rule in Cambodia and eventually seized power to establish a violent 
revolutionary regime from 1975-1979. As a revolutionary organization engaged in the process of 
state formation, the Khmer Rouge was structured along the lines of a Leninist revolutionary 
party, known as the Angkar, which means “the Organization” (Chandler 1999; Chandler 2008). 
Directed by a Central Committee led by Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge reorganized the country into 
six administrative zones, North, Northeast, Northwest, East, Southwest, and West. Additional 
administrative units included the Center as well as the Kratie, Siem-Riep/Uddor Meanchey, and 
Preah Vihear autonomous sectors (Jackson 1989; Short 2004; Documentation Center of 
Cambodia 2007; Mertha 2014).  Each of these administrative zones was controlled by a powerful 
zone secretary who, in turn, often installed their own patron-client networks, known as khsae or 
“strings” (Chandler 1999; Hinton 2005).  
For example, the Southwest Zone was controlled by Zone Secretary Mok, also known as 
Chhit Chhoeun. Mok, sometimes referred to as Ta Mok or Grandfather Mok, had violent 
reputation that earned him the nickname “the Butcher” while serving as one of the top military 
commanders of the Khmer Rouge forces and a member of the powerful Standing Committee of 
the Central Committee. A veteran of the fight against French colonialism and the republic, Mok 
                                                        
5 This is accomplished using the btergm function, which is part of the xergm package in R 
(Leifeld et al. 2018). 
 
 120 
was also well known for building patronage networks within the formal structures of the CPK. 
As Southwest Zone Secretary, he installed family members, including children, siblings, and in-
laws, in strategic positions within the military, administrative, and political structures of the 
CPK. The practice of establishing and maintaining patron-client networks gave zone secretaries a 
degree of autonomy from the Party Center, especially during the period of civil war leading up to 
the fall of Phnom Penh and into the early months of the new regime (Kiernan 2002; Hinton 
2005). This meant that zone secretaries often operated through extensive patron-client networks 
(Hinton 2005). 
These networks provided support and protection for members of the Khmer Rouge; 
however, the Party Center, led by Pol Pot, viewed these rival political networks as an existential 
threat to the regime and sought to destroy them in a series of violent purges. CPK internal 
security forces, known as the Santebal, operated under the assumption that suspects were part of 
larger networks, or “strings of traitors,” actively seeking to undermine the Party (Hinton 2005). 
In response, the Party Center demanded that the Santebal identify all members of a suspect’s 
“string” and eliminate them as well. The personal relations of a suspect immediately came under 
suspicion and were also targeted for arrest and execution. This included spouses, children, 
extended family, friends, coworkers, and other associates. These efforts to root out “strings of 
traitors” drove widespread purges that tore through the CPK cadres during the party’s 48 months 
in power (Hinton 2005). 
The Southwest Zone, however, represents a particularly interesting case from which to 
examine the resilience of the Khmer Rouge. Under Mok’s administration the Southwest Zone 
gained recognition from the Party Center for its accomplishments in advancing the goals of the 
revolution (Kiernan 2002; Ea 2004). Moreover, in the face of challenges associated with regime 
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consolidation, the Party Center relied on Mok’s loyalty to Pol Pot to use Southwest Zone cadres 
as its main weapon against potential rivals from other zones (Kiernan 2002; Ea 2004; Hinton 
2005). Thus, the Southwest Zone represents a significant part of the Khmer Rouge that deserves 
further investigation. 
This paper relies on evidence from the digital archives of the Documentation Center of 
Cambodia (DCCAM), which contain detailed biographical information on Khmer Rouge 
officials to reconstruct the social networks of Southwest Zone personnel. Data were collected 
from the DCCAM Biographical Database, which contains the digitized and translated 
biographical records of more than 30,000 Khmer Rouge members down to the district level. The 
archives record a variety of ties, including kinship, recruitment, work, and general associations 
for each individual, which are suitable for reconstructing the social networks that existed within 
the organization as a single contact network based on direct personal ties.  
An initial search of the Biographic Database located 1,188 individuals associated with the 
Southwest Zone through the category “DK Geographical Area 75-79” and search terms 
“Southwest” and “SW.” The search results were used to collect information only on individuals 
who held an official position in the Khmer Rouge, which fell into four broad categories: military, 
administrative, labor, or political personnel. For each individual, a selection of attributes and 
relationships were also collected, including name, aliases, gender, date of birth, birthplace, 
ethnicity, previous occupation, date of joining the revolution, number of years in the 
organization, pre-Democratic Kampuchea role, role during the Democratic Kampuchea era, 
geographic zone, region, district, village, kinship relationships, recruitment relationships, 
superiors, subordinates, and other known associates. Lastly, arrest, arrest dates, execution, and 
execution dates were also noted. This information was coded and placed into two data structures, 
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one containing attributes of individuals and the other listing all of the dyadic relationships within 
the Southwest Zone administration. Using the biographical data collected from the DCCAM 
database, I then reconstructed the social networks of members of the Khmer Rouge in the 
Southwest Zone as an undirected, temporal network for each month between March 1975-
February 1979, producing a longitudinal network that covers a 48-month period. In order to 
maximize the data available, this study restricts its scope to the social networks within the Khmer 
Rouge as a militant revolutionary organization, limiting the analysis to the 1,188 individuals who 
held an official position and their face-to-face relationships with one another inside the 
organizational structure of the Southwest Zone.  
5.5.1. The social network of Southwest Zone personnel 
The dependent variable of interest in this study is the network itself in order to uncover 
the properties that give rise to organizational resilience over time. The network of Khmer Rouge 
officials described below represents a contact network, consisting of face-to-face relationships 
among personnel within the organization. It does not include individuals connected to regime 
officials who were not actually part of the Khmer Rouge, but instead, focuses on the internal 
connections among those who were part of the Southwest Zone administration.  
The social network of Khmer Rouge personnel in the Southwest Zone contains 1,807 
connections among 1,188 officials. The population of 1,188 Khmer Rouge officials in the 
Southwest Zone provides a picture of an organization consisting of mostly male members with 
men comprising 70% of the personnel and women the other 30%. The average Khmer Rouge 
member was relatively young 26 years old, but age ranges between the youngest at 6 and the 
oldest at 60 years old. The Khmer Rouge officials in the Southwest Zone also represent a largely 
homogenous ethnic group with 96% identifying as Khmer. A solid majority of these officials 
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(63%) joined the Khmer Rouge prior to victory in the civil war in April 1975 and came from an 
agricultural background as peasant farmers. Most officials served in administrative roles 
followed by military, labor, and political positions respectively. During the period of Khmer 
Rouge rule, officials in the Southwest Zone were scattered throughout 567 different village 
locations.  
On first glance, the network reveals also several visually distinct features. First, there are 
a considerable number of isolates. In fact, there are 571 individuals who possess no ties to other 
organizational members. Second, the remaining 617 officials are clustered in 26 identifiable 
components of which the largest contains 525 individuals. This large connected component 
consists of 525 individuals and 1,217 ties, meaning that connections within the network are 
concentrated in this component with 44% of the personnel and 67% of all ties in the Southwest 
Zone. Additionally, there are 22 distinct social groups nested within the largest connected 
component, reflecting a tendency for individuals to form smaller clusters joined together by 
brokerage positions. There is, however, a clear core-periphery structure in which the majority of 
ties are densely clustered in a few groups around the center. The largest connected component as 

















Figure 5.1. Largest Connected Component within the Southwest Zone Network, April 1975 
 
 
Between 1975-1979, the Khmer Rouge sought to rid itself of internal enemies through a 
series of intra-party purges that led to the arrest and execution of 63% of Southwest Zone 
personnel. As a result, the network of Khmer Rouge officials in the Southwest Zone shrank from 
525 to 334 between 1975 and 1979. In the same period, however, no new relationships were 
formed among officials. This loss represents a significant shock to the organization, yet despite 
this self-inflicted wound, the Southwest Zone continued to operate. Changes to the network over 




Figure 5.2. Southwest Zone Networks, 1976-1979 
 
 
a. 1976                                                                  b. 1977 
 
c. 1978                                                                 d. 1979 
 
Annual measures of network robustness, including diameter, average path length, and 
connectivity can be seen in Table 1. Between 1975-1979, network diameter remained relatively 
consistent, changing from 10 to 8. This means that the longest path between any given pair of 
nodes shortened by a distance of two individuals. Average path length decreased each year, 
falling from 4.26 in 1975 to 3.64 in 1979. This suggests that as members were forcibly removed 
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the network closed ranks, decreasing the distance between individual personnel and making it 
easier to reach other members within the network.  
Table 5.1. Robustness measures for Southwest Zone networks, 1975-1979. 
 
 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Diameter 10 12 11 10 8 
Average Path Length 4.26 4.18 4.05 3.93 3.64 
Connectivity 1 0 0 0 0 
Critical threshold 0.725 0.712 0.704 0.701 0.703 
 
Vertex connectivity moves from 1 to zero, meaning that although the largest connected 
component continues to exist, small pieces of the network are easily removed. Using the Molloy-
Reed Criterion, the critical threshold remains above 70% throughout the forty-eight months 
Khmer Rouge rule (Barabasi 2016). In contrast, the percent of members removed from the 
network is below 50%. This indicates that the losses fail to reach the critical threshold required 
to cause the core of the network to break down, implying the presence of a robust network 
(Barabasi 2016). Together, these measures demonstrate that the Southwest Zone displayed a 
remarkable amount of resilience during the period of Khmer Rouge rule despite suffering 
significant losses due to internal party purges.  
5.5.2. Model specification 
Given its ability to withstand a considerable shock, further examination of organizational 
resilience based on network topology of the Khmer Rouge in the Southwest Zone requires 
understanding the underlying mechanisms that drive network formation. In a TERGM, actor 
covariate effects can used to control for actor activity. Actor activity effects, or main effects, 
indicate whether an individual with a particular attribute is more or less likely to be socially 
active in forming ties to others within the network. In the model used in this paper, a total of 
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three actor activity effects (gender, age, and length of time in the organization) are used as 
control variables. The actor covariate effects for activity included in the model are gender 
(0=Female, 1=Male), age (in years) and whether or not a person joined before the 1975 takeover 
(0=No, 1=Yes) as a measure of the social activity of individuals through the number of times an 
actor with a particular attribute appears in an edge (Handcock, Hunter, and Morris 2008).  
5.5.2.1. Embeddedness 
Embeddedness, which is characterized by brokerage positions within the network, can be 
operationalized using an alternating k-2-path across dyads, also known as dyadwise shared 
partner distribution (Lusher et al. 2013). This term enables a test of “whether k shared partners 
encourage the presence of a tie between two nodes” (Lusher et al. 2013, 70). In other words, this 
term is intended to capture the likelihood of the emergence of brokerage positions within the 
network. To capture this effect, the geometrically weighted dyadwise shared partner distribution 
(GWDSP) is used to help avoid issues of model degeneracy (Lusher et al. 2013).  
5.5.2.2. Cohesion  
Homophily effects account for the tendency for individuals who share attributes to form 
ties with one another. A total of five homophily terms (gender, ethnicity, geographic co-location, 
role in the Khmer Rouge, and social group) are included in the model. Gender (0=Female, 
1=Male), and Khmer ethnicity (0=No, 1=Yes) are operationalized using categorical variables. 
Formal role within the Khmer Rouge regime is accounted for using dummy variables for 
military, administrative, labor, and political roles (0=No, 1=Yes), respectively.  
To account for the tendency of individuals to cluster in patron-client relations within the 
largest connected component, a community detection algorithm is used to identify the presence 
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of distinct social groups.6 These communities represent interconnected social groups within the 
largest connected component. Using this procedure, each individual was assigned membership in 
one of 22 social groups, which is then operationalized as a homophily term to test the likelihood 
of tie formation based on within-group membership.  Positive coefficients indicate likelihood of 
tie formation.  
Additionally, cohesion can also be measured using terms specifically designed to account 
for the dependencies among ties in the network. These structural effects include terms for edges, 
degree centrality, and transitivity. The edge term indicates the propensity for ties to form within 
the network and reflects the overall density (in log-odds) of the network. A negative term 
signifies a sparse network (Morris et al. 2008). The best option to address the endogenous 
dependencies related to degree centrality, or the number of ties an individual has within the 
network, is to use the kstar(2) term, which provides a count of the number of times a structure 
consisting of two ties occurs in the network. Moreover, the number of connections a person has 
within the network follows an exponentially decaying distribution, where a few members have a 
large number of ties. The use of terms like kstar to account for such structures, however, often 
leads to model degeneracy in larger networks (Lusher et al. 2013). Fortunately, the kstar and 
alternating kstar statistics can be represented using an endogenous dependency term known as 
geometrically weighted degree distribution (GWD) (Hunter 2007). I therefore operationalize 
degree centrality using GWD to model the degree distribution and obtain a better model fit 
(Lusher et al. 2013).  
                                                        
6 Community detection was accomplished using a fastgreedy algorithm, which implements an 
iterative search to partition the network in a way that optimizes modularity. This process 
identified 22 distinct social groups. 
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To capture transitivity, or triadic closure, within the network, a geometrically weighted 
edgewise shared partners (GWESP) term is used. GWESP is used instead of a triangle term 
because like degree, the edgewise shared partner distribution decays exponentially, which tends 
to lead to model degeneracy when using a standard triangle term (Hunter 2007; Lusher et al. 
2013; Leifeld 2018). Lastly, I include a memory term to account for intertemporal dependencies 
among ties (Leifeld et al. 2018). I operationalize the memory term using a positive 
autoregression term, which simply captures the stability of ties over time and tests the extent to 
which previous ties continue to exist in the following iteration of the network (Leifeld et al. 
2018).  Coefficients can be interpreted as the persistence of ties from one time period to the next 
(Leifeld et al. 2018). 
5.6. Results 
The results of the TERGM are presented in Table 2. The variable names for control 
variables, embeddedness, and cohesion are listed in the first column. The second column 
contains the coefficients for the model followed by 95% confidence intervals. The model 
indicates that both embeddedness and cohesion drive the formation of resilient networks within 
the organization. The edges term produces a negative coefficient, highlighting the sparse nature 
of the network. 
5.6.1. Embeddedness 
As anticipated, the results of the model reveal a positive and significant effect of 
brokerage on the emergence of a robust network within the Khmer Rouge. This suggests that 
network resilience is, in part, based on the development of brokerage positions, which increase 
network efficiency by connecting different parts of the network (Granovetter 1973). Moreover, 
these kinds of brokerage positions present several advantages to revolutionary organizations. For 
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instance, the presence of brokerage positions gives organizations the ability to access 
information and resources. Brokerage also helps sustain global cohesiveness throughout the 
network, providing a level of connectedness that would otherwise be unlikely (Granovetter 
1973). Thus, brokers facilitate a decentralized structure that avoids vulnerability and creates 
flexibility for revolutionary organizations (Parkinson 2013).  
Table 5.2. Summary of Temporal Exponential Random Graph Model Results.  
 
 Model 1  
Edges -5.5692 [-5.7788; -5.3822]*  
Gender -0.0016 [-0.0204; 0.0173]  
Age -0.0014 [-0.0025; -0.0003]*  
Joined before 1975 -0.0143 [-0.0324; 0.0042]  
   
Embeddedness   
Brokerage 0.0613 [0.0593; 0.0633]*  
   
Cohesion   
Same Gender -0.0013 [-0.0238; 0.0232]  
Both Khmer -0.0358 [-0.0856; 0.0201]  
Same Village 0.0103 [-0.0343; 0.0541]  
Military -0.0028 [-0.0236; 0.0198]  
Administrative 0.0156 [-0.0019; 0.0343]  
Labor 0.0002 [-0.0233; 0.0270]  
Political 0.0075 [-0.0240; 0.0393]  
Same Social Group -0.0432 [-0.1495; 0.0269]  
Degree -0.3165 [-0.4180; -0.2170]*  
Closure 0.5240 [0.5101; 0.5366]*  
Memory Term 3.8096 [2.9394; 4.5281]*  
Num. obs. 2833591  
* 0 outside the confidence interval 
 
5.6.2. Cohesion 
Interestingly, cohesion appears to be driven by decentralized clustering and network 
closure rather than homophily. None of the effects for homophily return as statistically 
significant when considered across the forty-eight months of Khmer Rouge rule. The results, 
therefore, fail to offer support for hypotheses 2 and 3. Individuals are unlikely to form ties with 
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one another due to shared attributes, whether physical characteristics or similar roles in the 
organization. This means that while homophily might be influential in the formation of the initial 
network, it does not appear instrumental to sustaining relationships over time within the Khmer 
Rouge.  
As expected, degree centrality is negative and statistically significant. Offering support 
for hypothesis 4, the results indicate that there is a tendency toward decentralization within the 
network over time. Although individuals form clusters, these clusters remain scattered 
throughout the largest connected component joined together by brokerage positions. This 
configuration offers at least two potential benefits for a revolutionary organization like the 
Khmer Rouge. First, a decentralized structure gives members of the organization a relative 
degree of security through the limited connectivity that is created by this overall structure. A 
decentralized structure compliments the presence of brokerage roles (Ouellet et al. 2018). 
Second, the findings for degree centrality lend support to the argument that even within the 
Southwest Zone, patron-client relations continued to persist despite efforts on the part of the 
Party Center to eliminate such forms of relationships (Hinton 2005). The presence of numerous 
small to medium sized clusters created by this process reflects the widespread nature of patron-
client relations in which individuals sought protection and access to resources in exchange for 
loyalty (Scott 1972; Hinton 2005; Hicken 2011).  
Triadic closure, also referred to as transitivity, is similarly positive and significant, which 
supports hypothesis 5. Triadic closure indicates that cohesion is driven by a tendency to form 
strong within-group relationships among members of the Southwest Zone. Strong ties offer 
better security as a result of the trust that becomes possible through regular interaction with 
individuals whose behavior and reputations are known, reducing transaction, opportunity, and 
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reputation costs associated with forming and maintaining such relationships within the 
organization (Granovetter 1985; DellaPosta 2016). In return, individuals who build relationships 
with insiders can anticipate a higher return on their investment of time and energy due to these 
lower social costs (DellaPosta 2016). Network closure also supports the argument that the 
internal dynamics of the Khmer Rouge were characterized by patron-client networks in which 
loyalty was expected and demanded from members (DellaPosta 2016). 
Lastly, the memory term is also positive and significant, which indicates that previous 
network ties have an effect on existing ties at each time step. This suggests that ties indeed 
remain relatively stable across time despite the chaotic nature of life under the Khmer Rouge. 
Overall, the results for mechanisms of embeddedness and cohesion provide evidence in support 
of hypotheses 1, 4, and 5, which focus on endogenous self-organizing processes as network 
effects. The model fails to confirm hypotheses 2 and 3, which predict an effect for homophily.  
5.7. Discussion 
This paper examines the mechanisms of network formation across time in order to better 
understand the sources of organizational resilience. The social networks within the Southwest 
Zone of the Khmer Rouge show an ability to withstand the shock of internal purges, maintaining 
a distinct, large connected component throughout the organization’s forty-eight months in power. 
Despite losing nearly half of its members, the largest connected component persists because 
losses do not approach the critical threshold at which the network would collapse.  
The results of the temporal exponential random graph model indicate that social networks 
within the Southwest Zone of the Khmer Rouge are the product of mechanisms related to 
embeddedness and cohesion. In line with theoretical expectations, I find that organizational 
resilience is built on network structures that emerge from the development of brokerage, degree 
 
 133 
centrality, and closure. Interestingly, while homophily might be important for the initial 
formation of networks, it does not appear to play a role in sustaining relationships within the 
Khmer Rouge over time.   
Embeddedness, which can be seen in the tendency for brokerage to play a role in network 
formation, allows revolutionary organizations to develop a great deal of connectivity at low cost 
to the network itself. Brokerage positions join disconnected parts of the network increasing the 
reach of leaders like Zone Secretary Mok. This phenomenon has important consequences for 
militant organizations engaged in conflict and state formation. Brokers can enable more effective 
communication and improve coordination of collective action between different parts of the 
network (Granovetter 1973; Parkinson 2013). Moreover, these open lines of communication can 
also facilitate flexibility and adaptation needed to remain resilient in the face of both internal and 
external shocks (Parkinson 2013). 
The results also demonstrate that cohesion, which is driven by degree centrality and 
triadic closure, pushes revolutionary organizations to favor security over efficiency. Security 
concerns mean that clusters are distributed throughout the network and characterized by strong 
within-group ties that foster trust and loyalty (DellaPosta 2016). The security that results from 
closure also brings costs to organizational performance. Network closure limits the flow of 
information and inhibits coordination between different parts of the network by encouraging 
interactions to take place within small, well-defined clusters (della Porta 2013; DellaPosta 2016).  
Even during chaotic periods of internal conflict and regime change, networks can provide 
stable social structures on which to build party and state. Brokerage, decentralized clusters, and 
triadic closure can enable revolutionary organizations to maintain a viable core of members 
despite operating under conditions of extreme hardship. The findings of this paper suggest that 
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the ability to balance efficiency and security as complementary mechanisms of network 
formation is the key to creating organizational resilience (Bakker et al. 2012; Ouellet et al. 2018).  
5.8. Conclusion 
 This paper presents new insight into the way that social networks provide a source of 
organizational resilience for militant organizations in the context of internal conflict and state 
formation. The results of a temporal exponential random graph model indicate that network 
formation is the product of self-organizing, endogenous processes that attempt to find a balance 
between embeddedness and cohesion. The findings support the argument that resilient 
organizations are built on social networks that display a tendency to create structures that enable 
a degree of both security and efficiency at the same time.  
Networks form the backbone of revolutionary organizations. The social structures 
examined in this paper appear to have facilitated the ability of the Khmer Rouge to withstand 
severe losses without losing its capability to continue to operate as a governing institution. 
Through a combination of both embeddedness and cohesion, the social networks within the 
Khmer Rouge held the organization together during its forty-eight months in power even as its 
own security forces forcefully removed nearly half its members.  
The results of this paper also highlight the need for continued research on how social 
networks influence organizational behavior. First, how do the findings hold up in comparison 
with other bad actor organizations? We should test the validity of the findings presented here 
across a more diverse range of organizations, including other militant organizations, terrorist 
groups, gangs, mafia, and drug trafficking networks to pinpoint the exact effect that networks 
have on organizational resilience. Second, how might different network configurations, such as 
either very decentralized or highly centralized, influence the ability to balance efficiency and 
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security in a way that enables organizational resilience? Third, how does network formation 
differ across different types of ties, such as kinship, recruitment, and friendship? Answering 
these questions would add to our understanding of the internal dynamics of militant 




Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
6.1. Introduction 
This dissertation began by asking the question, how do social networks influence the 
development and trajectory of militant organizations and revolutionary parties engaged in the 
process of establishing political order through violence? What leads to the emergence of 
informal institutions? Why are some individuals purged while others survive during times of 
revolution? Why are some organizations resilient while others are not?  
In answer to these questions, I have presented four articles connected by the theme of 
networks within revolutionary organizations. In the four articles, I have argued that social 
networks matter a great deal to the development and trajectory of militant organizations as they 
transition into governing roles. Sometimes, as seen in the example of the Khmer Rouge 
presented in this dissertation, the configuration underlying social networks works against the 
objectives of formal institutional structures in an attempt to balance security and efficiency.  
Moreover, while explanations that point to individual attributes such as gender, ethnicity, 
occupational background, official positions, or length of time in an organization to understand 
the behavior and performance of militant organizations and revolutionary parties offer insight, 
they fail to consider the interdependent nature of the revolutionary experience. Given the fact 
that individuals do not exist in isolation but are embedded in a broader social context, the 
topology of social networks becomes key to understanding how the complex web of 
interpersonal relationships shapes identities, interests, and collective action. As a result, I have 
argued that networks are the result of mechanisms of attraction based on shared attributes, also 
referred to as homophily, and self-organization that relate to the network topology itself. These 
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mechanisms influence the formation of networks on which informal institutions are built, 
violence spreads, and organizational resilience emerges. 
6.2. Summary of the Main Findings 
Chapter 2 presented a detailed description of the social networks present in the Southwest 
Zone. The results revealed a map of the topological features of the network that enabled an 
analysis of the social structures that existed beneath the formal institutional structures of the 
Khmer Rouge. The social networks on which the regime was built were found to display a 
tendency for strong within-group ties that led to the formation of distinct communities 
throughout the network. Network closure suggests that members of the Khmer Rouge had a 
preference for building strong relationships with individuals through repeated interactions in an 
effort to create a sense of security. These communities, however, are not isolated, but instead, 
they are joined at strategic points by brokerage positions that connect an otherwise sparse 
network.  
Chapter 3 focused on the emergence of informal institutions, such as patron-client 
relations, using a relational approach that relied on social network analysis to explain how 
endogenous dependencies influence the formation of networks within revolutionary 
organizations. Using an exponential random graph model, I examined the entangled nature of 
exogenous and endogenous factors behind the formation of networks, which precede the 
development of informal institutions. The model results reveal that personnel in the Southwest 
Zone sought out relationships with other individuals on the basis of shared attributes such as 
shared ethnicity, geographic co-location, similar occupational background as professionals and 
peasants, and serving in similar roles as military or political personnel. At the same time, the 
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models also demonstrated that networks within the Khmer Rouge were the product of 
endogenous forces related to limited connectivity and triadic closure. 
In Chapter 4, I turned to the consequences of individual network position during violent 
political purges, such as those that tore through the ranks of the Khmer Rouge, resulting in the 
arrest and execution of nearly 63% of the personnel in the Southwest Zone. With the help of a 
network autocorrelation model, I examined the influence of network position and exposure to 
violence on an individual’s likelihood of becoming a victim of a purge. The results of the model 
indicate that in addition to individual characteristics, there is a strong correlation between the 
likelihood of becoming a purge victim and network position, defined in terms of degree, 
betweenness, and structural similarity, and exposure to violence up to a distance of two 
handshakes away from an individual. This lends credence to the claim that violence moves 
across networks in contagion-like fashion similar to a virus, spreading from person to person 
through personal contacts. 
Chapter 5 investigated the sources of organizational resilience in the Khmer Rouge with a 
longitudinal network that tracked the evolution of relationships in the Southwest Zone during the 
forty-eight months of communist rule. After conducting a series of checks, I demonstrated that 
the networks beneath the Khmer Rouge display characteristics of robustness, which means that 
they are able to withstand shocks and persist. I then used a temporal exponential random graph 
model to examine how the mechanisms of embeddedness and cohesion each contribute to the 
development of resilient networks within the organization, demonstrating the stability of ties 
over time. I find that organizational resilience is built on networks that emerge from the 
development of strong within-group ties formed through closure and clustering but connected 




6.3. Significance of the Study 
The articles submitted as part of this dissertation represent a significant advance in our 
understanding of the internal dynamics of militant organizations and revolutionary parties.  In 
providing a rare look inside the Khmer Rouge, these articles examine the social networks within 
the organization in detail. Moving beyond a longstanding recognition that networks play an 
important function for organizations engaged in insurgency, terrorism, crime, and state building, 
this study offers the first known mapping of interpersonal relationships among personnel inside a 
militant organization turned revolutionary party. Going even further, the articles in this 
dissertation extend the analysis of social networks to include tests of hypothesis related to 
network formation and contagion in order to draw causal inferences related to the emergence of 
informal institutions, the spread of violence, and organizational resilience.  
 Moreover, the findings presented in this dissertation highlight the dilemma facing 
organizations engaged in the process of state formation through violent contestation. Given the 
inherently high-risk environment, non-state violent actors must guard against internal and 
external threats, which results in social structures that often undermine the goal of establishing 
formal institutions. The example of the Khmer Rouge suggests that underlying social structures 
often remain relatively unchanged as militant organizations transition into governing roles. This 
means that social networks designed for the purpose of overthrowing the government often 
become the backbone of the new regime, which produce an unstable system characterized by 
rivalry, suspicion, and institutional weakness. 
When placed in the context of studies of state formation, conflict, and revolution, the 
findings of this dissertation appear robust and not limited to the Southwest Zone under the 
Khmer Rouge. Most particularly, the collective findings of the four articles presented here are 
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consistent with Kalyvas’s (2003) call for greater attention to the micro-foundations of conflict as 
a product of “interactions between various central and local actors with distinct, identities, 
motivations, and interests” (476). Kalyvas (2006) emphasizes the central place of interaction at 
the local level as the source of complex identities and uncertainties found in conflict and state 
building. Local cleavages, which are often defined by well-established patterns of interaction 
such as patron-client networks, give rise to a number of motivations and causes of individual and 
group behaviors, including suspicion, intrigue, and violence. 
Where the articles in this dissertation complement Kalyvas (2003; 2006) and other 
scholars is by taking a closer look at the underlying social structures beneath a militant 
organization turned revolutionary party and moving beyond description. While Kalyvas (2006), 
Fujii (2009), Parkinson (2013), Staniland (2014), Straus (2015), and Finkel (2017) address the 
importance of interpersonal networks, this study examines these webs of connections in greater 
detail using methods that provide insight into the formation and consequences of the social 
context in which individuals decided to participate in and found themselves victims of betrayal, 
torture, and mass killing in the name of creating a new political order.    
In focusing on a specific example of how social networks influence the development and 
trajectory of a militant organization turned revolutionary party, this dissertation adds a layer of 
complexity to Kalyvas’s (2006) argument that interaction is key in two ways. First, the adoption 
of a network perspective and specific tools from social network analysis creates a more nuanced 
theory of interpersonal relationships as the ontologically prior source of identities, interests, and 
instrumentality. While Kalyvas (2006) points out the importance of interaction in defining 
cleavages, this dissertation highlights the fact that instrumentality is based on interests, which are 
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shaped by identity. Identities, in turn, emerge from interactions (McLean 2011; Padgett and 
Powell 2012).  
Second, the micro-level approach taken in this dissertation adds to our understanding of 
the mechanisms that drive the formation of networks, which are the invisible backbone of 
militant organizations and revolutionary parties. The findings indicate that networks are the 
product of both attractions based on similar attributes as well as endogenous processes related to 
the topology of the network itself. These mechanisms provide the social structure on which 
informal institutions are built, violence spreads, and organizational resilience emerges. 
The insight that informal institutions, such as patron-client systems, are the product of 
interactions based on shared attributes and endogenous network processes is consistent with 
other work on informal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 2006; Tsai 2006; Tsai 2007). The 
formation and self-organization of social networks within the formal organizational structures of 
militant groups and revolutionary parties reflect the relational nature of endogenous institutional 
development that leads to the emergence of informal institutions (Tsai 2006). As the findings of 
this dissertation demonstrate, however, the social structures that characterize informal ways of 
accomplishing objectives sometimes work against the creation of robust formal institutions 
needed for effective governance and long-term regime stability. 
Moreover, the finding that the likelihood of victimization and survival is related to 
network position and exposure to violence underscores the role that social structure plays in the 
spread of political violence (Fujii 2009; Su 2011; Finkel 2017). The logic of seeking individual 
level security that is observed within the networks of clandestine organizations often translates 
into explosive outbreaks of violence marked by overkill as perpetrators seek to wipe out entire 
chains of potential threats. Understanding violence as a socially embedded phenomenon helps 
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explain how the topology of social networks both constrains and facilitates the spread of 
violence, leading to uneven patterns of distribution among survivors and victims.  
Lastly, the finding that social networks contribute to the resilience of militant 
organizations and revolutionary parties emphasizes the significance of endogenous factors in 
determining organizational performance, adding a level of detail to previous studies that focus on 
the importance of interpersonal relationships within these types of groups (Parkinson 2013; 
Staniland 2014). Organizational longevity is the result of a balance between security and 
efficiency that often leans heavily in favor of the former in militant organizations and 
revolutionary parties. In the case of the Khmer Rouge, this explanation runs counter to the 
historical consensus that the organizations maintained a tight grip on power. The networks 
examined in this dissertation challenge this view, presenting a much different picture of an 
organization that favored the protection of factions, rivalry, and competition in the interest of 
individual security at the expense of collective communication, coordination, and efficiency. As 
a result, when faced with the challenge of a foreign invasion after forty-eight months in power, 
the Khmer Rouge was unable to mount an effective resistance, instead relinquishing their rule 
and retreating to their mountain strongholds to become insurgents once again. 
6.4. Recommendations for Future Research 
 
The next step in expanding the research agenda started here involves at least two tasks. 
First, building on the findings in the four articles, the natural progression of this study is to 
collect additional biographical data on Khmer Rouge personnel in the remaining five 
administrative zones in order to create an unprecedented view of the social networks beneath the 
Khmer Rouge throughout the entire country. This research will benefit from ongoing efforts to 
update the Documentation Center of Cambodia’s archives with new information about victims, 
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survivors, and perpetrators associated with the Khmer Rouge. Such work, when finished, will 
provide a better understanding of the mechanisms of network formation and the contagion of 
violence that occur as part of the process of state formation.  
Second, the Cambodian case is not the only instance in which social networks have 
mattered for militant organizations and revolutionary parties. The topic of political purges has 
potential for cross-national comparison between Cambodia and other instances of state formation 
characterized by violence. Possible candidates for additional cases include party elites, such as 
members of the Central Committees of China, the USSR, and other Eastern Bloc countries 
during the Cold War. Using the approach demonstrated in this dissertation, additional cases can 
rely on publicly available, digitized archival records containing the biographical information of 
party elites.  
Other possible studies involving a natural extension of the cross-national comparison of 
revolutionary organizations is the study of how social networks influence the development and 
trajectory of authoritarian political parties, organized crime, and terrorist organizations as well as 
how militant organizations forge political order through conflict and become ruling parties. Of 
particular interest, overlapping roles in multiple networks and brokerage positions could provide 
new insights into the fragility and resilience of different kinds of ‘bad actor’ organizations.  
Finally, the study social networks in the context of conflict and state formation has the 
potential to expand into the study of institutional design, the emergence of new forms of political 
organization, and policy variation. Along these lines, a possible path forward is to examine the 
overlap of political, military, bureaucratic, and economic networks in different countries and 
how these networks have influenced institutional development as part of the process of state 
formation. Do different network configurations produce different types of formal institutions? 
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How do networks shape policy preferences of elites? Do networks play a role in the emergence 
of new forms of political organization? What role do patron-client networks play in the modern 
state? These questions offer several lines of valuable research, and much of this initial research 
can be accomplished by leveraging publicly available information to map the networks of elites 
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Goodness of Fit for ERGM 
 
The goodness of fit for Model 3 is shown in Figure A.1 below. Model 3 provides the best 
fitting model when accounting for both homophily and structural effects. The boxplots represent 
distributions of network statistics for degree, minimum geodesic distances, edgewise shared 
partners, and dyad shared partners simulated from the specified model as part of the MCMC 
maximum likelihood estimation. The solid line shows the same statistics for the observed 
network (Leifeld 2018).  
Figure A.1. Goodness of Fit for ERGM Model 3 
 
As can be seen from visual inspection, Model 3 fits reasonably well with the observed 
network. Overall, the model does a good job of creating networks that resemble the degree 
distribution, geodesic distances, edge-wise shared partners, and dyad-wise shared partners of the 
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observed network. When examining goodness of fit, it is also important to remember that 
individual plots represent different aspects of fit for a model and must be considered as a whole 




Diagnostics for the Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulations are shown below. A good 
fitting model will appear as a relatively stable line on the left and be normally distributed around 
zero on the right. The model appears to fit relatively well with the observed data. 
 























Significant Results of Network Autocorrelation Models  
 
Table B.1. Significant Results of Network Autocorrelation Models 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
(Intercept) -4.3341 (1.2673)*** -4.6127 (1.2892)*** -4.8031 (1.3857)***  
  Gender 2.4105 (0.3485)*** 2.3541 (0.3553)*** 2.4231 (0.3943)***  
  Age 0.0570 (0.0170)*** 0.0593 (0.0177)*** 0.0588 (0.0186)**  
Official Role     
  Military 1.4041 (0.3472)*** 1.1923 (0.3556)*** 1.0096 (0.3834)**  
  Administrative 0.9842 (0.3889)* 0.7408 (0.4003) 0.8756 (0.4278)*  
  Labor 2.8695 (0.6609)*** 2.8703 (0.7041)*** 3.0807 (0.7747)***  
Network Position     
  Degree  -0.3532 (0.1477)* -0.4088 (0.1664)*  
  Betweenness  0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0002 (0.0001)*  
  Structural Similarity  -0.1221 (0.0619)* -0.1575 (0.0698)*  
Network Exposure     
  Direct Exposure   0.9636 (0.4052)*  
  Indirect Exposure (Path dist. of 2) 5.5209 (1.5541)***  
AIC 484.9022 472.6571 425.0603  
BIC 544.5897 545.1349 514.5916  
Log Likelihood -228.4511 -219.3286 -191.5301  
Deviance 456.9022 438.6571 383.0603  
Num. obs. 525 525 525  





















Figure B.1. Results of Network Autocorrelation Models 
 
 
The Impact of Network Position 
 
Although the log-likelihoods produced by the models are useful as indicators of 
significance and positive or negative effects, odds ratios offer an alternative metric of the impact 
of network position and exposure on the risk of becoming a purge victim. Table A.2 shows the 
odds ratios (OR) and 95% confidence intervals (CI) for Model 3 of the network autocorrelation 
models, which includes a test of the network variables using the largest connected component.   
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Table B.2. Odds Ratio Estimates with 95% Confidence Intervals. 
 
 OR 2.50% (CI) 97.50% (CI) 
Gender 11.281 5.393 25.537 
Age 1.061 1.023 1.101 
Khmer 2.041 0.372 11.915 
Previous Military 1.871 0.216 21.693 
Professional 0.518 0.077 3.715 
Service 2.281 0.190 34.893 
Agriculture 0.401 0.087 2.033 
Skilled Worker 0.695 0.060 9.663 
Unskilled Worker 0.421 0.053 3.448 
Joined Before 1975 1.188 0.595 2.422 
Military 2.745 1.312 5.932 
Administrative 2.400 1.050 5.646 
Labor 21.773 5.195 111.676 
Degree 0.664 0.471 0.898 
Betweenness 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Structural Similarity 0.854 0.740 0.969 
Direct Exposure 2.621 1.188 5.844 
Indirect Exposure (Path Dist. Of 2) 249.852 12.645 5720.604 
Indirect Exposure (Path Dist. Of 3) 0.003 0.000 5.476 
Indirect Exposure (Path Dist. Of 4) 0.000 0.000 10.281 
N = 525    
 
For every connection a person adds within the organization, the odds of getting purged 
are reduced by 33.6% (OR=0.664, CI, 0.471 to 0.898). On the other hand, the odds ratios for 
direct and indirect exposure reveal a much different story. Having direct contacts that become 
victims puts an individual at risk of being purged, increasing the odds of being arrested and 
executed by 162% (OR=2.62, CI, 1.19 to 5.84). Additionally, friends of friends who are purged 
create additional risk for an individual, increasing the likelihood of becoming a victim. For each 
additional indirect connection at a distance of 2 that is victimized, the odds of becoming a victim 
increase dramatically by 24,910% (OR=249.852, CI, 12.645 to 5720.604). Beyond this distance, 
the risk of being purged declines by 99.7% (OR=0.003, CI, 0 to 5.48).  
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Additionally, I also compared the results of the network autocorrelation model to a 
logistic regression model similar to those commonly used in Papachristos, Braga, and Hureau 
(2012) and Papachristos and Wildeman (2014), who find a similar effect in the contagion of gang 
violence. Although a generalized linear model fails properly to account for the complex 
interdependence present in relational data, it can help indicate whether or not the results of the 
network correlation models are on the right track. Even with biased estimates, the logistic 
regression produces similar results as the network autocorrelation model, suggesting that the 
network models used in this study can be viewed with a degree of confidence. Like the network 
autocorrelation model, the logistic regression points to the significance of direct and indirect 
exposure as a key factor in determining the likelihood of purge victimization or survival. The 








































Goodness of Fit for TERGM 
 
The goodness of fit for Model 3 is shown in Figure C.1 below. Model 3 provides the best 
fitting model when accounting for both homophily and structural effects. The boxplots represent 
distributions of network statistics for degree, minimum geodesic distances, edgewise shared 
partners, and dyad shared partners simulated from the specified model as part of the MCMC 
maximum likelihood estimation. The solid line shows the same statistics for the observed 
network (Leifeld 2018).  
 






As can be seen from visual inspection, the model fits reasonably well with the observed 
network. Overall, the model does a good job of creating networks that resemble the degree 
distribution, geodesic distances, edge-wise shared partners, and dyad-wise shared partners of the 
observed network. When examining goodness of fit, it is also important to remember that 
individual plots represent different aspects of fit for a model and must be considered as a whole 
to assess how well the model captures the network formation process (Leifeld 2018). 
 
